The competitiveness of European industry — 1999 Report. Commission staff working paper accompanying the communication on structural change and adjustment in European manufacturing. SEC (99) 1555 final, 30 September 1999 by unknown
The competitiveness of European industry 
1999 Report 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION The competitiveness of 
European industry 
7999 Report 
Working document of the services of the 
European Commission 
Preceded by the Commission Communication 
of 6 October 1999 on structural change and 
adjustment in European manufacturing 
COM( 1999) 465 
This report has been prepared by the Enterprise Directorate-General of the European 
Commission, with the assistance of a scientific committee, composed of Pierre Buigues, Steve 
Davies, Pierre Defraigne, Ioannis Ganoulis, Paul Geroski, André Sapir and Leo Sleuwaegen. 
Parts of the report draw on background papers prepared for the European Commission by NEI 
(Nederlands Economisch Instituut) and WIFO (Österreichisches Institut für 
Wirtschaftsforschung). A great deal of additional information on the European Union is available on the Internet. 
It can be accessed through the Europa server (http://europa.eu.int). 
Cataloguing data can be found at the end of this publication. 
Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1999. 
ISBN 92-828-7647-0 
© European Communities, 1999 
Reproduction is authorised provided the source is acknowledged. 
Printed in Belgium 
PRINTED ON WHITE CHLORINE-FREE PAPER Table of Contents 
List of abbreviations 
Introduction 1 
PART ONE 
ADAPTABILITY AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING 
Chapter 1 - Statistical overview by Member State and industrial sector, 1988-1998 
1. The aggregate picture 7 
2. Comparisons across the Member States 8 
3. Growth of industrial sectors 9 
4. Variability of growth rates between sectors and Member States 10 
5. The theory 10 
6. Previous empirical studies 11 
7. Defining and measuring specialisation and concentration 12 
Chapter 2 - Specialisation of European manufacturing 
1. A weak overall tendency to an increasing production specialisation 15 
2. A weak overall tendency for export specialisation to decrease 16 
3. Individual countries in more detail 16 
4. Summary 19 
Chapter 3 - Geographic concentration of industries 
1. An overall tendency towards de-concentration 21 
2. Convergence across industry types 23 
3. The core-periphery pattern 25 
4. Income, country size and the North-South pattern 26 
5. Influence of other detenninants 27 
6. Summary 28 
Chapter 4 - The impact of structural change on competitiveness 
1. Recalling the advantages and disadvantages of specialisation and concentration 31 
2. Speed of change and growth, compared across Member States 32 
3. Is the speed of change increasing? 33 
4. Summary 33 
Chapter 5 - Main findings and policy implications 
1. Background and results 35 
2. Policy implications 37 
References for Part One 37 
III PART TWO 
PRIME FORCES OF STRUCTURAL CHANGE 
Chapter 1 - Physical investment in Europe 
1. Investment trends in the economy and in manufacturing 41 
2. Investment in manufacturing: specialisation and concentration 45 
3. Investment determinants: some empirical results 49 
4. Conclusions 52 
References 52 
Chapter 2 - Intangible investment and structural patterns of European manufacturing industry 
1. Performance by industry types 56 
2. Intangibles, skills and industry specialisation in the Member States 60 
3. Policy conclusions 62 
References 64 
Chapter 3 - Competitiveness, restructuring and firm location flexibility 
1. Industry dynamics and the location of economic activities 67 
2. Spatial networks of multinational enterprises 68 
3. Relocation in two types of networks 70 
4. Operating flexibility 71 
5. Further locational implications 73 
6. Conclusions 74 
References 75 
PART THREE 
THE SENSITIVITY OF EUROPEAN INDUSTRY TO EXTERNAL SHOCKS 
Chapter 1 - The impact of the financial and economic crisis in Southeast Asia on European industries 
1. Background to the crisis in Emerging Markets 83 
2. Impacts of the crisis on global trade and growth 84 
3. The composition of EU trade with emerging markets 85 
4. The impact of the crisis on aggregate European trade 86 
5. The impact of the crisis by manufacturing industry 87 
6. The impact of the crisis by Member State 95 
7. Conclusions 98 
References 99 
IV List of abbreviations 
bn billion 
CEEC Central and Eastern European Countries 
COMEXT Eurostat, New Cronos (external trade -COMmerce EXTéiïeur- database) 
CR3(5) Concentration Ratio referred to the largest 3(5) industries/countries 
DEBA Eurostat, New Cronos (Data on European Business Activity) 
EFTA European Free Trade Area 
EITO European Information Technology Organisation 
EM Emerging Market 
EOS Economies Of Scale 
EU European Union 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GFCF Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
GNP Gross National Product 
ICT Information and Communication Technologies 
IT Information Technologies 
n.a. not available 
MES Minimum Efficient Scale 
mio million 
MNE Multinational Enterprise 
p.a. per annum 
PPP Purchasing Power Parity 
R&D Research and Development 
RCA Revealed Comparative Advantage 
SBS Eurostat, New Cronos (Structural Business Statistics database) 
SME Small- or Medium-sized Enterprise 
SR Specialisation Rate 
STAN OECD, DSTI (STAN industrial database), 1998 
USA United States of America 
V STRUCTURAL CHANGE AND ADJUSTMENT 
IN EUROPEAN MANUFACTURING 
Communication from the Commission to the Council, to the European Parliament, 
to the Committee of the Regions and to the Economic and Social Committee 
COM(1999) 465 
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Introduction 
In its resolution of the 21
s
t November 1994 on 
reinforcing European competitiveness, the Council 
invited the Commission to report regularly on the 
competitiveness of European industry. 
This Communication summarises the main findings of 
the 1999 Competitiveness Report
1 and aims to 
stimulate the debate on the adaptation of European 
industry to the new conditions resulting from 
increasing competition both within and outside the 
European Union. 
The 1999 Competitiveness Report is the third one 
issued after the Council resolution. It deals with 
structural change in the EU economy, focusing on the 
presentation and analysis of sectoral data on 
manufacturing. 
The choice of emphasis on manufacturing and the use 
of country-level, rather than regional, information are 
imposed by data availability. 
Adaptability: key to competitiveness 
The competitiveness of a country is essential for the 
welfare of its citizens. It means output growth and high 
rates of employment in a sustainable environment. In a 
fast-moving world economy, one of the keys to 
competitiveness is adaptability. An economy is 
adaptable if it can accumulate and re-deploy resources 
rapidly in pursuit of new opportunities, while, at the 
same time, fully exploiting existing competitive 
strengths. Adaptability is crucial not only for the 
growth prospects of a country but also for its resilience 
to economic shocks. 
For an economy to be adaptable to rapid changes of 
technology and tastes, it should combine macro-
stability with micro-mobility. This year's 
Competitiveness Report is about mobility, structural 
change and accumulation in the European 
manufacturing sector over the last ten years. 
The 1999 Competitiveness report is divided in three 
parts. The first part considers the speed and pattern of 
change in the structure of European manufacturing. It 
looks at trends in industrial specialisation and in 
geographic concentration and it relates structural 
change to growth patterns in Europe. 
The second part considers in more detail some of the 
prime forces behind structural change. These include 
the decisions of firms to invest in tangible and 
intangible assets and the reorganisation of large 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) into integrated 
European-wide organisations operating through 
networks. 
The third part provides some indications on the 
sensitivity of different industries and of different 
European countries to a world-wide economic shock. 
It looks, in particular, at the effects on European 
competitiveness of the recent crisis in Southeast Asia. 
Large potential gains from 
restructuring 
During the period 1988-1998, manufacturing value 
added in constant prices grew in the EU by 1.8% p.a. 
and employment in manufacturing fell by 1.4% p.a. on 
average. Compared to the eighties, this has been a 
period of slow growth for both Europe and Japan. 
Growth has accelerated, instead, in the USA (see 
Figure 1). 
European Commission (1999). The competitiveness of 
European industry: 1999 Report. Luxembourg. SEC(1999) 
1555. 
VII Figure 1: Growth of manufacturing production and 
productivity in the Triad (1988=100) 
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Source: W1FO (Österreichisches Institut för Wirtschaftsforschung) 
calculations using Main Economic Indicators (OECD) and SBS 
(Eurostat). 
Output and employment performance were weak 
despite the fact that European manufacturing 
maintained its market share in the world markets and 
enjoyed a quality premium in its exports. The trade 
surplus remained large over most of the period (see 
Figure 2). 
Slow output growth was accompanied by sharp falls in 
employment in most large EU countries as well as in 
Finland and in Sweden. Only Ireland and Denmark 
registered substantial growth in both output and 
employment in the manufacturing sector (see Table 1). 
In part, the poor performance in the last decade may be 
due to cyclical factors. The case of Finland is different 
in that this country suffered a devastating loss of 
export markets in the beginning of the nineties but 
seems to have, since, turned around the tide. For the 
most part, however, previous competitiveness reports 
have attributed the unsatisfactory outcome of the 
nineties to structural weaknesses that have prevented 
EU firms from taking full advantage of new market 
opportunities. In general, small, open economies 
appear to have performed better. 
Figure 2: Trade surplus and quality premium in 
EU trade 
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Table 1: Annual growth, by 
EU 
Ireland 
Austria 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Sweden 
1998/1988 
Value added 
2.9 
7.9 
6.7 
6.7 
4.7 
4.4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.6 
3.0 
2.4 
2.5 
2.3 
1.8 
-0.2 
Member State 
1997/1988 
Value added 
3.2 
9.9 
7.0 
7.2 
5.3 
5.6 
4.2 
4.2 
3.1 
3.2 
2.8 
2.7 
2.4 
1.5 
0.3 
Productivity 
4.3 
5.7 
8.8 
7.6 
n.a. 
7.3 
4.2 
2.5 
3.9 
5.2 
3.7 
3.3 
4.4 
1.9 
0.9 
Employment 
-1.1 
4.2 
-1.8 
-0.4 
n.a. 
-1.7 
0.0 
1.7 
-0.8 
-2.0 
-0.9 
-0.6 
-2.0 
-0.4 
-0.6 
Notes: Value added in nominal terms. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS (Eurostat). 
Growth in output and employment also varied between 
different sectors of the economy. Those typified by 
large investments in intangibles, such as advertising 
and research intensive industries, grew faster than 
average. They also shed relatively fewer jobs. Capital 
and labour intensive industries have done worse on 
both accounts. 
The overall industrial specialisation of EU 
manufacturing does not appear, however, to be the 
main factor explaining slow growth. The variation in 
growth across countries is more pronounced than that 
across industries. This suggests that it is the general 
environment of doing business in each countiy that 
needs to be the focus of policy. 
VIII Further, the fact that growth rates vary substantially for 
the same industry in different countries suggests that 
there may still be much scope for restructuring and 
reallocation of resources within Europe. 
Little change in Member States' 
degree of specialisation
2 
High specialisation in few industrial sectors can be a 
blessing or a curse for a single country. For smaller 
countries, in particular, it allows a better exploitation 
of scale economies and of externalities of know-how. 
The effects, however, of an adverse economic shock 
may be devastating for a highly specialised country, 
especially if the mobility and adaptability in the 
economic system is low. 
Over the period under consideration, on average 
Member States' degree of specialisation in production 
has risen only marginally. The rise is for the most part 
attributable to increasing specialisation of larger 
countries in some industries, for example, cars in 
Germany, machinery in Italy and food in the United 
Kingdom. Smaller countries did successfully exploit 
niches but did not experience, in general, a rising 
specialisation in production. 
Further, there are indications that the degree of 
specialisation in exports has tended to fall, albeit 
slowly. The tendency of de-specialisation in exports is 
more prominent among smaller EU Member States, 
with the notable exception of Ireland. De-
specialisation in exports should have reduced the 
exposure of smaller countries to external industry-
specific demand shocks (see Figure 3). 
The production structure of a country is "highly 
specialised" if a small number of industries accounts for a 
large share of its production. This will be called "production 
specialisation". Specialisation can also be measured for 
exports, or for exports and imports together - "export 
specialisation" and "trade specialisation" respectively. 
Needless to say, patterns of specialisation (as well as those 
of concentration, discussed below) do not necessarily 
follow the lines of any standard industrial classification 
scheme, such as NACE used here. Specialisation processes 
sometimes develop at more disaggregated levels - sub-
industries or even firms and they may be regions within 
countries. 
Figure 3: Production and trade specialisation: 1988 
to 1998 (share of the largest five sectors) 
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Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COMEXT (Eurostat). 
There is no conclusive explanation of the opposite 
trends between production specialisation and export 
specialisation. One possible cause would be that MNE 
headquarter services are more likely to be included in 
value added statistics rather than in export statistics. 
Changes in the mix of intra- and inter-industry trade 
could also explain this phenomenon. 
IX Geographical concentration
3 of 
industries declined 
High geographical concentration of production or of 
exports means that a few countries supply a large part 
of the quantity sold in a given market. 
Previous analyses have shown that the EU economy as 
a whole is less geographically concentrated than that 
of the USA. This has often led to the prediction that an 
integrated Europe could become more concentrated. 
Peripheral and small countries could suffer in the 
process. 
Contrary to such predictions, geographical 
concentration of both production and exports fell in 
Europe during the nineties for the great majority of 
industries. This was primarily due to the fact that 
smaller EU Member States have grown faster on 
average than larger ones. A number of industries 
expanded their basis beyond the borders of the more 
industrially developed EU countries. 
On average, the share of the three largest countries in 
total EU value added fell by more than one percentage 
point. In exports, the fall was closer to four percentage 
points. Moreover, the geographical concentration of 
research and skill intensive industries declined faster 
than on average. The smaller EU countries gained 
shares also in these industries. 
Thus, contrary to expressed fears, closer integration in 
Europe does not seem to have led to a "core-
periphery" model at Member State level (see Figure 4). 
Speed of change is important for 
growth 
Structural change is not an end in itself. It is of interest 
to policy makers in so far as it reveals something about 
the adaptability and, hence, the competitiveness of the 
European economic system. 
Geographical concentration is defined as the extent to which 
EU activity in a given industry is concentrated in just a few 
Member States. It should be stressed that the report uses 
aggregate data, not firm data. The term "concentration" is 
therefore used to indicate the distribution of an industry 
across the Member States and should not be confused with 
the notion of "seller concentration" used in industrial 
economics and in competition policy, which denotes the 
importance of the largest firms in a market. 
Figure 4: Geographic concentration of production 
and exports 
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Source: WIFO calculations using SBS (Eurostat). 
The evidence from industry for the last ten years 
suggests that there is a relationship between the 
"mobility " or "speed of structural change " in Member 
States and the growth of their production and exports 
(see Figure 5). 
X Figure 5: Speed of structural change and growth of 
production and exports 
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Looking at the EU as a whole, mobility is found to 
have increased since the early nineties, as economic 
integration accelerated in line with the Single Market 
Programme. It declined somewhat over the recession 
years of 1993-94 (see Figure 6). 
On balance, the evidence of the first part of the report 
suggests that, over the last ten years, the industrial 
structure of Europe has been changing, albeit relatively 
slowly. This change has been in line with the 
objectives of cohesion in Europe: it has not created 
unfavourable asymmetries between countries and it has 
tended to favour smaller countries in the periphery of 
the EU. 
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Structural change in a period of 
decelerating investment 
The observed industrial change becomes all the more 
important if one considers that it took place in a 
decade of weak investment activity in Europe. 
In the nineties, the annual growth rate of investment 
fell sharply to 0.8% p.a. (from 2.5% in the eighties). As 
a percentage of GDP, gross investment in the EU was 
close to its post-war minimum (see Figure 7). The 
deceleration was only partly due to the overall fall in 
government investment in Europe. Growth of 
investment in the private sector also fell sharply. The 
deceleration concerned mainly, but not exclusively, the 
manufacturing sector. 
Figure 7: Gross fixed capital formation at 1990 
prices: total economy (percentage of GDP) 
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XI In contrast, recovery and restructuring in the USA 
were accompanied by a strong acceleration in 
investment growth (to 5.4% from 2.4% in the eighties). 
The acceleration was mainly due to private investment 
in the manufacturing sector. 
Within the EU, France, Italy, Finland and Sweden 
experienced a fall in gross investment in the nineties. 
Investment activity in Germany and Belgium grew at 
or below the EU average. The highest rates of growth 
were recorded in Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg and 
Portugal. 
Investment growth and employment creation have 
been positively related in the long run (see Table 2). 
This relation seems to have become stronger over time. 
Table 2: Trends in 
employment (averag 
GDP, investment and 
e annual rate of change) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU-Π 
EU-15 
USA 
Japan 
GDP 
1970-80 
3.4 
2.2 
2.7 
4.6 
3.5 
3.3 
4.7 
3.6 
2.6 
3.0 
3.6 
4.7 
3.4 
2.0 
1.9 
3.2 
2.9 
3 t 
4.5 
1980-90 
\M 
2.0 
τ τ 
0.7 
3.0 
2.4 
3.6 
2.2 
4.5 
2.2 
2.3 
3.2 
3.1 
2.0 
2.7 
2.4 
2.4 
2.9 
4.0 
1990-98 
1.7 
2.7 
2.0 
1.9 
2.1 
1.6 
7.7 
1.2 
5.0 
2.6 
2.1 
2.4 
1.5 
1.0 
2.0 
1.8 
1.8 
2.7 
1.1 
(lit ι-
1970-80 
2.3 
-0.8 
1.2 
2.8 
1.6 
2.5 
5.7 
1.7 
2.6 
0.2 
3.7 
4.1 
2.1 
0.6 
0.5 
1.7 
1.5 
3.6 
3.5 
1980-90 
2.3 
1.6 
1.6 
-η.4 
5.2 
2.3 
0.5 
1.6 
3.7 
1.9 
2.5 
3.0 
3.4 
3.3 
4.3 
ι ι 
2.5 
2.4 
5.2 
1990-98 
0.9 
4.4 
0.9 
3.3 
1.4 
-0.3 
5.6 
-0.4 
5.9 
2.6 
3.1 
4.4 
-2.5 
."> "Ì 
2.0 
0.6 
0.8 
5.4 
-0.4 
Employment 
1970-80 
0.2 
0.7 
0.1 
0.7 
-0.6 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1.2 
0.7 
0.3 
0.4 
0.9 
0.9 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
2.4 
0.8 
1980-90 
0.2 
0.7 
0.6 
1.(1 
(1.4 
0.3 
-0.2 
0.4 
1.7 
1.1 
l.l 
i.: 
0.6 
0.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
1.8 
1.2 
1990-98 
0.2 
0.3 
-0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
0.2 
2.9 
-0.6 
3.0 
1.7 
1.1 
0.4 
-1.3 
-1.4 
(1.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
0.5 
Note: EU li = 
Source: Europe 
Euro zone. 
an Commission. 
Low investment is likely to have slowed down 
structural change, particularly in the recession years of 
1993-1994. With the exception of Spain, the "speed of 
adjustment" of the manufacturing sector in all large 
European countries (and in Japan) was lower than in 
the USA. This was in contrast to the eighties when 
Germany and Japan had the fastest "speed of 
adjustment" among all large industrialised countries. 
The business environment of 
individual Member States has an 
important influence on investment 
There is no single set of factors that can explain 
investment patterns in European manufacturing during 
1985-1995. Both macro-economic factors and the life 
cycle of products and industries seem to have played 
an important role. 
Investment rates in European industries varied just as 
much across industries (in the same country) as they 
varied across countries (for the same industry). Thus, 
macro-economic policies and national regulatory 
frameworks may have been as important as industry-
specific technological changes and changes in 
consumer preferences. 
Two points are nevertheless worth noting in this 
respect. First, there is little evidence of a European-
wide investment cycle. Variables, such as domestic 
demand and labour costs, continue to be important 
determinants of investment at the national level. Thus, 
despite the process of economic integration, there is 
still a significant "home-countty effect" influencing 
investment. 
Second, this "home country effect" does not seem to 
be exclusively due to differences in the business cycle 
of Member States. Differences in investment rates of 
Member States have persisted over a long period, 
throughout the business cycle and across sectors. This 
suggests that there are important differences in the 
structural characteristics, as well as in cultural and 
institutional background of Member States, affecting 
the investment decisions of firms. 
Member States' heterogeneity persists 
also in intangible investment 
Member State's characteristics seem to matter also for 
the decisions of firms to invest in intangible and in 
human capital. 
Despite the importance of these types of capital for the 
competitiveness of the economy, our relevant data 
sources and our understanding of the investment 
decisions in this field are inadequate. 
Based on a broad industry taxonomy by factor inputs, 
one can gain a glimpse of the heterogeneity that exists 
in EU (see Table 3). 
Different structural patterns reflect differences in the 
utilisation of technology and in the skill intensity of 
production methods, both of which affect labour 
productivity and export unit values. 
The empirical evidence suggests that investment in 
intangibles is important for competitiveness 
irrespective of the industrial specialisation of the 
countiy. It is particularly relevant for the 
competitiveness of high-R&D and high-skill intensive 
industries. 
XII Table 3: Value added shares in total manufacturing 
in 1997, % 
Table 4: Evolution of MNE strategies and structures 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
USA 
Japan 
Mainstream 
manu fact. 
22.12 
29.50 
28.06 
19.61 
21.17 
21.94 
12.06 
28.88 
21.50 
26.39 
21.92 
22.82 
21.95 
22.85 
25.41 
21.26 
24.86 
Labour-
intensive 
15.63 
14.68 
14.13 
17.71 
20.78 
13.57 
6.25 
19.84 
11.75 
18.83 
23.65 
14.98 
12.07 
13.21 
15.31 
12.22 
16.00 
Capital-
intensive 
22.24 
12.08 
15.46 
19.26 
16.47 
14.69 
12.56 
15.90 
19.23 
16.29 
13.94 
28.59 
21.25 
14.33 
15.55 
13.51 
16.01 
Marketing-
driven 
21.08 
28.60 
16.22 
35.36 
26.73 
22.10 
31.48 
17.65 
31.20 
24.61 
29.77 
17.54 
16.16 
25.52 
21.28 
23.17 
21.00 
Technology-
driven 
1 8.93 
15.13 
26.13 
8.06 
14.84 
27.69 
37.66 
17.73 
16.32 
13.88 
10.72 
16.07 
28.57 
24.08 
22.46 
29.84 
22.13 
Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS (Eurostat). 
Labour productivity, in particular, is found to be 
determined, in order of importance, by the skill-
intensity of labour, by the invested physical capital, by 
the research expenditures and by the advertising 
outlays. 
Multinationals are reorganising into 
European-wide networks 
Industry level data reflect only part of the whole 
restructuring process and mobility in Europe. A large 
part of this process takes place within industries, at the 
micro level. It involves, among other things, the entry 
and exit of firms, changes in ownership and control of 
enterprises through mergers and acquisitions, as well 
as the internal reorganisation of large MNEs. 
The strategies and structure of MNEs have changed 
over time. The establishment of stand-alone affiliates 
based on a specific territory, operating autonomously 
and duplicating activities represent old strategies. At 
present, an increasing number of MNEs are becoming 
integrated Europe-wide organisations. They build, and 
operate through, production and subcontracting 
networks that span the whole of Europe (see Table 4). 
The progress in information and communication 
technologies (ICT) has made access to networks easier 
for all firms. Nevertheless, it remains true that larger 
firms have more possibilities to build and participate 
in such networks throughout Europe. 
The creation of these integrated enterprise networks 
has far-reaching effects on European restructuring and 
integration. 
Form 
Stand-alone 
Simple 
integration 
Complex 
international 
production 
Types of intra-
firm linkages 
Ownership, 
technology 
Ownership, 
technology. 
markets, 
finance, other 
inputs 
All functions 
Degree of 
integration 
Weak 
Partially 
strong 
Potentially 
strong overall 
Environment 
Host country accessible to 
FDI; significant trade barriers; 
costly communications and 
transportation 
Bilaterally open trade and FDI; 
non-equity arrangements 
Open trade and FDI; IT; 
convergence in tastes; 
increased competition 
Source: World Investment Report 1993 (United Nations). 
First, the networking of finns is essential for the cross-
border transfer of know-how and of proprietary 
advantages. Second, firms that belong to such a 
network have an increased ability to reallocate 
resources internally in response to adverse economic 
shocks. This increases the adaptability of the whole 
economic system. At the same time, it limits the 
margins within which purely domestic policies can be 
conducted. 
Summarising, the second part of this report argues that 
the weak investment activity of the nineties has, in all 
probability, made restructuring in the EU more 
difficult. Investment decisions in both tangible and 
intangible assets are still influenced significantly by 
country specific structures and characteristics. It is 
easier for larger MNEs to reorganise their operation to 
take filli advantage of the Single Market. Policy needs 
to focus, therefore, on local impediments to investment 
and on the difficulties of SMEs to build and participate 
in European-wide networks. 
Industrial structure is important in 
facing world-wide shocks 
Adaptability is essential for the resilience of the 
European economic system to shocks. The 
redeployment of resources can mitigate the effects of 
adverse economic conditions in a specific industry or 
country. 
The recent crisis in Southeast Asia is a good example 
of how a macro shock abroad may asymmetrically hit 
industries and countries within Europe, necessitating a 
rapid structural adjustment. 
The aggregate impact of the crisis on European 
manufacturing during 1996-1998 is estimated to have 
been between half and one percent of aggregate 
production. As the impact was not concentrated 
particularly in sectors of high labour intensity, the loss 
of employment in manufacturing is likely to have been 
XIII of the same order. In the longer run, the effects of the 
crisis could still prove more significant. 
The overall analysis indicates that the effect of the 
crisis on EU manufacturing production was rather 
asymmetric across industries. Luxury goods industries 
stand out as having been hit hardest. Engineering 
industries also appear to have been highly exposed to 
the crisis. Basic metals industries have both lost 
exports and faced tougher import competition at home. 
EU countries were also hit asymmetrically, depending 
on their industrial specialisation (see Table 5). 
Table 5: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast Asia 
(actual and adjusted change in exports and imports)'
1 
France 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Finland 
Austria 
Exports 
% change 1996-1998 
Actual 
3.5 
-13.5 
-19.8 
-20.1 
-38.8 
-0.3 
21.7 
-7.4 
-26.7 
-26.5 
-40.2 
-23.5 
-27.7 
-22.1 
Adjusted 
-1.5 
-20.1 
-14.7 
-19.8 
-26.8 
-14.4 
3.8 
-16.9 
-24.9 
-6.0 
-20.4 
-15.6 
-15.6 
-19.7 
Imports 
% change 
Actual 
37.9 
33.6 
55.1 
14.6 
43.9 
37.0 
75.4 
36.7 
15.6 
16.0 
59.6 
11.8 
19.0 
9.8 
1996-1998 
Adjusted 
33.8 
28.1 
37.7 
33.6 
36.0 
34.1 
43.3 
32.1 
56.3 
27.3 
37.4 
28.8 
29.3 
32.1 
a Calculated on trade values. 
b Using actual sector shares in total extra-EU imports and exports in 
1996 for each Member State but assuming average EU growth rates. 
Source: NEI (Nederlands Economisch Instituut) using COMEXT 
(Eurostat). 
Export specialisation was an important contributing 
factor to aggregated falls in the value of manufacturing 
exports to Southeast Asia for Germany, Italy, Spain, 
Sweden, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg and Portugal. 
It is less evident whether Member States' import 
specialisation prior to the crisis had an important effect 
on the growth rate of imports from Southeast Asia. In 
Italy and Spain, an even stronger negative effect came 
through a poor performance of individual industries 
relative to the EU as a whole. 
In conclusion 
Adaptability and rapid structural change are essential 
for the competitiveness of the European economy and 
its resilience to world-wide economic fluctuations. The 
1999 Competitiveness Report argues that: 
• In a period of low growth and low investment 
rates, the European manufacturing system 
nevertheless appears to have taken advantage of 
European integration, shifting resources between 
industries and countries. 
• This restructuring seems to have taken place in 
line with the broad objective of closer cohesion. 
Data at Member State level does not indicate any 
strengthening of a "core-periphery" model. On the 
contrary, smaller countries in the periphery of the 
EU have tended to benefit most. 
• A recovery in investment activity in both tangible 
and intangible assets will be needed to facilitate 
the desired structural changes. 
• Along with industry-specific factors, there is still a 
large "home-country effect" influencing 
investment in both tangible and intangible assets. 
Emphasis on these local conditions and local 
impediments is essential for building a favourable 
environment for higher investment in Europe. 
• Cross border networking of enterprises is also 
essential for restructuring and competitiveness. 
Large MNEs are already reorganising their 
internal operations to take advantage of positive 
network effects in the Single Market. Attention is 
needed on the networking of smaller firms. 
The main challenge for policy makers that stems from 
the above conclusions is how to release the potential 
for further adjustment of industrial structures. 
Future analysis should seek to identify those factors 
which play a key role in the adjustment process and 
the best avenues for influencing them. The 
implementation of the Economic and Monetary Union, 
the emergence of electronic commerce and, more 
generally, the information society are examples of 
recent developments which encourage structural 
adjustment. The country-specific structural factors, the 
importance of which was emphasised in the 1999 
Competitiveness report, can constitute a suitable area 
for the application of benchmarking techniques. 
Beyond enterprise policy, the Commission will 
continue to exploit the results of its competitiveness 
analysis within the wider framework of the Cardiff 
process, the Broad Economic Policy Guidelines and 
the European Employment Strategy, particularly in 
relation to structural reform issues. 
Limited availability of statistical information, in 
particular as concerns services, reduced the scope of 
the analysis. There is a need to look further into the 
possibilities of improving the statistical tools for the 
purposes of competitiveness analysis. 
XIV Introduction 
Responding to fast moving markets 
European manufacturing has been and is currently 
facing dramatic changes in its business environment. 
The process of European integration has abolished 
trade barriers, created a single market and now a single 
currency. New technologies, based in telecom, 
electronics and biotechnology, are changing 
production patterns and consumer choices. 
Globalisation is widening the horizons for production, 
consumption and competition and is accelerating the 
diffusion of knowledge, information and technology. 
Globalisation also increases the world-wide impact of 
national and regional economic and political shocks 
and fluctuations. During the nineties, Asian countries, 
as well as Russia and South America, have been hit by 
a crisis and forced to reform their financial and 
economic institutions. At varying paces, CEEC are 
slowly catching up and have started the process of 
negotiating access to the EU. Meanwhile, the USA, the 
EU's major competitor, retains a robust productivity 
advantage and is enjoying an unprecedented, long 
period of economic growth without inflation and fiscal 
deficit. 
In this fast moving world economy, adaptability is a 
key to the competitiveness of Europe. In order to be 
competitive, the European economy has to be in a 
position to rapidly accumulate and re-deploy resources 
in the pursuit of new opportunities. It also has to 
exploit in full the existing competitive strengths. 
Adaptability and rapid structural change are crucial not 
only for the growth prospects of an economy but also 
for its resilience to economic shocks. 
This report is about adaptability and structural change 
in European manufacturing over the last decade. The 
emphasis on manufacturing and the use of country-
level, rather than regional, information is imposed by 
data availability. This restricts the scope of the report 
when it comes to drawing conclusions relevant for 
employment creation. Manufacturing has long ceased 
to be a major source of employment creation for most 
EU Member States. Also, many important questions on 
convergence in Europe are best examined with 
regional data. On the other hand, country level, 
manufacturing data may be well adapted for examining 
the broad patterns of restructuring, as it is at this level 
of aggregation and for this type of products that the 
Single Market Programme should have had its major 
impact over the nineties. 
The report is divided in three parts. The first part 
considers the speed and pattern of change in the 
structure of European manufacturing and their effect 
on growth. The second part considers in more detail 
some of the prime forces behind structural change. 
These include the decisions of firms to invest in 
tangible and intangible assets and the reorganisation of 
large MNEs into integrated European-wide 
organisations operating through networks. The third 
part examines in some detail the sensitivity of different 
industries and of different European countries to the 
recent shock in Southeast Asia. 
Recalling some key results from the 
1998 Competitiveness Report 
The main emphasis of this report is on the 
restructuring of industry within Europe. This is rather 
different than in last year's report, which was focused 
on the competitiveness of the EU compared to the 
USA and Japan. Nevertheless, it is instructive to recall 
some of last year's findings as a useful starting point. 
In the last Competitiveness Report, it was shown that, 
in comparison to the USA, Europe is at a deficit when 
it comes to creating income and employment. The 
productivity of the economy as a whole, and of the 
manufacturing sector specifically, is still significantly 
lower in Europe than in the USA. Furthermore, in 
Europe, the share of the population employed is lower 
and unemployment higher. Jobless growth is a major 
problem to be solved in the context of sustainable 
development. 
On the other hand, Europe has enjoyed a large and 
increasing trade surplus in manufacturing (albeit 
largely because of deficient home demand), a stable 
world market share of exports, a quality premium for 
manufacturing, and a strong position in technological INTRODUCTION - 2 
competence and skills. But these must be balanced 
against deficits of European manufacturing in fast 
moving markets, characterised either by technological 
upturns, as in the case of ICT-related research 
intensive industries, or by rapidly changing consumer 
tastes. 
The previous report attributed the unsatisfactory 
performance of Europe in growth and employment to 
structural weaknesses that have prevented European 
firms from taking advantage of new market 
opportunities. 
The effects of European integration -
hopes and fears 
To see why adaptability and structural change are 
important factors of the future competitiveness of 
Europe, it is helpful to consider the analogy with the 
design of a successful business strategy for the 
individual finn operating in competitive, fast moving 
markets. 
On the one hand, the finn must be ready and able to 
exploit its specific assets to the full, and this will often 
require dramatic refocusing over a short period. On the 
other hand, however, concentrating all of its efforts 
into too narrow a range of activities - "putting all the 
eggs in one basket" - runs the risk of being left behind 
as new opportunities arise. 
In just the same way, the future success of Europe's 
manufacturing sector depends on its ability to exploit 
the comparative strengths of its various Member 
States, whilst also retaining the flexibility to change 
direction as new challenges and opportunities emerge. 
This leads to three considerations with policy 
significance on industrial structure in Europe: 
• First, exploitation of scale economies and a deeper 
division of labour are expected to be the driving 
forces of Europe's increased competitiveness 
flowing from the Single Market Programme. If 
factor endowments are different across countries, 
one would expect this to lead to increasing 
specialisation. In this case, a hypothesis would be 
that high wage countries might move into high 
productivity and research intensive industries in 
order to ensure further growth, whilst low wage 
countries might specialise in more labour intensive 
activities. 
• Second, there is the concern that an over-
specialisation of individual countries in nanow 
product groups might render them too exposed to 
demand risks. The possibility is that individual 
countries and regions might become more 
vulnerable to "asymmetric shocks": disturbances 
that affect countries differently, and would 
therefore endanger stability within a common 
currency area. 
• Third, there is the potential concern of a regional 
nature. Integration may lead to an agglomeration 
of activities in attractive regions. There might be a 
danger that a prefened "core" will arise, in which 
high demand or better market access act as a 
magnet drawing more and more activity away 
from the poorer regions, located at the 
geographical "periphery" or disadvantaged by a 
lack of endowments, their history, or existing 
industrial structure. 
Certainly, if one compares the regional structure in 
Europe with that of the USA, one might anticipate the 
potential for dramatic change in Europe. Regions are 
far more specialised in the USA, and some economists 
have forecasted that similar levels of regional 
concentration will emerge in Europe as a consequence 
of the creation of a Single European Market. 
Thus, the purpose of the first part of the report is to 
contemplate the evidence of the last decade, and to 
ask: How fast has been the restructuring process? Has 
Europe - either as a whole, or within Member States -
displayed the ability to restmcture quickly? At the 
same time, we look for evidence that arguably 
worrying regional over-concentrations have emerged, 
leaving parts of Europe particularly exposed to 
asymmetric shocks. A stock-taking of the extent and 
direction of structural change over the last decade 
provides another opportunity to assess the impact of 
integration within the EU. 
The report starts (Chapter 1) with a brief overview of 
recent developments in the European manufacturing 
sector and a very short summary of the relevant 
previous literature in this area. Chapter 2 establishes 
that there has been a tendency towards specialisation, 
but this is only weak, and is confined to production. 
For exports, the reverse is true. Chapter 3 finds no 
evidence that this specialisation has resulted in 
increased concentration - on the contrary, most 
industries are slightly more evenly spread across the 
Member States than was true ten years ago. Chapter 4 
turns to the link between specialisation and 
concentration and competitiveness. Some of the 
evidence suggests that enhanced competitiveness is 
indeed more likely where the speed of change is faster. 
Chapter 5 summarises the main findings of the first 
part of the report. INTRODUCTION - 3 
Investment decisions and networking 
of firms 
The process of specialisation and concentration is 
driven by the decisions of individual firms and 
investors. The speed of this process depends on 
economic forces such as economies of scale, 
spillovers, technology, changing consumer tastes and 
the mobility of labour. While some of these market 
forces may be beyond the control of the policy maker, 
this does not mean that policy, regulations and 
government actions, in general, do not play a role. 
To return to the analogy of the successful corporate 
strategy, it is important that the firm is able to respond 
efficiently to signals from the market, and it is top 
management's task to ensure that inertia in the 
organisation of the firm does not act as an impediment. 
Similarly, Europe's firms operate within a framework 
determined by institutions, regulations, liberalisation 
programmes and public support, and these are 
amenable to policy intervention both at the national 
and at the European level. 
Thus, the second part of the report looks in more detail 
at the investment activity in Europe and at its 
determinants. The weak investment activity of the 
nineties in both tangible and intangible assets has, in 
all probability, made restructuring in Europe more 
difficult. In large part, the investment performance of 
each industry has depended on the characteristics and 
structures of the country where the industry is located. 
The existence of this "home country effect" suggests 
that emphasis should be given on policies, regulations 
and structures at the national level. 
Large MNEs are already reorganising their operation 
to take full advantage of the Single Market. There are 
developing into integrated European-wide 
organisations operating through networks. The 
networking of SMEs is also essential for the 
competitiveness and adaptability of European 
economy. 
The first chapter of the second part starts with 
investment in tangibles assets. Chapter 2 focuses on 
intangible investments and chapter 3 on the process of 
internal reorganisation of MNEs and the building of 
enterprise networks in Europe. 
The last part of the report examines the impact of the 
recent crisis in Southeast Asia on the competitiveness 
of single industries and countries in Europe. The crisis 
in Southeast Asia is a good example of how a macro 
shock abroad may hit asymmetrically industries and 
countries within Europe, necessitating a rapid 
structural adjustment. 
Main messages of the report 
In summary, this report argues that: 
• Adaptability and rapid structural change are 
essential for the competitiveness of the European 
economy and its resilience to world-wide 
economic fluctuations 
• In a period of low growth and low investment 
rates, the European manufacturing system 
nevertheless appears to have taken advantage of 
European integration, shifting resources between 
industries and countries. 
• This restructuring seems to have worked in line 
with the broad objective of closer cohesion. There 
has not been any signs of strengthening of a "core-
periphery" model. On the contrary, smaller 
countries in the periphery of the EU have tended 
to benefit most. 
• The potential for restructuring still appears to be 
wide. Future restructuring may involve transfer of 
activities across Europe. 
• A recovery in investment activity in both tangible 
and intangible assets will be needed to carry out 
the desired structural changes. 
• There is still a large "home country effect" on 
investment in both tangible and intangible assets. 
Emphasis on these local conditions and local 
impediments is essential for building a favourable 
environment for higher investment in Europe. 
Cross border networking of enterprises is also essential 
for restructuring and competitiveness. Large MNEs are 
already reorganising their internal operations to take 
advantage of positive network effects in the Single 
Market. Attention is needed on the networking of 
smaller firms. Part One 
Adaptability and structural change in 
European manufacturing Chapter 1 
Statistical overview by Member State and industrial sector, 1988-1998 
1. The aggregate picture
1
 
The production of European manufacturing as a whole 
increased in the period 1988-1998by 1.8% p.a. in real 
terms (2.9% p.a. in nominal terms). Seen from a long-
term perspective, this was a period of slow growth -
slower than in the USA, but higher than in Japan 
(Figure 1.1). Employment in manufacturing decreased 
in Europe by around 8% for the total period whilst it 
was approximately stable in the USA. Europe was 
more severely hit than the USA by the currency 
turbulence of 1993-1994, as well as by the Asian crisis 
ant its repercussions in Eastern Europe (Russia) at the 
end of the period. 
Europe's hope for catching up on productivity versus 
the USA is therefore not really evident during this 
period as a whole - indeed the gap has widened in 
recent years.
2
 
The period analysed is 1988 to 1998. Fortunately, the 
beginning and the end of this period are not 
particularly extreme points in the business cycle. In the 
middle of the period, Europe faced a severe recession 
with devaluations in some Member States. Additional 
country specific shocks during these years were the 
unification of Germany, the transition of the CEEC, 
the loss of the Russian market and the political turmoil 
in the Balkan region. Each of these shocks affected 
Member States differently and technically speaking 
increased the noise in the data set. 
Turning to trade, the picture is a little more favourable. 
Exports (at current prices) have grown faster than 
imports, so that Europe now has a surplus of 132bn 
ECU in its trade of manufacturing products (Figure 
1.2). Its exports are more higher-valued than its 
imports, reflecting a positive "quality premium" for its 
exports to non-members. This premium comes 
primarily from countries outside the USA and Japan, 
e.g. from CEEC. Exports as well as imports are rising 
faster than production, intra-EU exports are increasing 
The whole of Part One draws on Aiginger et al. (1999). 
Analyses from the US administration suggest that the 
acceleration of US productivity observed since 1995 is 
partly attributable to the diffusion and use of ICT in the 
economy. See US Department of Commerce (1998). 
faster than extra-EU exports, reflecting the deepening 
of integration in Europe (Figure 1.3). 
Figure 1.1: Growth of production and productivity 
in the Triad (1988=100) 
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Figure 1.2: Trade surplus and quality premium in 
EU trade 
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Figure 1.3: Exports growing faster than production 
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Let us now turn at looking at individual industries 
within individual Member States. 
2. Comparisons across the Member 
States 
Apart from the previous section, in this report, 
production is defined as nominal value added on 
grounds that the creation of value added is the final 
goal of economic activity.
3 Additionally, it is defined 
as one of the components of competitiveness. Taking 
More precisely, we measure production by the value added 
at factor costs. This is preferred to gross production because 
it avoids double counting and differences in the degree of 
vertical integration. This definition is different from that 
used in many of the publications prepared on SBS data by 
Eurostat where the variables "turnover" or "production 
value" are used as equivalent for production. 
value added in nominal terms is not ideal for all 
questions, but problems of price adjustment and 
holding quality constant for nearly 100 industries in 
each Member Country are nearly insoluble. 
Judged by growth of nominal value added within 
aggregate manufacturing, the Member States
4 fall into 
four broad groups (see Table 1.1): 
• Three fast growing smaller Member States: 
Ireland, Portugal and Austria. Irish 
manufacturing industries performed particularly 
strongly, growing on average by nearly 8% per 
year, combining a remarkable catching up process 
with significant specialisation in fast growing 
industries. With average growth at 6.7%, Portugal 
is a similar example of a country which has been 
catching up. Austria also shows an annual growth 
rate of 6.7%. 
• Slightly faster than average growth was also 
recorded by five other, also mainly small Member 
States: Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, 
Greece and Spain 
• Germany, France, Italy and the United 
Kingdom performed rather sluggishly. Germany 
recorded the highest growth of the four - at just 
about the overall EU average, but Italy, France and 
the United Kingdom were all below average. 
• At the bottom end of the scale are the two Nordic 
countries, Finland and Sweden. Finland 
experienced a period of deep recession, induced by 
problems in the banking sector as well as the large 
reduction in trade with the former Soviet Union. 
Both countries were also faced with the devaluation 
of their currencies during the early nineties. 
This country growth pattern is consistent with a 
catching up process in some of the Member States 
which had below average per capita income at the start 
of the nineties. Starting from a position of low average 
labour productivity in 1988, Ireland and Portugal 
managed to catch up considerably. However, catch-up 
was not so pronounced in Greece and Spain. 
The ranking of countries by productivity growth is 
similar, but there are some noteworthy exceptions. In 
Europe, productivity grew by 1.1% p.a. faster than 
value added, and this means that employment declined, 
on average by 1.1%. The countries with particularly 
strong productivity growth (relative to value added) 
were Germany and the United Kingdom amongst the 
The EU is defined according to its Member States in 1998. 
The activity of the countries which joined in 1995 is 
included for the whole period. CHAPTER 1 - 9 
larger Member States, and Greece and Austria amongst 
the faster growing smaller Member States. These were 
also the four countries suffering the greatest falls in 
employment. More generally, however, employment 
has been decreasing in the manufacturing sectors of 
every Member State, with the exceptions of Ireland 
and Denmark. 
Table 1.1: Annual growth by Member State 
reduced employment at a rapid rate - due to the 
aforementioned negative growth in value added (Table 
1.2). 
EU 
Ireland 
Austria 
Portugal 
Belgium 
Greece 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Spain 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Finland 
Sweden 
1998/1988 
Value added 
2.9 
7.9 
6.7 
6.7 
4.7 
4.4 
3.9 
3.9 
3.6 
3.0 
2.4 
2.5 
2.3 
1.8 
-0.2 
1997/1988 
Value 
added 
3.2 
9.9 
7.0 
7.2 
5.3 
5.6 
4.2 
4.2 
3.1 
3.2 
2.8 
2.7 
2.4 
1.5 
0.3 
Productivity 
4.3 
5.7 
8.8 
7.6 
n.a. 
7.3 
4.2 
2.5 
3.9 
5.2 
3.7 
3.3 
4.4 
1.9 
0.9 
Employment 
-1.1 
+4.2 
-1.8 
-0.4 
n.a. 
-1.7 
0.0 
1.7 
-0.8 
-2.0 
-0.9 
-0.6 
-2.0 
-0.4 
-0.6 
Note: Value added and productivity are in nominal terms. Reliable 
figures on employment are unavailable for 1998, and so the last three 
columns show the comparable estimates for value added, productivity 
and employment for 1988 to 1997. Throughout this report, country 
aggregates refer to aggregate manufacturing. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
3. Growth of industrial sectors 
Within manufacturing,
5 the average annual growth rate 
varied quite noticeably. There was negative or zero 
growth in computers and office machinery, and the 
textiles and clothing sector, while strong growth - in 
excess of 4% was observed in tobacco, rubber and 
plastics, radio, TV and telecommunications equipment, 
and publishing and printing. Again, in general, 
productivity growth exceeded that of value added, and 
the inevitable consequence was generally declining 
employment. Some of the largest declines in 
employment were posted by the more traditional 
sectors of textiles and clothing, and basic metals 
industries. But office machinery and computers also 
Table 1.2: Annual growth by 
15 Food products and beverages 
16 Tobacco products 
17 Textiles 
18 Wearing apparel; fur 
19 Tanning and dressing of leather 
20 Wood, products of wood and cork 
21 Pulp, paper and paper products 
22 Publishing, printing and reproduction 
23 Coke, refined petroleum, nuclear fuel 
24 Chemical and chemical products 
25 Rubber and plastic products 
26 Other non-metallic mineral products 
27 Basic metals 
28 Fabricated metal products 
29 Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
30 Office machinery and computers 
31 Electrical machinery/apparatus n.e.c. 
32 Radio, TV and communication equip. 
33 Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches 
34 Motor vehicles, trailers 
35 Other transport equipment 
36 Furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
Total manufacturing 
ndustrial sector 
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9.6 
4.5 
3.1 
3.4 
3.7 
3.7 
3.3 
4.4 
4.5 
4.1 
3.8 
5.1 
4.0 
4.6 
2.1 
4.8 
5.9 
4.9 
4.4 
5.9 
3.1 
4.3 
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0.0 
-3.8 
-3.S 
-2.9 
-3.0 
-0.5 
-1.6 
+ 1.0 
-1.3 
-1.2 
+0.4 
-1.6 
-4.3 
+0.1 
-1.1 
-3.2 
-2.1 
-0.8 
-2.0 
-0.5 
-2.2 
+0.1 
-1.1 
Note: Value added and productivity are in nominal terms. Reliable 
figures on employment are unavailable for some industries for 1998, 
and so the last three columns show the comparable estimates for value 
added, productivity and employment for 1988 to 1997. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
Another, potentially more illuminating, way to 
disaggregate manufacturing, is to apply the WIFO 
taxonomy.
6 This classifies industries according to 
factor intensities into labour-intensive, capital-
intensive, and research- and advertising-intensive 
sectors. It has as a fifth segment a mainstream sector, 
which uses the average mix of factors (Table 1.3). 
When grouped in this way, it turns out that the growth 
in productivity is very similar - between 4.5 and 4.7% 
on average for all sectors, except the capital-intensive 
group, for which growth was lower than average. 
Growth in value added was highest amongst the 
advertising intensive industries (3.9%), and lowest 
amongst the labour and capital intensive sectors, at 
Manufacturing is defined by Eurostat as NACE sectors 15-
36, which amounts to 22 two-digit sectors and roughly 100 
three-digit industries therein. The main data sources are 
Eurostat, European Commission, United Nations and 
WIFO. 
6 First applied in European Commission (1998), Part Two. 
For the methodology, see Peneder (1999) as well as Part 
Two (Chapter 2) of this report. 10-CHAPTER 1 
2.7% and 1.6%, respectively. It was also these sectors 
which showed the fastest loss of employment. 
Table 1.3: Annual growth by type of industry 
(WIFO taxonomy): 1988 to 1998 
Table 1.4: Country and industry effects on growth 
Analysis of variance of industry growth (1989 to 1997) 
Source Partial SS df F 
Mainstream 
Labour intensive 
Capital intensive 
Advertising intensive 
Research intensive 
Total manufacturing 
Value added 
3.4 
2.7 
1.6 
3.9 
3.2 
2.9 
Productivity 
4.6 
4.7 
4.2 
4.7 
4.6 
4.5 
Employment 
-1.2 
-2.0 
-2.5 
-0.8 
-1.3 
-1.4 
Note: Value added and productivity are in nominal tenns. Estimates 
were computed for those industries for which employment data in 
1998 were missing. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
Although these differences are not very pronounced, 
they are consistent with weak demand growth in 
labour and capital industries. They seem to support 
two hypotheses: labour intensive industries lose 
ground in European manufacturing due to the forces of 
the intensified globalisation process, which lead to de-
location of labour intensive production to low wage 
countries outside. Capital intensive industries seem to 
substitute labour more intensively through stronger 
rationalisation. The former hypothesis is supported by 
the fact (not shown in the table) that highly globalised 
industries, which are to a large extent labour intensive, 
expanded at a slightly below average rate of 1.8%. The 
latter hypothesis is confirmed by the below average 
growth (1.7%) of mainly capital-intensive high-wage 
industries, which reduced employment the most. 
4. Variability of growth rates between 
sectors and Member States 
Having disaggregated EU manufacturing in two 
directions - by Member State and then by sector - one 
preliminary step is to assess in which direction the 
variability is greater. This information is potentially 
helpful in highlighting whether country- or industry-
level determinants are likely to be the more important. 
The average rate of nominal growth in a typical three-
digit industry amounted to 2.1% during the nine-year 
period 1989-1997. The standard deviation of 6.3 
percentage points reveals the high variation between 
EU Member States and between industries, a picture 
confirmed by the very high extremes in the distribution 
and by the analysis of variance in Table 1.4. 
Model 
Intercept 
Country 
Industry effect 
Country χ industry 
Residual 
Total 
Ν 
R
2 
effect 
18370.3 
3124.1 
5705.3 
2527.9 
8796.5 
20574.6 
38944.9 
998 
0.47 
214 
1 
11 
17 
1X6 
783 
997 
3.3 
118.9 
19.7 
5.7 
1.8 
** 
** 
:|: :\: 
■■: * 
** 
Note: SS = Explained and unexplained variance; df = degrees of 
freedom.; F = Test of the significance of the model/coefficients 
(** = significant at 5%). 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
Forty-seven percent of the variation can be explained 
by country, industry and combined industry and 
country effects. The variation across countries is more 
pronounced than the industry effects, indicating that 
the country specific environment, economic policy and 
macroeconomic development have a significant impact 
on industry growth. This picture is consistent with the 
view that European manufacturing is not yet fully 
integrated. Most of the variation in average growth 
rates comes from combined country and industry 
effects, suggesting that country specific environments 
combined with industry specific determinants common 
throughout the entire EU - such as demand growth -
are the ingredients of long run perfonnance. 
Given these results, there are obviously a large number 
of country- and industry-specific factors at work, and 
therefore it is not surprising that we shall find below 
that broad-based general trends in both specialisation 
and concentration are fairly weak. 
5. The theory 
Three strands in economic theory have some bearing 
on how specialisation and concentration might develop 
with increasing integration.
7
 
For given endowment differences across Member 
States, traditional trade theory suggests that 
intensified integration will tend to increase 
specialisation. Countries with higher incomes will tend 
to specialise in capital intensive, skill intensive and 
research intensive industries. On the other hand, if 
endowments converge - as they should eventually in a 
single market with factor mobility - and industries 
See Wolfmayr-Schnitzer (1999) for a more extensive 
survey. CHAPTER 1-11 
have constant returns to scale, then specialisation 
should decrease. 
According to the new trade theory, high-income 
countries will tend to concentrate on industries with 
high levels of innovation, driven by forces on the 
demand side (new products and greater variety are 
demanded) and supply side (innovation rents and the 
capacity to make use of technological opportunities). 
In industries where product differentiation is 
important, countries will specialise in products on the 
upper quality segment. Countries with similar incomes 
will engage in mira-industry trade, and there is no 
certainty that increased specialisation will emerge. 
Economic geography, on the other hand, highlights 
the possibility that regions/countries with privileged 
market access (defined by size, income level, and 
centrality) may profit first and more strongly from 
integration. Industries characterised by increasing 
returns to scale should locate near the largest market; 
spillovers should enforce the advantages of large 
markets, as will forward and backward linkages. On 
the other hand, the periphery will specialise in low 
wage industries, in industries with less product 
differentiation and limited spillovers. Eventually, 
however, this process will reverse if wages rise faster 
in the centre, if diseconomies of agglomeration emerge 
and if lower transport costs make a given cost 
difference between the core and periphery more 
decisive. International migration, as well as labour 
mobility within a country and between industries, will 
also reinforce this offsetting effect. The mobility of 
firms, as well as the upgrading of skills and 
productivity in the periphery, will also diminish the 
danger of uneven development. 
Overall, then, the predictions from theory suggest that 
specialisation and concentration might go either way, 
especially in the longer ran. 
6. Previous empirical studies 
For the sake of brevity, we merely itemise the key 
findings:
8 
• The USA has higher, albeit declining, regional 
concentration 
Krugman (1991) showed that manufacturing is more 
regionally concentrated in the USA than in Europe by 
comparing four regions in the USA with four large 
countries in the EU. However, the most highly 
concentrated industries were not "cutting edge", high 
technology sectors - in fact, textiles were the most 
concentrated. Higher concentration in the USA was 
subsequently confirmed in later studies, and this led to 
a widespread expectation that concentration in Europe 
would converge on US levels once the Single Market 
took effect. However, Karsten (1996) cautioned that 
Europe was not fully comparable with the USA, 
insofar as skills were more dispersed, and the Single 
Market in Europe was evolving from an initially more 
fragmented structure. In the USA, on the other hand, 
the fundamental locational decisions were made at the 
start of the industrial revolution, in a market that was 
already integrated. In fact, concentration declined in 
the USA between 1947 and 1985. This, combined with 
the additional evidence of Kim (1995, 1997), led to the 
conclusion that regional concentration has been 
declining in the USA with the "high water mark of 
manufacturing location ... reached probably in the 
1920's" (Krugman, 1991, p. 80). 
• Conflicting evidence for Europe 
In an investigation of eight countries (including the 
USA), Dollar and Wolff (1993) found that an equal 
number of industries were concentrating and de-
concentrating between 1970 and 1986, although their 
main focus was on catching up and not on 
concentration. Bruelhart (1995) reported that 14 out of 
18 industries were concentrating in Europe between 
1980 and 1990. Labour intensive industries exhibited 
the highest dispersion, but they also showed significant 
potential for future concentration, while industries with 
high returns to scale were already concentrated. Amiti 
(1998) found that concentration increased in the 
majority of industries between 1976 and 1989, and that 
specialisation rose in six out often European countries. 
However, Dalum et al. (1998) and Laursen (1998) 
reported the contrary for exports. 
• Technology, multinationality and quality ranges 
In another strand of literature, Archibugi and Pianta 
(1992, 1994) found evidence of convergence in 
aggregate indicators of scientific and technological 
activity (e.g. R&D, and patent intensity). However, at 
the sector level, they found increasing technological 
specialisation. Similar results by Cantwell (1989) and 
Laursen (1998) raise the possibility that technological 
and sector specialisation might be moving in opposite 
directions. More generally, in a background study for 
this report,
9 it was found that factor endowments have 
become more similar over the past fifteen years. This 
seems to be driven by a catch-up of countries like 
Spain, Ireland, Finland and Denmark (by accumulating 
See Aiginger (1999) for a more extensive survey.  See section 2.3 of Aiginger et al. (1999). 12-CHAPTER 1 
R&D capital) and, to some extent, also of Portugal and 
Greece (by investing in physical capital). The 
implication is that any increase in specialisation arising 
from integration will be dampened by the decreasing 
differences in endowments between Member States. 
Davies et al. (1998) report that geographic 
concentration did not change in Europe between 1987 
and 1993. In terms of the location of production, it 
appears that the leading firms have dispersed their 
operations across more, rather than fewer, Member 
States. That is, multinationality had increased. Trade 
increased fastest in industries seen as sensitive to the 
Single Market Programme (catching up from low 
values). Multinationality did not increase specifically 
in sensitive sectors (it had been high here before), but 
rather grew fastest where it had been low: in 
advertising intensive industries and in industries with 
low trade intensity. 
• Concentration of trade? 
The European Commission (1997) distinguished inter-
industry (one-way) trade from /«ira-industry (two-
way) trade and further disaggregated the latter into 
horizontal and vertical components. Overall, it found 
that intra-industry trade is increasing, although the 
most recent data indicates that the increase has 
flattened out. Portugal and Greece have the highest 
shares of one-way trade. Denmark is an exception, as a 
high-income country with a one-way trade share of 
60%. France, Germany and Belgium have the lowest 
shares of one-way trade, but the largest shares in both 
categories of two-way trade. The two-way 
differentiated category can be split again into the 
markets in which exports are more highly valued 
(upper quality segment) and in which they are lower 
valued. Some countries are specialised in certain 
industries over the entire price/quality spectrum 
(Denmark in agriculture, Greece in textiles). Most 
countries are specialised in different quality segments, 
with Germany being the outlier, supplying all its 
important industries in the higher quality segment. The 
conclusion is that countries may not be specialised in 
industries, but rather in quality ranges within the same 
industry. This hints at the importance of productivity 
differences and/or of skills, and possibly indicates that 
specialisation according to factor intensities may not 
be all-important. 
7. Defining and measuring 
specialisation and concentration 
Specialisation is defined as the extent to which a 
given country specialises its activities in a small 
number of industries or sectors. Thus, the production 
structure of a country is "highly specialised" if a small 
number of industries accounts for a large share of its 
production. A traditional example would be the Nordic 
countries, highly specialised in timber, pulp and paper. 
This will be called "production specialisation". 
Specialisation can also be measured for exports, or for 
exports and imports together - "export specialisation" 
and "trade specialisation" respectively. 
Geographic concentration is defined as the extent to 
which EU activity in a given industry is concentrated 
in just a few Member States. Motor vehicles would be 
a good example (it is concentrated in a few countries) 
and similarly electrical machinery. 
It should be stressed that the report uses aggregate 
data, not firm data. The term "concentration" is used to 
indicate the distribution of an industry across the 
Member States and should not be confused with the 
notion of seller concentration used in industrial 
economics and in competition policy which denotes 
the importance of the largest firms in a market. 
Both concepts are to be investigated at the sector level 
(22 NACE two-digit sectors) and at the industry level 
(95 NACE three-digit industries). Data are available 
for 14 Member States (Belgium and Luxembourg are 
consolidated). Needless to say, patterns of 
specialisation and concentration do not necessarily 
follow the lines of any standard industrial 
classification scheme, such as NACE: specialisation 
processes sometimes develop at more disaggregated 
levels - sub-industries or even firms and they may be 
regions within countries. Again, data unavailability 
prevents such further disaggregation. 
There are many standard statistical indexes of 
dispersion which might be employed to measure these 
two concepts. Each has different properties and none is 
ideal for all purposes. Since our preference is for 
robust findings, most of the results reported below will 
be based upon the general picture provided by the 
seven different indicators shown in Box 1.1. However, 
some tables and figures will refer directly to one 
particular measure, e.g. the concentration ratio. CHAPTER 1-13 
Box 1.1: Indicators of specialisation and concentration: an overview 
Concentration ratios (CR3 and CR5) 
This is the share of the largest « units in the total, e.g. CR3 is the share of the largest three 
industries/countries. Here, we calculate two alternatives, taking n to be either three or five for geographical 
concentration and specialisation at the sectoral level, and five or ten, for specialisation at the industry level. 
Herfindahl 
This is the sum of the squared shares of each sector/industry in total manufacturing. Although this measure 
formally makes use of all information, its value is heavily influenced by the largest (market, export, country) 
shares. 
Standard deviation of the shares 
This is a measure of dispersion across industries with respect to an average industry. 
Specialisation rates (SR) 
For country specialisation, this is the sum of the country's shares in each industry relative to each industry's 
share of total manufacturing; for geographic concentration of an industry, it is the sum of the industry's share 
in each country relative to that country's share in total manufacturing. In trade analysis, this is called the RCA 
or Balassa index, and in geography it is sometimes called the locational coefficient. Since the measure is not 
symmetric (it is between 1 and infinity for positive specialisation and between zero and one for negative 
specialisation), it is conventional to transform it into an SRA index, defined as (SR-1) / (SR+1). This 
transformation is specifically useful in econometric work; its standard deviation is known as sd-SRA. 
Dissimilarity index (the sum of absolute differences) 
For specialisation, this is the sum of the absolute differences between the country's share in each industry and 
the industry's overall share in EU manufacturing. For concentration, it is the sum of the absolute differences 
between the industry's share in each country and the country's overall share in EU manufacturing. 
Gini coefficient 
This summarises differences in the specialisation rates by cumulating the differences in the shares of a 
country and the shares of the EU, after ranking the industries according to their specialisation ratios. The first 
four measures do not compare an industry/country against a norm and are therefore called absolute indicators. 
The specialisation rate, dissimilarity index and Gini relate industries/countries to such norms and are tenned 
relative. Absolute indicators implicitly focus attention on large countries; relative indicators implicitly give 
more weight to the role of small countries. Chapter 2 
Specialisation of European manufacturing 
1. A weak overall tendency to an 
increasing production specialisation 
Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1 provide an overall picture of 
which Member States are the most specialised, and the 
magnitudes of the changes 1988-98. 
• The prevailing tendency is for specialisation to 
increase, albeit marginally, in most Member 
States. This is quantified in the table. Remembering 
that there are seven measures (Box 1.1), fourteen 
countries and two levels of aggregation (sector and 
industry), in total, there are 196 comparisons 
between 1998 and 1988. Of these, 133 (68%) 
indicate an increase - a proportion which is 
statistically significantly greater than half at the 
99% level. Visual confirmation is provided by the 
cob-web diagrams of Figure 2.1, based on the five-
country concentration ratio (CR5) - the 1998 line 
tends to lie marginally outside the line for 1988. 
• Portugal and the Netherlands are exceptions to 
this general trend - in these countries de-
specialisation has occurred. 
Table 2.1: Production specialisation increases, but 
export specialisation decreases: 1988 to 1998 
Figure 2.1: Production and trade specialisation: 
1988 to 1998 (share of the largest five sectors) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Ireland 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
Sum of signs 
Production indicators 
increasing/decreasing 
Sector 
+ 
2 5 
3 4 
7 0 
6 1 
4 3 
6 1 
7 0 
7 0 
0 7 
5 2 
0 7 
7 0 
7 0 
7 0 
68 30 
Industry 
+ 
3 4 
7 0 
6 1 
4 3 
2 5 
1 6 
3 4 
7 0 
1 6 
6 1 
4 3 
7 0 
7 0 
7 0 
65 33 
rotai 
+ 
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10 
13 
10 
6 
7 
10 
14 
1 
11 
4 
14 
14 
14 
133 
-
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4 
1 
4 
S 
7 
4 
0 
13 
3 
IO 
0 
0 
0 
63 
Trade indicators 
increasing/decreasing 
Sector 
+ 
2 
0 
6 
0 
6 
6 
7 
8 
2 
3 
0 
1 
4 
1 
46 
-
ft 
8 
2 
8 
2 
2 
1 
0 
ft 
5 
S 
7 
4 
7 
fifi 
Industry 
+ 
0 8 
1 7 
5 3 
0 8 
5 3 
4 4 
3 5 
7 1 
7 1 
4 4 
0 8 
1 7 
2 6 
4 4 
43 69 
Total 
+ 
2 14 
1 15 
11 5 
0 16 
11 5 
10 6 
10 6 
15 1 
9 7 
7 9 
0 16 
2 14 
6 10 
5 11 
89 135 
Note: Number of positive and negative changes between 1988 and 
1998 (for the indicators, see Box 1.1). 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COMEXT. 
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France 
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Denmark 
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Greece 
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Netherlands 
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Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COMEXT. 
• In most cases, the magnitude of the change is 
marginal. This is illustrated graphically by the 
very fine difference in the lines for 1988 and 1998 
in Figure 2.1. Numerically, the weighted average 
five-sector concentration ratio rises only slightly 
from 24.8 in 1988 to 25.5 in 1998. 16-CHAPTER 2 
• If we look at the development over time, we see 
that specialisation tended to decrease from 1985 
to the beginning of the nineties, but to increase 
since then. The time paths for the average of the 
seven indicators are shown for each country in 
Figure 2.2. 
2. A weak overall tendency for export 
specialisation to decrease 
Switching to exports, we find: 
• There is a tendency of decreasing specialisation. In 
only five countries the majority of indicators 
exhibit increasing specialisation in exports: 
Germany, Ireland, Italy, France and Spain - all 
except Ireland are large countries. In the remaining 
nine countries, export specialisation has declined. 
If we again count signs, we see that only 89 of the 
total 224 indicators (40%)' increase - a proportion 
which is significantly less than half at the 99% 
level. 
• In five countries, this de-specialisation of exports 
has occuned alongside increasing specialisation in 
production: the United Kingdom, Sweden, Finland 
and to some extent Greece. 
3. Individual countries in more detail 
We now turn to some of the individual Member States, 
in order to illustrate some of the underlying forces at 
work. 
Both production and export specialisation rise 
Germany 
Starting from a moderately low initial value, 
production specialisation in Germany decreased up 
until 1990-1991, but has shown a rising trend ever 
since.
2 Its largest sectors are those which are large in 
the EU total - the skill intensive mainstream sectors of 
machinery, motor vehicles and chemicals, with 
electrical machinery and metal products following. As 
a group, the share of these leading sectors 
increased slightly over this period. 
has 
The indicator for which this downward trend is most 
pronounced is the RCA value, which provides information 
on net trade. It declines in twelve countries on the sectoral 
level and in thirteen on the industry level. The average 
decline is rather strong. This is the indicator traditionally 
used in empirical work testing the Hcckschcr-Ohlin theory, 
namely on the relative specialisation of exports and imports. 
The data now includes the Neue Länder. These new regions 
did not decrease the degree of specialisation but rather 
complemented the old structure. 
The picture on trade is more mixed: while 11 of the 16 
indicators of export specialisation have risen, if we 
measure trade specialisation by the standard deviation 
of net exports (exports minus imports, i.e. net RCA), 
specialisation has tended to decline for sectors and 
industries. There are two reasons, and both also apply 
more generally for other countries: 
• An increase in intra-industry trade in a stronghold. 
For instance, the share of the motor vehicle 
industry in German total exports increased from an 
already high level of 17.4% to 18.9%. But imports 
also surged from 8.4% to 12.1%, and the relative 
trade specialisation (RCA minus the industry's 
export surplus relative to that for total 
manufacturing) declined from 0.67 in 1988 to 0.55 
in 1998. 
• Weak demand in resource intensive industries with 
traditional trade deficits. Examples are petrol 
products and pulp and paper, whose large negative 
RCA values in 1988 declined up to 1998. 
However, while the low exports kept up with the 
general growth of total exports, the absolutely 
higher imports did not keep up with total import 
growth. The explanation lies with the low income 
elasticity of these industries, the ability of 
downstream industries to economise on inputs, 
and the success in upholding exports in niches. 
Italy 
Italy started from the lowest level of all the Member 
States, but the specialisation of both production and 
exports increased over this period. The driving force is 
the persistent rise in the machinery industry, which 
presently accounts for 14% of production and 21% of 
exports. On the other hand, a stronghold which has 
been lost is office machinery. The shares of the textile 
industries have been decreasing slightly, but less so 
than in other countries. This has led to increasing 
market shares for Italy in this sector, and more 
generally to its share in labour intensive industries. It 
has also increased the dissimilarity in Italy's 
production structure compared to the EU average. 
However, Italy is focusing on the quality segment of 
the textile industries, and the unit value of its exports is 
significantly higher than the European average. CHAPTER 2-17 
Figure 2.2: Specialisation trends in production and exports 
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Ireland 
Ireland maintained its position as the most specialised 
country - during the decade, it continued to intensify 
its specialisation. The top three sectors produce 56% of 
total industrial output, the largest being chemicals 
(basic chemicals and pharmaceuticals), with a 
production share rising from 16.4% to 27.2%. Large 
increases also took place in office machinery and 
printing and publishing (reproduction of recorded 
media). Ireland also has the highest degree of 
structural change (mobility of structure): the food 
industry, which was a former stronghold, lost 7 
percentage points; and textile and wood related 
industries, which were never strong, continued to lose 
share. 
Ireland now has the largest share in manufacturing of 
research intensive industries, although these are mainly 
subsidiaries of MNEs with headquarters outside of the 
country. Ireland's share of labour intensive industries 
is the lowest in Europe. Ireland is positively 
specialised in high growth, highly globalised 
industries, in the high productivity sector, and has 
reinforced all of these strengths during the last decade. 
The structural funds, a tax policy favourable for 
businesses, the upgrading of its educational system and 
the return of skilled workers have together created a 
successful policy mix which attracts and upgrades 
finns in dynamic industries. 
Increased specialisation in production but not in 
exports 
United Kingdom 
Statistically, the mix of increasing specialisation of 
production but decreasing specialisation of exports can 
be explained by specific developments in certain 
sectors: in food, domestic production seems to have 
substituted for imports; in printing, export shares are 
generally static; in basic metals, production declined 
less steeply than exports. 
Relative to the EU as a whole, specialisation is 
strongest, as well as increasing, in other transport, 
publishing and office machinery (the share of which is 
falling, but less sharply than in other countries). 
Finland 
Finland has a moderate position in specialisation, and 
also combines increasing production specialisation 
with decreasing export specialisation. Finnish 
production is dominated by pulp and paper, machinery 
and telecommunications -- the latter two growing 
sharply over the period. The food industry and the 
textile industries are losing shares; wood and wood 
related industries are rather stable. 
Export specialisation is decreasing according to most 
indicators. The main reason is that the export share of 
paper dropped from 32% to 23%. This is in contrast to 
the rising production of the pulp and paper industry. 
One reason for this divergence could be that the 
headquarter function of Finnish firms is strengthening 
the basis for creating value added. A wood and paper 
cluster provides services which increase value added, 
but some of these services are not reflected in exports 
or, at least, are not reported as exports of manufactured 
goods. 
Sweden 
Sweden, too, has a moderate position in specialisation, 
with the same diverging trends in production and 
exports. The largest four sectors in production are 
paper and cars (both increasing their shares), food and 
machinery (both losing shares). The greatest jump 
occuned in telecom equipment, which increased its 
share in production by nearly 6%, and it is now the 
largest exporter. 
Paper's share in production is rather stable, and its 
share in exports is falling. For machinery, production 
shares are increasing, while export shares are on the 
decline. In neither case can imports account for the 
difference, possibly hinting again at the effect of 
MNEs increasing headquarter services, but shifting 
part of their exports to foreign production, and thus 
contributing to the divergence of production and 
export trends. 
Greece 
In Greece, specialisation in production is increasing 
specifically in food, petroleum products and 
chemicals, and in construction related industries. This 
was once the country with the highest export 
specialisation, but this has lessened due to losses in the 
textile and apparel sector. The food sector is now the 
largest export sector. The share of intra-industry trade 
is lower than in all other EU Member States. 
A robust decrease in specialisation 
Portugal 
Portugal is the exception, insofar as specialisation is 
decreasing strongly and robustly in both production 
and trade. This declining specialisation reflects the 
shrinking share of the textile industry, which once 
accounted for 13.4% of production, but dropped to 
9.4% in 1998. Food production and wood related 
industries also lost ground. CHAPTER 2-19 
On the other hand, other sectors have made 
considerable progress, notably the motor industry and 
to a lesser extent electrical machinery. On the industry 
level, motor vehicles are the largest item, accounting 
for 13% of exports, thereby surpassing the apparel 
industry as the largest exporter. 
Portugal also managed to narrow its deficits in 
advertising intensive industries (tobacco, shoes) and in 
research intensive industries (agro-chemicals, 
electronic valves, telecom apparatus and motor 
vehicles). 
4. Summary 
There is undoubtedly some evidence of increasing 
specialisation in production. Some large industries in 
large countries play a key role here; for example, cars 
in Germany, machinery in Italy, and food in the United 
Kingdom. This should be quite consistent with theories 
stressing the importance of clusters, with path 
dependency of strategic advantages and knowledge 
spillovers within regions.
3 However, in the smaller 
countries, there is no clear tendency towards increasing 
production specialisation, with the notable exception 
of Ireland. Ireland is continuing to specialise, 
specifically in research- and skill-intensive industries 
and it now has the lowest share of labour-intensive 
industries. 
On the other hand, the other small countries are 
successfully exploiting new opportunities for niche 
producers offered by the Single Market. They are 
partly extending former strongholds via exports, and 
partly going multinational and producing abroad. They 
are also losing some of their former strongholds in 
resource-intensive or labour intensive segments. 
Overall, the evidence does not suggest that the trend 
towards specialisation has been either pervasive or 
quantitatively striking. But this is not to deny that, 
within individual countries, there has been noticeable 
structural change. Portugal and Ireland are prime 
examples where, for different reasons, this is reflected 
in quite different changes in our summary statistics. In 
other cases, there has been a turmoil which is not 
reflected at all by these summary statistics. (We return 
to this later, in Chapter 4.) 
Perhaps the most interesting finding from this chapter 
is the contrast between typically marginally increasing 
production specialisation and typically marginally 
declining export specialisation. To some extent, one 
Nevertheless, it should be recalled that the analysis is based 
on data at national level. This limits the inferences which 
can be made on regional developments. 
might expect a convergence of export and production 
specialisation, if production specialisation is catching 
up, because production for domestic consumption has 
been reduced. However, this cannot explain why 
export specialisation is decreasing and why, for 
several countries, decreasing export specialisation 
occurs alongside increasing production specialisation. 
Some specific developments in specific 
countries/sectors are illustrative examples. The pulp 
and paper industry increases or maintains its 
production share in Finland and Sweden, but lowers its 
large share in exports. Food, chemicals, and publishing 
and printing increase their shares of production in the 
United Kingdom, but decrease export shares. 
Production shares are rather stable for the steel 
industry in the United Kingdom, but the share of steel 
in exports has been on the decline. 
We have no conclusive explanation of these opposing 
trends, but there are various possibilities about the 
general underlying forces: 
• There might bé a systematic role for the 
headquarters and services of large MNEs. If these 
firms provide additional services to their core 
manufacturing activity, these tend to be reported in 
value added, since production statistics are 
classified according to main activities. It is less 
probable that the services are included in the 
export statistics. More generally, this may not 
simply be a statistical artefact. The theory of 
MNEs tells us that headquarters are providing 
knowledge and services to all of their subsidiaries. 
If the number of MNEs rises, and if they at least 
partly substitute domestic production with foreign 
production, production and export trends could 
move in different directions. Certainly, many of 
the industry/country combinations for which the 
opposite trends are apparent are characterised by 
large shares of MNEs. 
• Declining export/trade specialisation may often 
reflect the combination of two effects: (i) static 
world demand for exports of resource-based 
industries in which some countries have a 
traditional comparative advantage, and (ii) an all-
round growth in demand for other differentiated 
product industries due to the growth in intra-
industry trade. However, this combination need 
not necessarily imply decreasing production 
specialisation, especially if the resource-based 
exporting industry is relatively small so far as 
domestic consumption is concerned, and the other 
sectors, enjoying a growth in demand from intra-
industry exports are large in tenns of domestic 
consumption. 20 - CHAPTER 2 
• Not inconsistent with the previous hypothesis is 
the straightforward possibility that there has been 
a particularly pronounced trend towards 
specialisation in production for domestic 
consumption - sufficient to offset reduced 
specialisation in exports. 
This subject merits future investigation, but it does 
seem to be tied up with the changing mix in intra- and 
inter-industry trade on the one hand, and the increase 
in MNEs' activity on the other hand. Certainly, 
decreasing net trade balances are exhibited by all 
countries except Ireland (and the Netherlands at 
industry level only), due to two movements. Firstly, 
large net imports in resource intensive industries 
decreased due to the slow growth in demand for raw 
materials and semi-finished products. Secondly, large 
export surpluses decreased in strongholds, since 
imports - albeit still relatively small - increased faster. 
The first tendency shows that resource-based, inter-
industry trade, though still important to some 
industries, lost relative importance. The second shows 
that division of labour and intra-industry trade became 
even more important in the strongholds. This is 
consistent with the picture that comparative 
advantages as well as disadvantages are a declining 
force in Europe. Chapter 3 
Geographic concentration of industries 
1. An overall tendency towards 
de-concentration 
In this chapter we turn to industry concentration, 
asking, specifically, whether the share of the leading 
countries in individual industries is rising or falling. 
High concentration of production or of exports means 
that a few countries supply a large part of a given 
sector (industry). Low concentration or dispersion 
means that a sector or an industry is evenly spread 
across the Member States. 
Concentration of production 
Motor vehicles, electrical machinery and machinery 
are the most concentrated sectors. In these sectors 70% 
of European value added is generated in three 
countries. Germany supplies the largest production 
share in each sector, with France, the United Kingdom 
or Italy alternatively making up the top three. Office 
machinery and other transport equipment are also 
heavily concentrated. In all these sectors the leading 
five countries together produce about 85% of the total 
EU output. However, amongst these heavily 
concentrated sectors only motor vehicles has increased 
its geographical concentration in the past decade. 
The least concentrated sectors are wood and pulp and 
paper, food, mineral products and telecom equipment, 
here about 50% are produced in three countries and 
about 70-75% in five countries. Concentration has 
decreased in most of these industries, strongly in 
Figure 3.1: Geographic concentration of production (sectors), 1988 and 1998 
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telecom equipment, where Germany and Spain lost 
while Sweden and Finland increased their shares. In 
the food sector, concentration has increased, due 
largely to increased market shares of Germany and the 
United Kingdom. 
Overall, geographic concentration of production, as 
measured by CR5, increased in only four out of 22 
sectors: tobacco, food, plastics, and other transport. If 
confined to the share of the largest three producing 
countries (CR3), it increased in seven sectors (see 
Figure 3.1). 
The unweighted average of the concentration rate over 
all sectors declined by 0.9% for the top three countries 
and 1.6% for the top five countries. 
At the more disaggregated three-digit level (not shown 
in the table), we see a lot of mobility, but the pattern is 
similar. Concentration rates decline in two thirds of the 
industries, the weighted average decline being about 
1.2% (for top three and top five). The largest increases 
occuned in reproduction of media, which concentrates 
in Ireland and in Austria. Other increases are reported 
in a small basic steel sub-industry "other first 
processing of iron", which concentrates in Italy and 
France, and in the weapons and ammunition industry 
(United Kingdom, France). Games and toys is 
geographically concentrated in Germany, Denmark 
and the United Kingdom, three textile industries in 
Italy and partly Spain. 
In three industries the increase in concentration (CR5) 
was larger than five points but none of these belong to 
the top ten most concentrated industries, even after this 
increase. On the other side concentration decreased in 
13 industries by more than 5%. Some of them are high 
tech industries such as telecom, medical equipment 
and process control. 
Concentration of exports 
Concentration decreases robustly for exports and trade 
imbalances across countries shrink. The shares of the 
largest three countries in a typical sector decreased by 
3.2% and by 4.0% in the typical industry. Absolute 
export concentration increased in just two sectors: 
office machinery due to the inroads of Ireland and the 
Netherlands, and other transport due to the gains of 
Figure 3.2: Geographic concentration of exports (industries), 1988 and 1998 
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France, Italy and the United Kingdom. At the industry 
level the highest export concentration rates are to be 
seen in processing of nuclear fuel, and aircraft and 
spacecraft, in two leather industries and some resource 
related industries (bricks, tobacco, jewellery). (See 
Figure 3.2) 
On the other hand, increases in concentration are 
reported in one quarter of the industries, the largest 
being in leather, wood containers and bricks, as well as 
in pesticides, ships and boats and air and spacecraft. 
For the majority of industries even the relative 
indicators show declining concentration, underlining 
the picture drawn by absolute indicators. The highest 
export concentration rates are reported in pulp and 
paper, wood, leather, apparel and office machinery, the 
largest increases in chemical industry, publishing and 
printing and in tobacco. The regional imbalances of 
exports and imports of countries in specific industries 
(as measured by the RCA value) decline. 
2. Convergence across industry types 
In this section we investigate whether extra insights 
are provided by grouping together industries into the 
broad types identified in the WIFO taxonomy (see 
Table 1.3 above). 
The level of concentration has been historically higher 
in research-intensive and in skill-intensive sectors. 
This is exactly in line with modern theory, which 
stresses spillovers and pooled labour markets in 
dynamic industries. In both groups, however, 
geographic concentration has been declining over this 
period (see Table 3.1). 
In the typical research-intensive industry, the largest 
three countries produced 71.6% of total EU output in 
1988; but this share has now fallen to 68.8%. This 
decrease is more rapid than the average in the other 
sectors. 
Concentration has been declining specifically in: 
process control equipment, where France, Italy and 
Finland have made gains; in audio, video and telecom 
industries, where Finland, Sweden and, in part, Austria 
and Belgium have increased their shares; and in the 
pharmaceutical industry, where Ireland has made some 
inroads. The main losses in these sectors occurred in 
Germany (in the first two) and the United Kingdom. 
Table 3.1: Geographic concentration of production 
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Significant increases in concentration are evident for 
two chemical industries (agro-chemicals and other 
chemicals, where Germany and the United Kingdom 
have both increased shares; in electronic components 
(Germany and Italy), and in office machinery (Ireland 
and the Netherlands). 
Least concentrated is the advertising-intensive 
segment. Concentration increased here slightly, but the 
typical top three share is still only 62.1%. The largest 
increases occuned in some food industries, as well as 
in publishing, the reproduction of recorded media 
(Ireland, Austria), sports goods (United Kingdom) and 
games and toys industry (Denmark). 24 - CHAPTER 3 
Figure 3.3: Concentration trends in production and trade 
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In the labour-intensive segment, concentration lies 
below the average and the trend varies across 
industries. The shares of the largest countries are 
increasing in many textile industries, but decreasing in 
construction and transport-related industries and in 
electrical equipment. In the textile industries, the rising 
shares of Italy and of Portugal translate into high 
absolute and relative concentration, and an increase in 
the dissimilarity index. In four textile industries, Italy's 
shares account for about one third of Europe's value 
added (starting from about 20% in 1988). Portugal 
increased its share to 5%. The large increases in these 
countries' shares reflect the declining production in 
other countries, since Italy and Portugal's shares of 
manufacturing for the apparel industry are roughly 
constant. 
If we divide industries according to skill classes, we 
see the same convergence. Concentration is higher, but 
declining in the highest skill class. It is low in the low 
skill industries, in which absolute concentration is 
approximately constant. 
3. The core-periphery pattern 
Economic geography stresses the importance of a core 
region, in which dynamic economies of scale can be 
exploited, while the fate of the periphery depends on 
trade costs, factor costs, mobility and trade barriers 
(see Chapter 2). The importance of market access, 
market size, income levels and sometimes a North-
South split are also discussed in this literature. 
In order to test for a core-periphery split, we have 
chosen a classification of countries that defines about 
one half of manufacturing as coming from core 
countries and one half as periphery.' We find (see 
Figure 3.4): 
Dividing the EU Member States into core and periphery 
countries is not an easy task, since some countries comprise 
core as well as periphery areas (Italy, United Kingdom). 
Probably, the right measure of the European core should 
encompass higher-than-average industrialised regions, such 
as Northern Italy and parts of the United Kingdom. For 
present purposes, however, we define the core as composed 
by Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France and the 
Netherlands. In fact, the main results remain unchanged if 
we also switch Italy and the United Kingdom from the 
periphery to the core. However, the details of the results 
depend slightly on the indicators used. The share of the core 
is stable if we take the weighted average (or absolute value 
added). If we take unweighted averages of the market 
shares, the core loses and the periphery wins (since the 
periphery has higher market shares in smaller industries and 
small industries are growing at high rates in small 
countries). 
Figure 3.4: Industry types and 
geographic structure 
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Stable shares of production over time: roughly 
50% of total manufacturing was produced in the 
core and 50% in the periphery in both 1988 and 
1998. Some of the peripheral countries like 26-CHAPTER 3 
Ireland, Portugal and Greece have increased their 
shares of value added, but others (Sweden and 
Finland) have lost shares, following a rather 
difficult period of restructuring during the ten 
years on which the analysis is focusing. 
• The core has its largest market shares in the 
research-intensive sectors, although this declined 
over the period: the core share in a typical 
research-intensive industry fell from 58.2% to 
57.0%. The shares of the United Kingdom 
decreased and those of Ireland and Finland 
increased. The core made its largest gains in 
electric components (where Italy and Germany 
won shares) and pesticides (which shifted from 
Austria, Spain and Finland to Germany). The 
periphery made its greatest inroads in telecom 
equipment, control equipment and optical 
instruments, as well as considerable progress in 
audio and video, and aircraft and spacecraft. 
• The core produced less than half of value added of 
a typical advertising-intensive industry. 
Industries with an increased share for the core 
were publishing, games and toys, some food 
industries and beverages. Germany and the 
Netherlands, in particular, increased their market 
shares in this group, while the losses for the 
periphery occurred in the Scandinavian countries 
and Italy. 
• In the labour-intensive industries, the typical 
market share of the core was low, and it decreased 
slightly to 45.7% in 1998. From a country 
perspective, Germany's share dropped, while the 
shares of Spain, Portugal and Italy in this segment 
increased. Spain increased its shares in transport 
and construction related industries; Italy in textiles 
and machine tools; Portugal in wood, apparel and 
some engineering industries. In all these cases, the 
peripheral countries gained not only in narrowly 
defined low cost industries. 
• In capital-intensive industries, the core and 
periphery have stable shares, partly at variance 
with the prediction that, in such industries, 
integration would lead upsizing of plants located 
in the centre. The core increased its shares in basic 
metals, cement and textile fibres, but lost larger 
shares in basic chemicals, pulp and paper, and tiles 
and flags. From the country perspective, France 
and the Netherlands decreased their shares in 
capital-intensive industries, and Ireland had the 
greatest increase (e.g. basic chemicals). 
In exports, the core lost market shares, with no 
difference between extra- and intra-EU exports.
2 
The industries that contributed to this trend were 
capital-intensive industries (coke, nuclear fuel, and 
basic chemicals), as well as textile industries, 
audio and video and telecom equipment. The core 
is losing exports in research-intensive industries, 
but to a lesser extent than for total exports. From 
the country perspective, the loss of the core is due 
to the decreasing market shares of Germany and to 
a slighter degree of the Netherlands; the gains for 
the periphery come from Ireland, Spain and the 
United Kingdom. 
4. Income, country size and the 
North-South pattern 
The core-periphery dichotomy is based on 
geographical criteria. In this section, we investigate 
three alternative criteria. 
First, dividing the Member States according to per 
capita GNP (at PPP)
3 creates a pattern in which 
middle-income countries are losing shares, high-
income countries are making small advances, and low-
income countries are gaining strength. This split is 
particularly distinct in advertising-intensive countries, 
in which middle-income countries had an over-
proportionate share and have now regressed to the 
average. For the labour-intensive segment, the same 
loss has been witnessed in the middle-income 
countries, while the share of the low-income countries 
has increased. The rising shares of the high-income 
countries in the labour-intensive segment are 
nevertheless a surprise. While high-income countries 
lost shares in the apparel industry, as expected, some 
high-income countries, such as Germany, increased 
their production of construction materials. In the 
research-intensive segment, the shares of the high-
income countries are, as expected, over proportionate, 
but not by a large margin. The low-income countries 
have caught up by 2% and now have 8% of the value 
added generated by industries in this group. Measured 
according to exports, the high-income group has lost at 
the expense of the other two groups. 
The share of the core is now 57.6% of total exports, 55.7% 
for extra-EU and 58.8% for intra-EU (weighted data). 
The countries are classified as "high income" (Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany and Austria), "middle income" (France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United 
Kingdom) and "low income" (Greece, Spain, Ireland, and 
Portugal). CHAPTER 3 - 27 
Alternatively, a North versus South divide in many 
theoretical studies, primarily from the USA, implying 
that the South is specialised in labour-intensive 
industries, while the North is innovative, specialised in 
research driven industries and those with significant 
product differentiation. 
In Europe, the North
4 produced 19.4% of the output in 
typical labour-intensive industries in 1998, having 
reduced its share by 4.0%. The South produced 32.8%, 
having increased its share by 3.5 percentage points 
during the last ten years. A considerable amount of 
production in the research-intensive industries can be 
attributed to the North, although its share increased 
only marginally. The South increased its share in 
typical research-intensive industries by 0.9%. 
Finally, we compare large and small countries (see 
Figure 3.5). The large countries (Germany, Spain, 
France, Italy and the United Kingdom) produced 
79.6% of EU value added in 1998, representing a 
decline of 1.7 percentage points compared to 1988. 
This is due to the lower shares of Italy and the United 
Kingdom, while the shares of Belgium, Austria and 
Ireland increased. The share of large countries in 
research-intensive and in skill-intensive industries is 
over proportionate, but declined typically by 3.0 
percentage points. The same tendencies hold for 
exports. The share of large countries in capital-
intensive industries is below average. 
5. Influence of other determinants 
In this section, we tum briefly to three industry 
characteristics, to see whether they are discriminators 
between industries with increasing and decreasing 
concentration. Table 3.2 reports concentration trends 
for the different industry characteristics. 
We find that concentration is greater in industries with 
high multinationality, although it decreased in these 
industries between 1988 and 1998 by two percentage 
points. There are only three industries with high 
degrees of multinationality
5 in which concentration 
rose: reproduction of recorded media, other chemicals 
and other food. Large decreases were recorded in 
We have defined the "North" to include Denmark, Ireland, 
Finland, Sweden and the United Kingdom; the "Middle" as 
Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands; the 
"South" as Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal. 
Here, we have used the Davies and Lyons (1996) 
classification of industries according to the multinationality 
of their leading firms - the indicators roughly reflect the 
number of countries in which the finns produce. WIFO has 
reclassified their indicators from old to new NACE. 
control equipment, audio and video, telecom 
equipment, electronic components, electrical 
equipment and ships and boats. This suggests a 
generally de-concentrating effect for MNEs over this 
period. 
Figure 3.5: Geographic concentration of production 
and exports 
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Table 3.2: Industry characteristics and 
concentration trends 
High market growth 
Medium market growth 
Low market growth 
High degree of globalisation 
Medium degree of globalisation 
Low degree of globalisation 
High multinationality 
Medium multinationality 
Low multinationality 
High minimum efficient scale 
Medium minimum efficient scale 
Low minimum efficient scale 
High economics of scale 
Medium economies of scale 
Low economies of scale 
High product differentiation 
Medium product differentiation 
Low product differentiation 
High productivity 
Medium productivity 
Low productivity 
High wage level 
Medium wage level 
Low wage level 
Low skill industries 
Medium skills/blue collar workers 
Medium skills/white collar workers 
Hieh skill industries 
CR3 
1988 
64.05 
64.70 
65.91 
67.37 
66.01 
61.28 
66.47 
65.17 
63.02 
63.53 
65.10 
66.03 
64.90 
66.10 
63.66 
68.67 
65.48 
60.51 
63.34 
67.54 
63.78 
68.08 
65.42 
61.16 
55.87 
64.18 
63.25 
66.51 
1998 
62.34 
63.33 
65.31 
66.35 
64.44 
60.19 
64.49 
63.66 
62.82 
62.94 
63.82 
64.21 
64.51 
63.50 
62.97 
66.50 
64.88 
59.60 
63.19 
64.72 
63.07 
67.69 
62.94 
60.35 
54.79 
62.46 
61.34 
63.72 
change 
-1.72 
-1.37 
-0.60 
-1.02 
-1.58 
-1.09 
-1.97 
-1.51 
-0.20 
-0.58 
-1.28 
-1.82 
-0.39 
-2.60 
-0.69 
-2.17 
-0.60 
-0.91 
-0.15 
-2.82 
-0.71 
-0.39 
-2.48 
-0.81 
-1.08 
-1.71 
-1.91 
-2.79 
CR5 
1988 
82.46 
83.23 
83.64 
85.23 
84.50 
79.59 
83.54 
83.06 
82.73 
82.09 
83.29 
83.94 
83.32 
83.05 
82.95 
85.64 
84.23 
79.46 
S 1.68 
84.36 
83.28 
84.84 
82.98 
81.50 
79.67 
83.35 
79.67 
85.08 
1998 
.s 1.55 
81.55 
82.44 
83.86 
82.82 
78.85 
82.22 
81.66 
81.64 
81.32 
81.60 
82.61 
82.92 
81.16 
81.45 
83.85 
83.77 
77.91 
S0.S7 
82.95 
81.71 
84.32 
80.98 
80.23 
78.30 
82.35 
77.54 
82.19 
change 
-0.91 
-1.68 
-1.20 
-1.37 
-1.68 
-0.74 
-1.32 
-1.39 
-1.09 
-0.77 
-1.69 
-1.33 
-0.40 
-1.89 
-1.51 
-1.79 
-0.46 
-1.55 
-II.M 
-1.41 
-1.57 
-0.52 
-2.01 
-1.27 
-1.37 
-1.00 
-2.13 
-2.89 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
It is to be expected that integration will enable a 
stronger exploitation of economies of scale. We have 
tested this expectation using two statistical indicators: 
one for economies of scale (EOS) and the other for 
minimum efficient scale (MES).
6 The data indicate that 
industries with larger EOS are, indeed, geographically 
more highly concentrated, but the difference from 
average concentration is very small. For both 
indicators the results are not statistically significant. 
However, they suggest that concentration declines 
somewhat less in industries with prominent scale 
economies. Among the industries with strong 
economies of scale, we find increasing concentration 
in other transport, other chemicals, other food and 
agro-chemicals; but there are also other industries with 
increasing returns, like electrical equipment, basic 
iron, and paints, in which concentration is declining. 
Overall, then, there is little evidence of a systematic 
effect related to production scale economies. 
Industries with high market growth are less 
regionally concentrated, average concentration is 
64.3% in those with high growth and 65.9% in those 
with low growth. Regional concentration declined in 
both groups between 1988 and 1998. Concentration is 
six percentage points higher in the group of highly 
globalised industries, but there is no difference in the 
rate of decrease between 1988 and 1998 between 
highly and lowly globalised industries. 
Finally, we find that high wage industries are 
significantly more concentrated, although they did not 
reduce their concentration over the last ten years. 
Within the high-wage group, there are some capital-
intensive industries (like agro-chemicals and steam 
generators), as well as some engineering industries 
(like machine tools, office computer, production of 
recorded media). Exactly half of them increased, and 
half of them reduced concentration. Within the low-
wage industries, most textile industries increased 
concentration; in industries producing semi-finished or 
less processed goods, concentration decreased. 
Industries with high product differentiation
7 started 
from high levels of concentration, which tended to 
decline over the last ten years. 
6. Summary 
The evidence does not support fears that the Single 
Market would lead to increased concentration - either 
in terms of production or trade. If anything, 
concentration has tended to decline, albeit marginally, 
in the typical industry (see Figure 3.3 above). This is 
in spite of the slight trends towards specialisation 
noted in the previous chapter, which have been more 
than compensated for by the relatively faster growth of 
the smaller Member States over the last decade. (See 
Box 3.1) 
This has a number of implications, either direct or 
indirect. Not least of these is that there are no signs of 
a strengthening of the core at the expense of the 
periphery. The share of total manufacturing in the 
periphery is stable, and some indicators look even 
brighter for the periphery; for example, in research-
intensive industries the difference in favour of the core 
has become smaller. Theoretical models suggested that 
lower trading costs flowing from integration might 
first favour the centre and in a later stage, perhaps, the 
periphery. This hypothesis has been likened to a U-
shaped curve. Certainly, the data reviewed here are 
insufficient enough to answer the question of on which 
part of the U-curve European manufacturing is 
currently producing. However, if anything, the signs 
are most consistent with the possibility that Europe is 
As indicators for economies of scale, we use data from 
Davies and Lyons (1996) on Minimum Efficient Scale (in 
relation to industry size, MES) and Pratten's (1988) 
classification into EOS classes according to a set of 
indicators. 
The standard deviation of export-unit values is used as an 
indicator of product differentiation. See Aiginger (1997). CHAPTER 3 - 29 
eventually reaching the second side of the U. The Nevertheless, we should take into account that the 
periphery is catching up in several indicators (exports, study period is short, and that these results for 
research-intensive industries) and the low-income countries should be complemented by further analysis 
countries are making inroads in skill- and research- at the regional level, 
intensive sectors. 
Box 3.1 Rising specialisation, but declining concentration: no paradox 
At first sight, it seems strange that countries can become more specialised, whilst industries become less concentrated. 
After all, increased specialisation implies that a country is concentrating more of its activity in those industries in which 
it is comparatively larger, and less in those in which it is comparatively smaller. In a world where all countries were of 
the same size, and likewise all industries, increased specialisation must mean that industries will also become more 
concentrated (because the larger players would become larger, and the smaller players smaller.) 
To put the same point statistically, specialisation and concentration are two perspectives to be derived from a matrix with 
the columns referring to 14 countries, and the rows to 22 sectors (95 industries). Specialisation is observed by reading 
down each column, whilst concentration is observed by reading along each row. One might expect that if "inequalities" 
tend to increase down the columns, so they should also increase along the rows. 
In fact, there is no paradox in our results, and the two opposing trends can be reconciled precisely because the Member 
States are not all equal sized, nor are the industries. 
Formally, this can be shown most elegantly using the well-known statistical "Entropy index". This index is similar 
conceptually to the Herfindahl index described in Box 1.1 (the entropy is the summed product of share and log share, as 
opposed to the Herfindahl, which is the summed squared shares). In its numbers equivalent (antilogged) form, this 
converts each country's (industry's) actual distribution of industry (country shares) into an hypothetical equivalent 
number of equal sized industries (countries). So a very specialised country will record a low number equivalent 
industries, whilst a very diversified country will record a value nearer to 22 (in terms of sectors). Similarly, a 
geographically concentrated industry records a low value, whilst a dispersed one records a value near to the upper limit 
of 14. 
When the entropies are calculated for specialisation and concentration in 1988 and 1998 (based on production), we 
confirm the main message of the last two chapters: 
• average specialisation (across countries) increased slightly: the numbers equivalent decline from 16.6 to 15.9 
• average concentration (across sectors) declined slightly: the numbers equivalent rise from 7.5 to 7.7. 
Moreover, it is easy to show, algebraically, that the two concepts are related as follows: 
Average specialisation of countries = Average concentration of industries χ Specialisation of industries in the EU as a 
single entity / Concentration of total manufacturing as a single entity. 
For example, in 1998: 15.9 = 7.7 * (17.1 / 8.3); and in 1988: 16.6 = 7.5 * (17.6 / 8.0). 
This shows that average specialisation and concentration moved in opposite directions, because aggregate specialisation 
of the EU as a whole and concentration of manufacturing as a whole also moved in opposite directions. 
In other words, although most countries were specialising more in what they do best, this did not lead to increased 
concentration of industries because the smaller countries (which tend to account for the smaller shares in any particular 
industry) have grown more rapidly than the larger countries: in 1988, it was as if EU manufacturing in aggregate was 
produced by 8.0 equal sized Member States, but by 1998, this had risen to 8.3. 
Putting this story into more specific terms, the five largest sectors - chemicals, machinery, food, motor vehicle, metal 
products - increased their share of European production by 2.2%, and this trend influenced measured specialisation rates 
in most countries. For geographic concentration, what is important is that the share of the large countries declined, and 
so the concentration of those industries where the large countries have the highest shares tended to decline. High growth 
in small countries increased dispersion (decreased concentration). Chapter 4 
The impact of structural change on competitiveness 
Having established the main trends for specialisation 
and concentration, we now need to ask "what do these 
tell us so far about the concerns raised in the 
introductory section?" The answer is "more about 
some than others", and, in particular that we need a 
little more information before we can tackle what is 
perhaps the key issue: competitiveness. This chapter 
attempts to provide that extra information. But, first, 
we take stock of the story so far. 
1. Recalling the advantages and 
disadvantages of specialisation and 
concentration 
We argued in the introduction that the process of 
specialisation and concentration is driven by the 
decisions of individual firms and investors in a rapidly 
changing environment. The speed and direction of the 
process depend, on the one hand, on economic forces 
such as economies of scale, spillovers, technology, the 
price elasticity of demand and the mobility of labour, 
and, on the other hand, on the underlying economic, 
social and political framework. Institutions, 
regulations, liberalisation and public support can all 
influence the course of the process. 
In general there are advantages as well as 
disadvantages of specialisation. These can be grouped 
into two broad effects: 
• The efficiency effect. At the individual firm level, 
by specialising the firm may be able to exploit 
economies of scale, to reap learning effects, to use 
specialised inputs etc. If so, efficiency increases. 
• The risk effect. On the other hand, risks can 
increase for less diversified firms and 
specialisation can be particularly disadvantageous, 
if the firm is locked into a mature, declining 
industry. 
Both these effects have equivalent counterparts at the 
regional and national levels. Countries with higher 
specialised industries can enjoy higher productivity if 
specialisation occurs in dynamic markets, and if they 
have specific endowments and scale economies which 
can be exploited. Moreover, geographic concentration 
of industries may also enhance competitiveness if 
significant spillovers or vertical linkages exist. 
However, there are also other angles, not so easily 
explained by the analogy to the individual firm. In 
particular, the risk effect at the macro level has become 
a major policy issue as Europe becomes a currency 
union. This is discussed in the literature about the 
optimal regional extension of areas with a common 
currency.' 
If member countries of a currency union are too much 
specialised in narrow product markets, then external 
shocks will lead to asymmetries in demand, which can 
no longer be dampened by changes in the external 
value of currencies. In this case, the flexibility of 
capital, product and labour markets have to be 
increased to prevent persistent differences in demand. 
Against this backcloth, the previous chapters have 
helped provide a partial assessment of how real these 
hopes and fears have been. In particular, the two 
previous chapters have shown that, although there has 
been a trend towards increased specialisation, this has 
not been pronounced or pervasive. Nevertheless, in 
principle, this might have led to increased 
concentration. In practice, however, this has not been 
the case since geographical concentration has tended to 
decline, largely because of the relatively stronger 
growth performance of the smaller Member States. 
However, what they have not shown directly is how 
this has affected competitiveness. Indeed, a moment's 
reflection will confirm that there can be no simple and 
obvious causal link between specialisation and 
concentration and the competitiveness of Member 
States and the EU as a whole. While it is true that 
indexes of specialisation and concentration may reveal 
something about the extent of change
2, they can not 
See Mundell ( 1961 ) and De Grauwe, ( 1996). 
It should be noted that our indices capture the net effect of 
structural forces operating on industries. To the extent that 
there are offsetting forces at work: a specific small increase 
in specialisation may be the net effect of two countervailing 
forces, one increasing specialisation and a second smaller 
one working against. 32-CHAPTER 4 
establish directly that this has an effect on 
competitiveness. Ultimately, it is the underlying 
"speed of change" which would be expected to have an 
impact on competitiveness and growth. 
The purpose, then, of this chapter is to provide the 
missing link: evidence that change enhances 
competitiveness. 
2. Speed of change and growth, 
compared across Member States 
For this purpose, we have constructed an index of the 
"speed of change" for each country by summing the 
absolute changes in the sector (i.e. two-digit industry) 
shares between 1988 and 1998.
3 This index would be 
zero if no industry changed its share of total value 
added, and it increases the more industries change their 
relative positions. 
Countries have been ranked by this index, as well as 
by their growth in value added and exports (total, 
extra- and intra-EU). This has been conducted at the 
levels of both industries and sectors, and so we have 
eight comparisons of growth and speed of change 
(Table 4.1). 
Table 4.1: Growth of production, employment and 
exports and the speed of change 
Production 
Employment 
Exports: 
Total 
Extra-EU 
Intra-EU 
Rank correlation coefficient between 
speed of change and growth 
Sector level 
0.42 * 
0.18 
0.48 * 
0.43 * 
0.09 
Industry level 
0.38 * 
0.23 
0.47 * 
0.51 * 
0.13 
Note: Speed of change (dissimilarity) = sum of absolute 
differences of shares in a specific country in 1998 as 
compared to 1988. * - Significant at 90% level. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COMEXT. 
The index calculates the sum of the absolute differences 
between the shares of production in 1988 and 1998. This 
process is repeated for each country, and separately for 
value added, total exports, extra-exports and intra-exports. 
This is again a dissimilarity index of the type used in 
previous chapters. But this time it is between structures for 
the same country at two points in time (for specialisation, 
the same calculation was made to compare a country with 
the EU; for concentration to compare an industry with total 
manufacturing; in both cases for the same year). 
All eight correlations are positive, six of them 
significantly so at the 90% level.
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Amongst the Member States, the index was highest 
(structural change fastest) in production in Ireland, 
followed by Portugal: these two countries assumed the 
same positions in terms of growth in value added (see 
Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1: Speed of change and growth of 
production and exports 
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Source: WIFO calculations using SBS and COMEXT. 
Table 4.2 shows which sectors gained shares and 
which lost most heavily in the two countries. Having 
said this, the correlation is by no means perfect. For 
The lower correlation between speed of change and 
employment suggests that the underlying relation is quite 
complex. For some industries structural change might 
determine an employment reduction in the short term but a 
positive effect is likely to follow in the long run. CHAPTER 4-33 
instance, Germany, Austria and Belgium all grew 
relatively rapidly, while their structural change was 
slow. Contrarily, there was substantial structural 
change in Sweden and Finland, but their growth was 
relatively slow. 
Needless to say, there will be important country-
specific effects (e.g. for the Nordic countries, 
devaluation and the loss of the Russian market). 
However, these correlations, especially for change in 
production and extra-EU imports, are sufficiently high 
to be suggestive of an underlying positive relationship 
between change and growth in value added, exports 
and competitiveness. Of course, correlation does not 
prove causality. This would require at least a longer 
timer series and controlling for intervening economic 
and political variables. 
Table 4.2: Growth of production in Ireland and 
Portugal and the speed of change 
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Ireland 
Chemical and chemical products 
Publishing, printing and reproduction 
Medical, precision and optical instruments. 
watches 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n. e. c. 
Radio, TV and communication equipment 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c. 
Office machinery and computers 
Basic metals 
Tobacco products 
Food products and beverages 
1988 
16.39 
4.94 
3 72 
2.76 
2.12 
4.72 
10.34 
2.54 
3.19 
27.88 
1998 
27.18 
8.73 
5.13 
4.17 
3.09 
3.44 
8.89 
0.57 
1.15 
20.07 
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Portugal 
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Electrical machinery and apparatus n. e. c. 
Furniture; manufacturing n. e. c. 
Publishing, printing and reproduction 
Machinery and equipment n. e. c. 
Office machinery and computers 
Basic metals 
Tobacco products 
Food products and beverages 
1988 
3.01 
7.10 
2.62 
1.44 
3.48 
3.82 
2.42 
5.01 
13.43 
10.50 
1998 
7.67 
8.91 
4.34 
3.04 
4.89 
2.91 
1.39 
2.38 
9.36 
5.26 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
3. Is the speed of change increasing? 
We have also investigated whether the speed of change 
has been increasing over this period by recomputing it 
for each year, based on absolute changes in shares 
compared to three years previously.
5 Again this can be 
computed either by looking at changing industry 
structure of countries or by looking at country 
structure of industries. We have done both, and the 
results are shown in Figure 4.2. It appears that the 
speed of change has accelerated, being faster through 
the nineties than it was at the end of the eighties. 
Although we can not rule out external influences 
(globalisation), this finding is consistent with the 
Single Market Programme having led to an increased 
the speed of adjustment and, possibly, enhanced 
competitiveness of European Industry. However, if we 
recall the size of the remaining productivity difference 
versus the USA and the temporary halt to the catching 
up process, this effect may not have been sufficient 
from the efficiency point of view. 
Figure 4.2: Speed of structural change 
17(1 
160 
150 
140 
130 
120 
110 
too 
90 
SO 
/ 
Mobility in geographic 
structure 
-\ /--
\ / 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Note: "Mobility" stands for the absolute change of value added shares 
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and 1986, etc. 
Source: WIFO calculations using SBS. 
4. Summary 
This chapter has delved beneath the aggregate indices 
of specialisation and concentration of the previous 
chapters to extract an indicator of the underlying speed 
of change. Some, admittedly basic, statistical tests 
suggest that: 
• Those Member States exhibiting the most dynamic 
industrial structures have tended to enjoy faster 
growth; 
• The speed of change appears to have increased as 
the effects of the Single Market have begun to 
work through. 
Both results will require deeper analysis in the future 
before we can attribute an element of causality, but, on 
the face of things, both are consistent with a link 
between structural change and competitiveness. 
That is, the equivalent of the index in the previous section, 
but instead of just comparing the end points, here we 
investigate three-year changes on a rolling basis. Chapter 5 
Main findings and policy implications 
1. Background and results 
Motivation 
In a fast-changing world economy, one of the keys to 
competitiveness is adaptability. Amongst other things, 
this means the ability to push extra resources into 
exploiting existing comparative strengths, whilst 
keeping open the capability to pursue opportunities in 
new areas as and when they arise. This is just as true 
for the EU as a whole as for any individual firm 
searching for an optimal corporate strategy. 
One purpose of this report is to assess how far the EU 
displays this desired adaptability. In principle, there 
are a number of ways of assessing this question. Here 
we have chosen to examine the data on two key 
statistical indicators - the extent to which the Member 
States have specialised (or not) their activity into a 
small number of industries; and the extent to which 
industries within the EU are concentrated (or not) in 
just a few Member States. 
Coincidentally, these two indicators also offer valuable 
insights into the effects of the single European market. 
They allow us to evaluate whether European 
integration has led to the specialisation which is, to 
some extent, implied by the removal of market 
imperfections within Europe. Similarly, they allow us 
to test whether this has been at the expense of an over-
concentration in geographical terms, in which certain 
disadvantaged countries lose out to the larger, more 
geographically core countries. 
Main findings 
The main results in a nutshell are as follows. First, the 
evidence on specialisation is mixed. On balance, most, 
but not all, countries have tended to become slightly 
more specialised in terms of their production. This is 
more pronounced in the last five years than the 
previous five years, and is consistent with the effects 
of the Single Market beginning to bite. On the other 
hand, there has been no such tendency for exports - if 
anything, the reverse is true. Second, fears that 
geographical concentration would rise have not 
materialised. Here, the evidence is robust and clear cut 
- in the typical industry, production is now more 
geographically dispersed across the Member States 
than it was ten years ago. These are, of course, 
generalisations and we should not ignore the 
considerable diversity that the data reveal. For 
example, two of the fastest growing economies, in 
manufacturing terms, are Ireland and Portugal. Whilst 
the former has become even more specialised over the 
decade by pursuing newly found strengths, the latter 
has become considerably more diversified as it 
establishes footholds in what, for it, are new industries. 
On the other hand, in some of the larger Member 
States, structural change has been less pronounced. We 
must not be extravagant in our claims to have 
unearthed a strong causal positive relationship between 
the extent of structural change and the rate of growth. 
But, with caution, we do suggest that some of our 
findings (especially in the previous chapter) are 
consistent with such a relationship. 
The findings in more detail 
In slightly more detail, our main findings are as 
follows: 
1. There has been a slight strengthening of certain 
clusters, specifically of large industries in large 
countries (e.g. the manufacturing of cars in 
Germany, machinery in Italy, chemicals in 
France, and food in the United Kingdom). This 
movement is contributing to a rise in the 
specialisation indicators for production in a 
majority of countries. The tendency is however 
quite weak, and its strength varies between 
countries. Portugal, for example, is broadening its 
production structure and its exports, while Ireland 
is enjoying high and increasing specialisation. 
2. If anything, there has been a slight de-
specialisation of manufacturing exports. In most 
countries export specialisation in 1998 is lower 
than in 1988. This result merits further analysis, 
but is consistent with a broad-based growth in 
intra-industry trade, contrasted to little growth in 
inter-industry trade in resource-based and certain 36 - CHAPTER 5 
other industries. In some countries, increasing 
production specialisation has coincided with 
decreasing export specialisation. The Finnish pulp 
and paper, Swedish machinery, and the United 
Kingdom chemical industries are examples of 
industries which were affected by this trend. 
Another interesting case is the German car 
industry, which increased both its exports and its 
overall market share over this period. However, 
since imports expanded relatively faster (from a 
much lower level), this increase in intra-industry 
trade actually eroded the magnitude of Germany's 
trade balance relative to that of the rest of the EU. 
3. Geographic concentration, measured as the share 
of the top three or five countries in industries, has 
declined. This holds on average, as well as for the 
majority of industries for production and, even 
stronger, for exports. In terms of production, only 
four out of 22 sectors (food, tobacco, plastics and 
other transport) had increasing absolute 
concentration rates, in exports only two. At the 
industry level, absolute concentration decreased 
in two thirds of the industries. 
4. Geographic concentration is higher in research 
and skill intensive industries. But in both groups, 
it has been declining faster than the average. 
Specific examples are control equipment, the 
audio and video sector, telecom equipment and 
pharmaceuticals. Geographic concentration is 
higher in industries with strong economies of 
scale, and in industries with high globalisation, 
with high product differentiation and high wages. 
All of these results are consistent with the theory. 
However none of them really help to explain the 
changes in concentration we have observed 
between 1988 and 1998 (although there is some 
evidence that a strong presence of MNEs has 
contributed to de-concentration). This indicates 
that strategies of individual firms may play an 
important role in explaining changes in 
concentration in specific industries. Perhaps the 
period studied here was too short and too strongly 
influenced by shocks, but the net effect is that we 
have not unearthed a complete quantitative 
explanation of the sources of change. 
5. The combination of generally increased 
specialisation and generally decreasing 
concentration may appear superficially surprising. 
However, it can be explained by the fact that the 
smaller Member States have tended to grow faster 
in aggregate, than the larger Member States. As a 
consequence, increased specialisation within 
individual large countries does not mean that the 
EU is more dependent on that country for that 
particular industry. Rather, concentration does not 
increase because the "market" shares of the 
smaller countries have increased simultaneously. 
In many ways, this is a happy coincidence of 
events - the presumed benefits of specialisation 
have not coincided with the tensions of increased 
concentration. 
6. Contrary to the fears of some, the industrial 
shares of the more centrally located countries 
have not risen over the past ten years. For the 
sake of brevity, we shall call this group "core" 
and the non-centrally located Member States 
"periphery", although these concepts are more 
appropriate for regions than countries. This result 
is robust to changes in the classification of 
countries. As for exports, the core is losing 
market shares. As might be expected, it has an 
over-proportionally large share of research 
intensive industries, but even this has declined 
marginally (more strongly for exports). The 
periphery has made inroads in telecom 
equipment, control instruments as well as aircraft 
and spacecraft. In advertising intensive industries, 
the core has traditionally had lower shares, but, 
conversely, this has been increasing during the 
last ten years. Sport goods, music, games and 
some food industries are responsible for this 
trend. Thus, there are some signs of convergence 
- if anything, the Member States' industrial 
structures are becoming more similar, at least in 
broad terms. 
7. As already mentioned, the smaller countries have 
been growing faster over the past ten years than 
larger countries. In Ireland and in Portugal, this is 
partly a result of the catching up process. In the 
former this has been effected by increasing its 
already high specialisation, whilst the latter has 
spread its manufacturing over a wider range of 
industries by expanding into (for it) new areas. 
Relatively, fast growth has also emerged in 
Austria and Denmark, which were already 
members of the high-income group. If classified 
according to income per capita, the medium 
income group has been losing output share, the 
high income group has been winning slightly and 
the low income countries have been gaining 
fastest. The high-income countries are losing 
some of their lead in research intensive industries, 
while low-income countries are catching up in 
endowment structure and in industry structure. 
However, these trends are not particularly 
pronounced. CHAPTER 5-37 
8. While most of our statistics only provide indirect 
evidence of a link between the speed of change 
and enhanced competitiveness, the slightly 
speculative statistical experiments in the previous 
chapter do support such a connection. They show 
a positive correlation between the growth of 
individual Member States and the underlying 
changes in the shares of industries within each 
country. 
2. Policy implications 
In a world where patterns of demand are changing 
rapidly, similarly rapid changes in market shares are a 
sign of an efficient market. Indeed, to the extent that 
the Single Market programme had the objective of 
removing market imperfections, at least within Europe, 
it might be expected (and hoped) that the last ten years 
would have seen significant structural change in 
European manufacturing. 
On balance, however, the evidence reported here 
suggests that, although there has been change, it has 
been rather limited (with exceptions in some of the 
smaller Member States). It is true that stable market 
shares are not incontrovertible evidence of an 
inefficient market — for instance, strong and 
unchanging consumer preferences can also sometimes 
give rise to such stability. Nevertheless, bearing in 
mind the continuing productivity gap vis-à-vis the 
USA, it is likely that one remaining cause of slow 
structural change is market imperfections within 
Europe. 
The policy implication must be that efforts to remove 
remaining imperfections should continue, and 
probably accelerate. While the root cause of change in 
any market economy must always be the responses of 
individual firms to new opportunities, there is still 
invariably an important facilitating role for policy. 
Perhaps, there might have been some cause for 
caution, if there was evidence that such change as there 
has been over the last decade has led to undesirable 
inequalities between the Member States. However, 
none of the evidence we have reported points in this 
direction - on the contrary, geographical concentration 
has weakened. 
Overall then, our conclusion is a simple one. In the 
wake of the Single European Market, the extent of 
structural change appears to have been, somewhat 
disappointingly, slow. In this context, even a prudent 
commentator would be justified in arguing for no let 
up in the drive towards more efficient markets within 
the EU. 
Of course, it has not been the purpose of this report to 
investigate the impact of specific policies on these 
dimensions of structural change. To that extent, it 
would be inappropriate to end with specific policy 
proposals. On the other hand, examples of policies 
which should improve the efficiency of any market 
include: an active competition policy; continuing 
managed removal of subsidies for declining industries; 
no specific protection of national champions; positive 
upgrading of the infrastructure of regions where low 
wage, low growth industries are concentrated; 
continued investment in education and training; 
provision of support for basic research (to avoid 
market failure inevitably associated with public 
goods); and enhanced flexibility in the labour market. 
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Prime forces of structural change Chapter 1 
Physical investment in Europe 
Gross fixed capital formation is of crucial importance 
for the competitiveness of an economy. Periods of 
strong output growth are always accompanied by 
substantial physical investment. Such investment not 
only enhances directly the productivity of labour but is 
also the means of acquiring new technology embodied 
in new machinery. Indeed, in most sectors of the 
economy, the component of technology embodied in 
fixed capital - including computers - is much more 
important than disembodied technical change. Very 
often, capital investment is a necessary condition if we 
are to fully exploit the returns from R&D expenditures. 
In the short run, physical investment is also important 
as a component of aggregate demand. In many 
macroeconomic models, the demand side is built 
around the investment equations. Though fixed capital 
investment represents commonly less than a fourth of 
total aggregate demand, its role over the cycle is of 
particular importance because it is one of the most 
fluctuating and least predictable demand components. 
The role of physical investment often comes under 
scrutiny when problems of employment are 
considered. There is little doubt that, to create new 
durable employment posts, new physical investment is 
usually needed. This is one of the reasons why most 
countries have some type of investment promotion 
policy in place. 
On the other hand, particularly in periods of slow 
output growth, physical investment often accompanies 
important restructuring programmes that lead to losses 
of jobs in the short run. In particular in Europe, this 
role of fixed capital as a substitute rather than a 
complement to labour has received substantial 
publicity. Indeed, the received wisdom so far has been 
that European firms invest more as a share of their 
value added but create fewer jobs than their US 
counterparts.
1 
In this chapter, after examining the latest aggregate 
and sectoral data on investment, we find that the 
picture has changed substantially in the nineties. In 
Europe the accumulation process has undergone a 
strong deceleration accompanied by a less sharp fall in 
output growth; in the USA there has been an 
acceleration of investment activity at almost constant 
economic growth. Investment and employment 
creation turn out to be more complements rather than 
substitutes. 
Following the main line of the report, the analysis 
focuses on investments' structural change within 
European manufacturing. In particular, it investigates 
whether the Member States are becoming more 
specialised or more similar in their investments' 
structures, and whether industrial investments are 
becoming more concentrated in fewer individual 
Member States or more dispersed over all regions. 
Considering sectoral specialisation, we find no very 
marked differences between the larger European 
economies and the USA. Overall, we detect no 
consistent pattern of increasing or decreasing 
investment specialisation over time. 
Instead, we do find some evidence of a decreasing 
geographic concentration of investment of various 
manufacturing sectors within Europe, possibly as an 
effect of market integration. 
In the last part of this chapter some tentative results are 
presented on the determinants of sector-specific 
investment in the EU Member States. In spite of the 
convergence of regulation structures among Member 
States and the wide process of economic integration, 
country differences still remain strong. 
1. Investment trends in the economy 
and in manufacturing 
Investment patterns in total economy 
At the beginning of the nineties the general assessment 
was that Europe and, even more so, Japan were 
gradually catching up in the productivity and 
specialisation race vis-à-vis the USA. This view was 
often based on the observation that Europe and Japan 
See European Commission (1997, 1998). 42 - CHAPTER 1 
were consistently investing more than the USA in new 
physical capital. 
Indeed, over the last 30 years, the USA has 
consistently represented the lower bound and Japan the 
upper bound of investment as a ratio of GDP at 
constant prices (see Figure 1.1). In the beginning of the 
nineties, this ratio was around 17% for the USA and 
over 30% for Japan. 
Figure 1.1: Gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP 
EU15  -USA·  -Japan 
1969 1972 1975 1978 1981 1984 1987 1990 1993 1996 1999 
Note: GFCF and GDP are deflated using their own price indices. 
Source: European Commission. 
All major European countries consistently fell within 
this band, though dynamics have varied substantially 
from one EU Member State to another (see Table 1.1). 
On average, at the beginning of the nineties, EU 
countries were investing around 22% of their GDP. 
Table 1.1: Real gross fixed capital formation as a 
percentage of GDP in EU Member States 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
ETJ-15 
ι ;SA 
Japan 
1970-79 
20.3 
26.4 
25.3 
30.0 
22.8 
23.1 
23.8 
23.5 
25.5 
24.2 
23.9 
29.3 
30.7 
20.5 
19.2 
23.4 
17.2 
30.2 
1980-89 
16.4 
19.9 
22.0 
22.5 
19.7 
20.0 
20.9 
19.8 
22.2 
20.4 
21.5 
25.9 
27.2 
is. 6 
18.3 
20.4 
17.3 
27.9 
1990-98 
18.8 
20.1 
22.0 
22.9 
22.5 
19.5 
16.1 
18.5 
26.1 
20.2 
24.0 
28.7 
20.5 
17.1 
19.3 
20.3 
17.6 
30.3 
1995 
18.4 
20.3 
22.0 
21.5 
22.1 
19.1 
15.2 
17.8 
25.0 
19.8 
24.3 
27.9 
17.6 
16.2 
18.6 
19.8 
17.8 
29.7 
1996 
18.3 
20.6 
21.4 
22.8 
21.8 
18.7 
16.0 
17.8 
23.9 
20.2 
24.4 
28.6 
18.4 
16.6 
19.0 
19.7 
18.6 
31.3 
1997 
18.7 
22.0 
21.0 
24.2 
22.1 
18.3 
16.0 
17.6 
24.9 
20.X 
24.5 
30.9 
19.9 
15.5 
19.5 
19.7 
19.3 
30.0 
1998 1999 
19.0 19.3 
22.8 23.0 
20.6 20.6 
25.6 27.4 
23.3 24.4 
18.5 18.8 
16.0 16.3 
18.0 18.2 
25.8 25.8 
20.9 20.7 
25.1 25.6 
32.3 33.4 
20.5 21.1 
16.5 16.9 
20.5 20.9 
20.0 20.3 
20.4 20.7 
28.1 27.0 
Note: Figures for 
Source: European 
1999 are estimates. 
Commission. 
In the last years, the perception of the highly investing 
European and Japanese economies and of the laggard 
USA is changing rapidly. 
Investment levels as a percentage of GDP fell in 
Europe in 1998 for the first time below US levels (20.0 
and 20.4 respectively). Estimates suggest that this is 
likely to be repeated in 1999. Investment activity in 
Japan also shows clear signs of slowdown. 
Growth rates, rather than investment levels, give an 
even more vivid picture of the changes that have taken 
place over the nineties. Between 1990 and 1998 the 
growth rate of investment (at constant prices) of the 
EU15 fell by two thirds (from 2.5% in the eighties to 
0.8% in the nineties), while that of the USA more than 
doubled (from 2.4% to 5.4%). In Japan, the fall was 
even sharper (from 5% to -0.4%). (See Table 1.2) 
Table 1.2: Trends in GDP, investment and 
employment (average annual rate of change) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU-11 
EU-15 
USA 
Japan 
GDP 
1970-80 
3.4 
2.2 
2.7 
4.6 
3.5 
3.3 
4.7 
3.6 
2.6 
3.0 
3.6 
4.7 
3.4 
2.0 
1.9 
3.2 
2.9 
3.2 
4.5 
1980-90 
1.9 
2.0 
2.2 
0.7 
3.0 
2.4 
3.6 
1.2 
4.5 
2.2 
2.3 
3.2 
3.1 
2.0 
2.7 
2.4 
2.4 
2.9 
4.0 
1990-98 
1.7 
2.7 
2.0 
1.9 
2.1 
1.6 
7.7 
1.2 
5.0 
2.6 
2.1 
2.4 
1.5 
1.0 
2.0 
1.8 
1.8 
2.7 
1.1 
GFCF 
1970-80 
2.3 
-0.8 
1.2 
2.8 
1.6 
2.5 
5.7 
1.7 
2.6 
0.2 
3.7 
4.1 
2.1 
0.6 
0.5 
1.7 
1.5 
3.6 
3.5 
1980-90 
2.3 
1.6 
1.6 
-0.4 
5.2 
2.3 
0.5 
1.6 
3.7 
1» 
2.5 
3.0 
3.4 
3.3 
4.3 
2.2 
2.5 
2.4 
5.2 
1990-98 
0.9 
4.4 
0.9 
3.3 
1.4 
-0.3 
5.6 
-0.4 
5.9 
2.6 
3.1 
4.4 
-2.5 
-2.2 
2.0 
0.6 
0.8 
5.4 
-0.4 
Employment 
1970-80 
0.2 
0.7 
0.1 
0.7 
-0.6 
0.5 
0.9 
0.6 
1.2 
0.7 
0.3 
0.4 
0.9 
0.9 
0.3 
0.3 
0.3 
2.4 
0.8 
1980-90 
0.2 
0.7 
0.6 
1.0 
0.9 
0.3 
-0.2 
0.4 
1.7 
1.1 
1.1 
1.2 
0.6 
0.5 
0.8 
0.6 
0.6 
1.8 
1.2 
1990-98 
0.2 
0.3 
-0.5 
0.5 
0.6 
0.2 
2.9 
-0.6 
3.0 
1.7 
1.1 
0.4 
-1.3 
-1.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.0 
1.3 
0.5 
Source: European Commission. 
Within Europe, the fall was sharpest in Finland and 
Sweden (especially in the beginning of this decade 
when they were hit by devaluation and the loss of 
Russian markets) and in the largest countries of 
continental Europe, France and Italy in particular. 
The different patterns of investment between the USA 
and EU are not only an effect of the falling role of the 
European public sector investments. Looking at the 
breakdown of real investment spending, between 1990 
and 1998 real government investment spending has 
dropped by 1.3% p.a. in the EU, while in the USA it 
was increasing by 3.7% (see Table 1.3). In the same 
period, the real investment in the private sector has 
increased merely by one percent in Europe and by 
5.7% in the USA. 
Interestingly, the rise and fall of investment growth 
was generally accompanied by similar changes in 
employment growth, highlighting in this way the CHAPTER 1 - 43 
complementary relation between the two
2 (see Table 
1.2 above). The USA has registered one of the fastest 
growth rates in both fixed investment and 
employment. Within Europe, Luxembourg and Ireland 
were among the best performers on both accounts. 
Table 1.3: Breakdown of investment into private 
sector and general government (average annual 
rate of change) 
Table 1.4: Ex-post elasticities of investment to GDP 
growth 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU-11 
EU-15 
USA 
Japan 
Private sector 
1970-80 
2.0 
-0.6 
1.5 
3.8 
1.7 
2.7 
5.4 
1.5 
1.1 
0.4 
4.0 
3.4 
2.1 
1.5 
1.9 
1.9 
1.8 
4.1 
2.6 
1980-90 
3.9 
2.5 
2.2 
-0.5 
3.7 
2.0 
1.6 
1.2 
4.8 
2.3 
2.9 
3.3 
3.5 
4.1 
4.5 
2.2 
2.6 
2.1 
5.6 
1990-98 
0.7 
4.3 
1.2 
2.2 
2.1 
-0.5 
5.3 
0.0 
5.8 
2.6 
3.8 
3.8 
-2.9 
-2.1 
2.8 
0.8 
1.1 
5.7 
-1.7 
General government 
1970-80 
3.3 
-1.9 
0.0 
-0.5 
-0.4 
1.4 
7.0 
3.0 
8.5 
-1.0 
2.6 
10.5 
2.6 
-2.4 
-5.0 
1.0 
-0.3 
0.9 
8.0 
1980-90 1990-98 
-8.5 3.4 
-5.1 4.8 
-1.9 -2.0 
-0.1 7.3 
16.2 -1.9 
3.6 0.7 
-5.3 7.7 
3.8 -2.7 
0.3 6.0 
-0.7 2.5 
0.2 -2.8 
1.4 8.4 
2.8 -0.1 
-0.5 -3.1 
2.7 -5.2 
2.0 -1.0 
1.8 -1.3 
3.7 3.7 
3.1 5.0 
Source: European Commission. 
Investment, growth and employment 
Not all of the fluctuations in the available factors of 
production have worked their way through to output 
growth. Indeed, a characteristic of the nineties, that 
differs from the stylised facts of previous decades, is 
that, in Europe, the accumulation process has 
undergone a strong deceleration in presence of a not so 
much reduced output growth. In the USA there has 
been an acceleration of investment activity at almost 
constant economic growth. 
Another way of observing the same relation between 
capital and output is by calculating the ex post 
elasticity of capital formation to output growth (the 
ratio of the investment growth rate to the GDP growth 
rate) (see Table 1.4). Low ex post elasticity means that 
higher domestic growth was needed to induce the same 
investment growth and, conversely, less investment is 
required to bring about the same output growth. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU-11 
EU-15 
USA 
Japan 
Investment / GDP 
1970-80 1980-90 1990-98 
0.7 1.3 0.5 
-0.3 0.8 1.6 
0.4 0.7 0.4 
0.6 -0.6 1.7 
0.4 1.7 0.7 
0.8 1.0 -0.2 
1.2 0.2 0.7 
0.5 0.7 -0.3 
1.0 0.8 1.2 
0.1 0.9 1.0 
1.0 1.1 1.4 
0.9 1.0 1.9 
0.6 1.1 -1.7 
0.3 1.6 -2.2 
0.2 1.6 1.0 
0.5 0.9 0.3 
0.5 1.0 0.4 
1.1 0.8 2.0 
0.8 1.3 -0.4 
Source: European Commission. 
For the EU, there has been a fall of this elasticity from 
1 to 0.4 between the eighties and nineties. A similar 
"break" is found also in the USA data but in the 
opposite direction. The "ex-post" elasticity of 
investment with respect to GDP has increased to 2 
from values below unity.
3 
For some European countries, there has been a strong 
increase in the investment elasticity but never 
exceeding that of the USA. Smaller countries 
registered higher elasticity. Among larger countries, 
the United Kingdom had an investment elasticity of 1 
(though lower than that of the 80's), Germany of 0.4 
and France and Italy registered negative values. 
The ex post elasticity of employment to investment 
growth also fell in Europe from 0.3 to around zero. In 
the USA, it remained positive, albeit lower than in the 
past (0.2 in the nineties, 0.8 in the eighties). 
Composition of investment expenditures 
Aggregate capital spending highlights only part of the 
whole picture in capital accumulation. It is clearly also 
important to know on what type of capital the 
economy is spending and in what uses it puts its 
This relation seems to have strengthened over time. The 
correlation for the European countries is 0.9 in the last 
decade. It was 0.1 in 1970-80 and 0.3 in 1980-90. 
See Caselli et al. (1999). The authors claim that the change 
in the relation between investment and output is mainly due 
to the different role played by the uncertainty of aggregate 
demand in the USA and in the EU. 44 - CHAPTER 1 
capital. Detailed information in this respect is, 
unfortunately, scarce and often outdated. 
Scattered evidence suggests that the composition of 
investment is rather different even between the highly 
industrialised countries. 
Looking, for instance, on the weight of investment in 
equipment over total investment, we find that the EU, 
as a whole, has consistently invested a smaller part of 
total investment on equipment compared to the USA. 
Japan has lagged behind both. In recent years, the 
trend has been that investment in equipment was 
increasing faster than total capital spending. The recent 
US capital spending is characterised by a fast rise in 
the share of equipment investment on the total (see 
Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2: Equipment investment (as a percentage 
of total investment) 
Table 1.5: Equipment investment (as percentage of 
total investment) 
■EU15excl.L  ■USA 
50% 
45% 
40% 
35% 
30% 
Japan 
1977 1979 1981 1983 1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 
Source: European Commission. 
Among European countries, Sweden and Italy reach 
shares higher than the USA (see Table 1.5). 
Data on a more detailed breakdown of investment 
spending is scarce. Ongoing investment in information 
technology, for example, explains an important part of 
the investment expansion in the USA (see Table 1.6). 
Investments in computers have increased, on average, 
18 percent in the last expansion phase. 
Unfortunately, comparable data do not exist for the 
EU. Anecdotal evidence suggests that Europe has been 
much slower in investing in information technology. 
From the breaking down of investment figures by 
macro sectors, it is possible to see the primary role 
played by private services (see Table 1.7). 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU-15 excl. Lux 
USA 
Japan 
1970 
38.5 
31.8 
38.1 
31.4 
39.5 
34.8 
46.8 
36.4 
39.4 
47.3 
n.a. 
35.0 
30.6 
47.6 
n.a. 
39.4 
43.3 
1980 
29.7 
36.7 
38.0 
27.4 
33.3 
34.1 
49.3 
47.0 
33.5 
40.8 
51.0 
34.4 
37.5 
46.3 
35.5 
42.1 
32.6 
1990 
47.0 
44.3 
46.0 
35.0 
33.1 
39.7 
45.5 
49.2 
44.7 
42.6 
50.4 
34.8 
42.6 
42.3 
43.2 
44.4 
39.8 
1995 
40.1 
44.9 
35.7 
38.6 
29.6 
40.1 
40.9 
51.4 
42.4 
36.9 
47.9 
39.4 
52.9 
47.7 
42.7 
48.3 
35.5 
1996 
42.1 
43.8 
37.0 
38.8 
31.0 
41.1 
37.0 
51.3 
42.9 
36.6 
46.5 
40.5 
53.3 
48.8 
43.4 
48.4 
37.6 
1997 1998 
41.0 41.2 
43.2 43.3 
38.7 41.8 
37.8 37.6 
33.3 34.2 
40.9 42.2 
33.8 31.5 
51.9 53.4 
42.9 43.9 
36.8 36.6 
45.5 46.6 
38.8 39.3 
56.9 58.2 
48.6 48.2 
43.7 45.2 
48.6 49.4 
42.8 39.8 
Source: European Commission. 
Table 1.6: Private fixed capital formation in the 
USA (average percentage changes) 
1983-
1991 
1992-
1998 
Construction 
Residential 
3.6 
6.9 
Non 
residential 
-1.5 
1.5 
Equipment 
Metal products and 
machinery 
Computer 
8.9 
18.1 
Other 
1.8 
4.3 
Transport 
equipment 
2.8 
10.1 
Total 
2.3 
8.0 
Source: Caselli et al. (1999) 
Table 1.7: Sectoral composition of investment 
expenditures (as a percentage of total market 
economy) 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Agriculture 
1980 
3.1 
4.3 
4.6 
8.9 
11.9 
5.7 
3.8 
6.4 
1990 
2.4 
3.7 
3.8 
7.-I 
6.4 
3.5 
1..S 
4.2 
1996 
1.6 
2.6 
4.1 
7.9 
6.5 
4.4 
1.3 
3.8 
mar 
1980 
21.6 
27.5 
19.3 
28.3 
22.9 
22.9 
24.7 
20.7 
Total 
ufaetu 
1990 
34.8 
31.4 
21.8 
24.6 
19.6 
20.0 
18.3 
17.6 
ring 
1996 
30.6 
23.6 
18.3 
22.2 
31.3 
28.3 
18.2 
16.6 
Construction 
1980 
2.5 
2.9 
4.1 
4.5 
2.6 
2.4 
1.7 
1.9 
1990 
2.9 
2.3 
3.0 
3.3 
2.6 
3.3 
1.2 
1.11 
1996 
2.4 
2.2 
2.4 
2.9 
1.7 
2.3 
1.4 
1.4 
Market services 
1980 
72.8 
65.3 
72.0 
58.3 
62.6 
69.0 
69.8 
71.0 
1990 1996 
59.9 65.3 
62.6 71.5 
71.4 75.1 
64.7 67.0 
71.5 60.5 
73.1 65.0 
78.7 79.0 
76.8 78.2 
Note: For Italy and Sweden, the last available year is 1994. 
Source: European Commission calculations using OECD-ISDB, 1998. 
For all the countries, the highest share of investment 
expenditures (with respect to the investment of total 
market economy) is carried out by market services. In 
the last decade the trend has been increasing in all 
countries (except in Finland and Sweden). Compared 
with the shares in 1980, the service sector has 
increased most in the United Kingdom, the USA and 
Italy. The four countries with shares higher than 70% CHAPTER 1 - 45 
are the United Kingdom, France, Germany and the 
USA. 
Total investment in manufacturing industries has 
instead decreased in the period in the majority of 
countries. Contrary to this trend, Sweden and Finland 
have strengthened their manufacturing investment 
shares. 
Growth patterns show that in the nineties the USA has 
experienced the strongest growth in investment levels 
both in manufacturing and market services (see Table 
1.8). In all the European countries (with the exception 
of the Netherlands) for which data are available, there 
has been a decrease in manufacturing investment and 
for half of them there has been also a reduction in 
market services investment. The biggest decreases in 
investment in market services occurred in the two 
Scandinavian countries. 
Table 1.8: Sectoral composition of value added and 
investment (average annual growth) 
Belgium 
Germany 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Manufacturing 
Market services 
Value added 
1970-80 
3.5 
4.1 
1.9 
3.6 
3.5 
4.5 
5.6 
3.2 
2.2 
4.1 
3.9 
4.0 
1.2 
2.7 
-0.3 
2.2 
2.2 
3.9 
4.4 
5.8 
1980-90 
2.8 
1.7 
1.5 
2.9 
1.0 
3.2 
2.4 
0.4 
2.3 
2.7 
3.1 
4.3 
2.0 
2.9 
2.0 
3.6 
2.4 
3.5 
4.9 
4.7 
1990-98 
0.5 
11.6 
0.1 
2.9 
1.2 
1.2 
1.1 
10.2 
1.7 
2.9 
3.4 
0.2 
1.3 
0.7 
0.5 
3.1 
4.8 
2.8 
1.2 
2.4 
GFCF 
1970-80 
-1.1 
3.5 
-1.0 
0.9 
0.4 
3.0 
3.0 
0.9 
-1.8 
1.0 
0.7 
2.0 
0.3 
0.4 
-0.9 
1.3 
2.2 
3.6 
-0.6 
3.2 
1980-90 
9.8 
2.5 
2.9 
I..3 
3.0 
2.4 
0.5 
2.5 
1.1 
1.0 
3.3 
4.3 
3.5 
5.3 
1.3 
5.1 
0.3 
3.1) 
8.5 
6.5 
1990-98 
-2.9 
0.3 
-2.5 
2.5 
-4.0 
-0.2 
-5.1 
-2.5 
5.9 
1.1 
-2.6 
-9.5 
-5.5 
-13.7 
-2.2 
0.2 
4.4 
6.2 
-5.6 
-2.4 
Note: Last available data: Italy, 1994; Japan and the Netherlands, 1996. 
Source: European Commission calculations using OECD-ISDB, 1998. 
2. Investment in manufacturing: 
specialisation and concentration 
Similarity and convergence in the investment 
structure of European countries, the USA and 
Japan 
A natural question that arises from the above analysis 
is whether the sectoral distribution of investment at a 
more disaggregated level is very different between the 
various industrialised countries and whether it has 
been converging or diverging over time. Data 
availability permits a more detailed analysis only for 
the manufacturing sector. 
The similarity in the sectoral composition of 
investment among countries is measured with the 
index of Michaely for three different periods (1970-79, 
1980-89 and 1990-97). (See Box 1.1) 
Figure 1.3 considers the USA as a benchmark but 
similar results are reached whichever the country of 
reference might be. Values close to the outside circle 
Box 1.1: The index of Michaely 
The index is estimated on the basis of the 
investment shares of 28 manufacturing sectors with 
respect to total manufacturing and takes the values 
between 0.5 (minimum similarity) to 1 (maximum 
similarity). The measure is given by 
IM = 1 - Vi Σ, Ι (χ/Χ) - (y/Y) | 
where x¡ is investment of sector i in one country, X 
is its total manufacturing investment and y¡ and Y 
are respectively investment of the same sector and 
of total manufacturing of another country. This is 
constructed on the basis of ten-year average 
investment shares. 
of the cob-web diagram (values close to one) represent 
high similarity vis-à-vis the investment structure of the 
USA.
4 
The results suggest that there are no very important 
differences in investment structures among larger 
countries. The United Kingdom has an investment 
structure that resembles that of the USA somewhat 
more than other large industrialised countries (France, 
Germany, Italy, but also Sweden). Similarity with 
Japan is somewhat lower. On the other extreme, the 
index takes the lowest values for the EU peripheral 
countries like Finland, Portugal and Greece (but also 
for Denmark). Austria, the Netherlands, Belgium and 
Spain record values at the middle. 
Moreover, some changes are observed over time 
(depending also on the phase of the business cycle), 
but there seems to be no overall tendency of 
convergence or divergence of investment structures 
(see Figure 1.3 again). Japan and Germany have 
relatively changed their investment structure with 
respect to the USA, and this has mainly happened in 
the last decade. In the same period, Italy and Sweden 
have slightly converged towards the USA. Portugal 
4 Note that similar values of the index for, say Italy and 
Germany, do not necessary imply that the sectoral pattern of 
investment of the two is similar, but that both are equally 
different from the USA. 46 - CHAPTER 1 
has now a relatively more similar structure than in the 
eighties. 
Figure 1.3: Similarity in the investment structure: 
benchmarking the USA, 1970 to 1996 
UK 
EL 
FIN 
DK 
E 
I 
■1990-1996 -■-1980-1989  -1970-1979 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Another way to analyse the similarity in the 
investment composition is to consider changes within 
each country across time (see Figure 1.4).
5 This index 
measures the "speed of adjustment" of the investment 
structure. Shifts in the investment patterns are often 
signs of important restructuring processes that aim to 
take advantage of new economic conditions. 
The figure presents comparisons of the investment 
structure between eighties and seventies (leftward 
axis), and between nineties and eighties (rightward 
axis). The countries are ordered in a decreasing level 
of turbulence in investment structure of the most 
recent years. The picture can be read as follows: the 
closer the bar of a specific country is to one the fewer 
the changes in the country's investment structure have 
occurred across time. 
With the exception of the USA, in the last decade, the 
most industrialised countries show a relatively static 
structure. The biggest changes happened between the 
seventies and the eighties. Japan and Germany, among 
the largest countries, and Greece and Portugal, among 
the smallest ones, report the biggest changes. 
The index is again that of Michaely as described in Box 1.1. 
The only difference is that now the analysis considers the 
sectors of the same countries in different time spans. 
Figure 1.4: Speed of adjustment of the investment 
structure 
C  : 
EL | 
Π 1970-80 
0 1980-90 
ΊΣ 
NL I 
ΖΣ 
ΖΓ 
UK [ 
XL 
Ι τψ 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Investment specialisation of countries 
A different question is whether the EU Member States, 
the USA and Japan have different degrees of 
specialisation (invest in fewer or more sectors). 
One of the empirical findings in the first part of the 
report is that there has been a slight tendency for 
production specialisation to increase and a stronger 
tendency for exports to de-specialise. We next 
investigate the investment specialisation patterns. The 
indicators used in the analysis are the same as those 
used in the previous analysis on production.
6 
The trend is not as clear as in the case of specialisation 
of value added. The specialisation rates are more 
fluctuating than the equivalent indicators based on 
value added. This reflects the fact that investment is 
much more fluctuating than value added. 
Figure 1.5 shows the average values of the shares of 
the largest three sectors in each country (CR3). On 
average, the first three industrial sectors cover almost 
37% of total manufacturing investment. The spread 
ranges from 30% (Austria, France and Italy) to above 
40% (Finland and Japan). 
Specialisation (as measured by CR3) is closely 
correlated with the size of a country: the smaller the 
country is the more specialised the distribution of 
investment shares will be. There are some exceptions, 
notably Austria (a small country with a low CR3) and 
Japan (a big country with high rates of specialisation). 
See Box 1.1 in Part One of the report. It is worthy to 
underline that, due to a different availability of data, a 
comparison of investment patterns between 1988 and 1998 
is not possible. For this reason, this chapter gives more 
emphasis to the overall trends in country specialisation and 
geographic concentration of investments starting from 1980. CHAPTER 1 - 47 
Figure 1.5: Investment specialisation: share of the 
largest three sectors (five-year averages) 
Figure 1.6: Trends in the country specialisation: 
relative indicators (1980 = 100) 
01980-1984 
■ 1985-1989 
D1990-1996 
fe 
f 
Β 
Α Β DK FIN F D EL Ι J NL Ρ Ε S UK USA 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Looking at five-year time intervals, it can be noticed 
that for some countries the overall tendency is for de-
specialisation: Austria, Denmark, the Netherlands and 
the USA. For Finland, Belgium and, to a lesser extent, 
Italy the specialisation rate is instead increasing. For 
the remaining countries the second half of the eighties 
has represented either a period of peak or trough for 
the investment shares of the largest sectors. In the first 
group there are Germany, Greece and Sweden while in 
the second one France, Spain and the United Kingdom. 
Portugal is the exception: in the period under 
consideration there has been a decrease in 
specialisation of 7.5 percentage points. On the 
opposite, Japan seems to be the most static country. In 
fifteen years the concentration index changed only by 
0.1 percentage points. 
Another way of detecting changes in the relative size 
of industries is to look at the standard deviation of 
investment shares in each country across time. The 
highest dispersion has been found in Portugal, Spain 
and Sweden; the lowest in Denmark, Finland and in 
the United Kingdom. 
If we look at relative indicators like the specialisation 
rate and the dissimilarity index, the picture is twofold. 
These indicators give rather a large weight to small 
countries and small industries and detect their 
positioning in the European investment structure. 
The standard deviation of the specialisation rate 
(transformed as explained in Box 1.1 of Part One) has 
become larger in the late eighties (see Figure 1.6). This 
is explained by the increase of absolute specialisation 
in some small countries in view of the Single Market. 
The composite dissimilarity index is instead quite 
stable all over the period. If any, it shows a general 
tendency towards the norm. 
180 
160 
140 
120 
100 
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 
The indicators are indexed and calculated on the basis of unweighted 
averages across countries 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Indeed, the overall picture is the result of different 
forces (see Figure 1.7). Large countries are, as 
expected, not very dissimilar from a "European" 
industrial structure of investment (they report low 
values of the dissimilarity index). This is the tendency 
for Austria as well as, in the last period, for Spain and 
Sweden. Over time, Belgium and Finland are 
becoming more dissimilar in their investment structure 
with respect to the European average. Portugal shows a 
robust decreasing in specialisation similar to the de-
specialisation process seen already in production. 
Summarising, the evidence does not suggest a 
consistent pattern of increasing or decreasing 
specialisation over time. On one side, there has been 
an increase of absolute specialisation in some small 
countries, in view of the Single Market, the exception 
being Portugal. On the other side, large countries are 
not very dissimilar from an "European " industrial 
structure of investment and they have not changed very 
much over time. 
Geographic concentration of investment in 
European industries 
As explained already in Part One of this report, high 
concentration means that few countries invest most in 
a given sector while low concentration implies that a 
sector is evenly distributed across countries. Moreover, 
absolute indicators implicitly focus on large countries 
while relative indicators focus on the dynamics in 
small countries. Four indicators are used here: two 
absolute and two relative ones. 48 - CHAPTER 1 
Figure 1.7: Trends in country specialisation of 
industries: dissimilarity index 
0.9 
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Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Figure 1.8 reports the five-year average data (1980-
1984, 1985-1989 and 1990-1994) of the investment 
shares of the three largest countries. For each sector, 
the last two columns can be used to evaluate the 
effects of the economic integration of Europe on 
investment. 
Over the whole period, 70% of investment is generated 
in only three countries. These countries are among the 
largest ones (Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom and 
France). The most concentrated sector is petroleum 
and coal products (83%) and the least is paper and 
products (50%). 
The main trend is that the geographic concentration 
has on average decreased in the last years, possibly as 
an effect of market integration. The indicator of 
standard deviation shows that there is less dispersion 
among sectors now compared to the past. The value 
has decreased at the beginning of the nineties by one 
tenth with respect the period 1985-1989 and almost 
halved since the beginning of the eighties. 
The magnitude of the change varies a lot between 
industries. We identify a group of industries for which 
the overall trend has been positive: some chemical 
industries (petroleum and coal products, rubber 
products), paper industries, some scale intensive 
industries (food, metal products, non-metallic 
products, iron and steel), some traditional industries 
(footwear, wood products), non-ferrous metal and 
electrical machinery. Then there is a group of 
industries with a decreasing trend: some traditional 
industries (textiles, wearing apparel, leather products, 
pottery and china), some chemical industries (other 
chemicals, industrial chemicals and petroleum 
refineries), beverages and furniture and fixtures. 
Figure 1.8: Trends in the geographic concentration 
of industries: share of the largest three producers 
(five-year averages) 
Other Manufacturing 
Professional Goods 
Transport Equipment 
Electrical Machinery 
Non-Electrical Machinery 
Metal Products 
Non-Ferrous Metal 
Iron & Steel 
Glass & Products 
Pottery, China etc 
Plastic Products, nee 
Rubber Products 
Petroleum Refineries 
Other Chemicals 
Industrial Chemical 
Printing & Publishing 
Furniture & Fixtures 
Wood Products 
Footwear 
Wearing Apparel 
Textiles 
Tobacco 
Beverages 
Food 
'=J 
~^ ■ 
< -, 
50 55 
D 90-94  Π 80-84 ■ 85-89 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
In terms of relative concentration the results are not so 
clear-cut. Both indices show an increase between 1982 
and 1987. Afterwards, the dissimilarity index 
decreases while the specialisation rate slightly 
increases (see Figure 1.9). 
However, looking at the trend of single sectors, the 
general picture is of decreasing concentration. The 
sectors with a decreasing concentration are 19 for the 
specialisation rate and 17 for the dissimilarity index. CHAPTER 1 - 49 
Figure 1.9: Trends in the geographic concentration 
of industries: relative indicators (index 1980 = 100) 
1980  19X2  1984  1986  1988  1990  1992  1994 
Note: The indicators are indexed and calculated on the basis of 
unweighted averages across sectors. 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Figure 1.10 shows the concentration trend of each 
sector using the dissimilarity index. As explained 
before this is an index that highlights the role of small 
countries. Indeed, the data show that concentration has 
increased in industries where also the relative shares of 
small countries have become bigger. This is the case of 
Portugal and its shares in the footwear and wearing 
apparel industries or Belgium in the iron and steel 
industry. But concentration increased also in the 
rubber and in non-metallic products, where the leading 
countries are France, Germany and Italy. On the 
opposite, the index has decreased most in the sectors 
of china and pottery, paper and products and furniture 
and fixtures. These are sectors where the large leading 
countries have reduced their shares and small countries 
have relatively increased theirs as Portugal in the 
sector of pottery and china, Belgium and Spain in the 
furniture and fixtures sector and Sweden in that of 
paper and products. 
Summarising, concentration has decreased in some 
sectors where the large leading countries have 
reduced their shares. On the other hand, there is 
evidence that it has increased in industries where the 
relative shares of small countries have also increased. 
On the whole, geographic concentration has tended to 
decline 
Figure 1.10: Trends in the geographic 
concentration of industries: dissimilarity index 
(five-year averages) 
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Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
3· Investment determinants: some 
empirical results 
Country and industry determinants of investment: 
analysis of variance 
In this section we consider how much the investment 
patterns described till now are explained by sector and 
country specific factors. This first part employs an 
analysis of variance that allows us to focus directly on 
the existence and on the importance of country, sectors 
and time effects without having to deal - for the 
moment - with specific hypotheses. 
In a simple descriptive model, real investment (scaled 
by value added) depends on country characteristics as 
well as on sectoral factors and on time. We define as 
"country" factors all those that are common to all 
sectors of a single country. They can be structural 
variables more or less constant over time, such as 
regulation, or they can contain time-varying factors 
affecting investment, such as macro policies, industrial 50 - CHAPTER 1 
relations. "Sectoral" factors are those common for a 
given sector in all countries. Again they can be time 
varying, e.g. a world-wide sector-specific demand 
shock or relatively constant over time, e.g. different 
sector-specific technologies. 
Tables 1.9a-1.9b present the results of the analysis of 
the variance of investment for a group of European 
countries for the period 1970-1996. The first model 
(see Table 1.9a) is based on a simple one-way analysis 
of variance while the second one (see Table 1.9b) 
considers also interaction terms.
7 
Table 1.9a: Country, industry and time effects on 
investment 
Analysis of variance of real investment over 
value added, 1970-1995 
Source 
Model 
Country effect 
Industry effect 
Time effect 
Residual 
Total 
N 
Adj.R
2 
Partial SS 
9.969 
4.516 
3.936 
1.292 
15.645 
25.614 
2880 
0.39 
df 
46 
12 
S 
26 
2833 
2879 
F 
39.24 * 
68.15 * 
89.09 * 
9.01 * 
Note: SS= explained and unexplained variance, df= degrees 
of freedom; F = Test of the significance of the 
model/coefficients (* = significant at 1%). 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
Table 1.9b: Country, industry and interacted-term 
effects on investment 
Analysis of variance of real investment over 
value added, 1970-1995 
Source 
Model 
Country effect 
Industry effect 
Country χ Time effect 
Sector χ Time effect 
Residual 
Total 
Ν 
Λ d ι. Im­
partial SS 
13.372 
4.53 
3.698 
2.161 
1.452 
12.241 
25.614 
2880 
0.52 
df 
538 
12 
8 
310 
208 
2341 
2879 
F 
4.75 * 
72.2 * 
88.4 * 
1.33 * 
1.33 * 
Note: SS= explained and unexplained variance, df= degrees 
of freedom; F = Test of the significance of the 
model/coefficients (* = significant at 1%). 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
In the first specification, the model explains 39% of 
the data variation. Country and sector factors are 
statistically significant. They both explain 
approximately the same proportion of investment 
In the statistical analysis, both country and sector factors are 
dummy variables. 
variation. Time dummies, that represent common 
European business cycles, are also significant but 
explain relatively little of the investment variation. 
When the analysis is based on a more refined 
definition of sectors (28 sectors), the sectoral effect 
becomes relatively more important. Interestingly, the 
importance of the country and sectoral effects remain 
the same even when we consider a more recent period 
(1985-1995). In spite of the convergence of regulation 
structures among Member States and the wide process 
of economic integration, country differences still 
remain strong. 
This simple model does not distinguish between 
constant and time varying effects. For this reason we 
introduce the second specification, which takes into 
account the interaction of country and sectoral effects 
with time. 
As far as countries are concerned, the interaction 
combines all the country specific time varying effects. 
We can think of changes in monetary or fiscal policies 
as well as of whatever factor may affect a country 
specific business cycle. The interaction of sector and 
time summarises world-wide factors like waves of 
technological innovations that are industry specific. 
Both the effects are statistically significant but their 
magnitude is quantitatively lower. The whole model 
explains 52% of the investment variation. 
Additionally, when we consider more recent years 
those interactive effects disappear. Sectoral 
characteristics are present throughout the period with 
constant intensity. The same is true for country 
specific effects that do not change their intensity over 
time. This result suggests that structural elements 
affect investment rather than unsynchronised factors of 
country specific business cycles. 
Country and industry determinants of investment: 
regression analysis 
We next estimate the effects of some relevant variables 
on the European investment patterns. 
The econometric specification is quite simple. The 
dependent variable is the same as that used in the 
analysis of variance, that is the real investment, scaled 
by real value added. 
Among the independent variables, we consider as 
internal determinants of investment: the internal 
demand (defined as production minus export plus 
imports), the labour cost (that includes wages and the 
costs of supplements such as employers' compulsory 
pension and medical payments) and the cost of capital 
(proxied by real long-term interest rates). As an 
external factor we introduce the net external demand CHAPTER 1-51 
(exports minus imports in real terms): this variable 
depends on exchange rate policies and on the relative 
competitiveness of a country. All variables (except 
interest rates) are scaled by real value added. 
Table 1.10 reports the estimated elasticities calculated 
on the basis of the coefficients of a panel regression 
where country, industry and time are considered as 
fixed effects. 
Table 1.10: Explaining investment: fixed effects 
regressions 
Specification 1: 1970-1995  Specification 2: 1985-1995 
lagged investment 
internal demand 
long tenn interest rate 
labour cost 
net external demand 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
N 
it: 
Fixed industry effects 
Fixed country effects 
Fixed lime effects 
Fixed vs random industrv effect 
Short run elasticity 
11.45 
0.22 
-0.023 
0.319 
0.019 
Coefficients 
0.02 
0.02 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.03 
0.01 
0.01 
o.os 
o.o: 
11.00 
-o.o: 
5852 
0.51 
12.47 F(27,5782)* 
19.84 F(12  .5782)* 
3.94 F(25.5782)* 
751.9 Ch  ¡2 (42)· 
1 value 
52.9 * 
11.2 * 
-2.3 ·· 
7.9 · 
6.9 * 
t value 
2.4 ** 
2.6* 
3.2 * 
-1.5 
5.4* 
4.2 * 
1.7 *** 
2.2 ** 
10.4 · 
3.9 * 
0.2 
-2.9 * 
Short run 
Coeffi 
elasticity 
0.597 
0.168 
0.365 
0.204 
0.021 
eients 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
-0.01 
0.03 
0.01 
0.00 
0.01 
11.04 
0.01 
0.00 
-0.01 
2437 
0.62 
5.14F(27.2381)* 
7.37F(27,2381)* 
4.01 F(27,2381)* 
159.7 chi:  »(42)* 
t value 
38.6 * 
7.3 * 
1.2 
4.6 * 
6.2 * 
ι value 
3.1 * 
I.I 
3.2* 
-1.0 
3.7 * 
I.I 
0.5 
0.9 
5.5 ♦ 
1.3 
-0.2 
-2.0 ** 
Notes: 
Dependent variable: real investment over value added 
Internal demand: (production-exports+imports)/value added 
Net external demand: (exports-imports)/value added 
Labour cost: wages /value added 
*, **, *** Significant at 1, 5, 10%. 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
The first column shows the results of the estimation for 
all the sample period (1970-1995), the second one for 
a more recent period starting in 1985. Net of the 
effects of the European business cycle, an increase of 
the internal demand by 1 % raises the investment in the 
short run by 0.2%; the same increase of the external 
demand raises investment only by 0.02%.
8 In the long 
run, the elasticity of investment with respect to these 
two variables doubles. Investments are reduced by 
0.2% when long-term interest rates increases by 1%. 
Interestingly the strongest impact on investment is that 
of the labour cost. The positive sign of the coefficient 
confirms the role of fixed capital as a substitute rather 
than a complement to labour
9. In the short run, 
Both values are quite low but it has to be remembered that 
we control for country characteristics in the regression. 
Therefore these are additional effects of internal or external 
demand due to different rates with respect to a mean effect. 
It is worth noting that we could not separately introduce 
profitability in order to test the other channel going from 
investment increases by 0.4% when the labour cost 
increases by 1%. 
The first column shows the results of the estimation for 
all the sample period (1970-1995), the second one for 
a more recent period starting in 1985. Net of the 
effects of the European business cycle, an increase of 
the internal demand by 1 % raises the investment in the 
short run by 0.2%; the same increase of the external 
demand raises investment only by 0.02%.'° In the long 
run, the elasticity of investment with respect to these 
two variables doubles. Investments are reduced by 
0.2% when long-term interest rates increases by 1%. 
Interestingly the strongest impact on investment is that 
of the labour cost. The positive sign of the coefficient 
confirms the role of fixed capital as a substitute rather 
than a complement to labour". In the short run, 
investment increases by 0.4% when the labour cost 
increases by 1%. 
In the second column, short run elasticities are 
reported for the period 1985-1995
l2. The time interval 
has been chosen in order to focus on the effects of 
world-wide integration on investment. A first sign of 
the progress is indirectly given by the fact that the 
interest rate variable is not any more significant. The 
increased competition in the financial field as well as 
the continuing deregulation of financial markets in 
general has accelerated the emergence of an integrated 
European financial market. This market is supposed to 
be more liquid, mature and efficient than existing 
national markets. Firms have now easier and better 
access to different forms of capital. Additionally, the 
results show that internal demand still remains 
important but it has a reduced impact on short run 
investment. Also the impact of labour cost on 
investment is reduced by one third but it remains still a 
strong determinant of investment as a substitution of 
labour. 
labour to investment where an increase of labour costs 
reduces profitability and investment. 
Both values are quite low but it has to be remembered that 
we control for country characteristics in the regression. 
Therefore these are additional effects of internal or external 
demand due to different rates with respect to a mean effect. 
It is worth noting that we could not separately introduce 
profitability in order to test the other channel going from 
labour to investment where an increase of labour costs 
reduces profitability and investment. 
The underlying hypothesis is that investment could have 
reacted to the Single market program long before its 
completion. The choice of the time span is based on the 
availability of data; we do not have enough observations to 
estimate the model for a longer period after 1992. 
Additionally, the results do not change much if we exclude 
from the sample the three countries that joined the EU late 
in 1995. 52 - CHAPTER 1 
4. Conclusions 
One of the main findings of last year's report was the 
tendency of the European economies to produce with 
higher capital-intensive and, thus, less employment-
creating sectors. 
In this chapter we find that the picture has changed 
substantially in the nineties. Growth of both fixed 
capital and employment fell sharply in Europe (and in 
Japan). Instead the growth of physical investment 
more than doubled in the USA, accompanied by 
substantial new employment creation and constant 
output growth. Contrary to received wisdom, therefore, 
a tentative new stylised fact of the nineties is that in 
Europe the accumulation process has undergone a 
strong deceleration accompanied by a less sharp fall 
in output growth; in the USA there has been an 
acceleration of investment activity at almost constant 
economic growth. 
Within Europe, performance has varied substantially. 
The two Scandinavian countries and the three largest 
countries in continental Europe have had the weakest 
performance in both investment and employment. 
Considering the degree of sectoral specialisation in the 
manufacturing sector, we find no veiy marked 
differences between the larger European economies 
and the USA. Instead, Japan has consistently registered 
higher rates of investment specialisation compared to 
the other large economies. 
Interestingly, Spain and the USA in the nineties and 
Japan and Germany in the eighties have registered the 
highest shifts in their sectoral investment patterns 
("investments' speed of adjustment") among the larger 
economies. Such investments' speed of adjustment is 
often a sign of important restructuring processes that 
aim at taking advantage of new economic conditions. 
Overall, we detect no consistent pattern of increasing 
or decreasing investment specialisation over time. 
Instead, we do find some evidence of decreasing 
geographic concentration of investment of various 
manufacturing sectors within Europe. On the other 
hand, concentration has increased in some industries 
where also the relative shares of small countries have 
become bigger. 
As far as the determinants of sector-specific 
investment are concerned, an analysis of the variance 
shows that in spite of the convergence of regulation 
structures among Member States and the wide 
economic integration process, national differences do 
remain strong. Sectoral effects are also important in 
explaining the variability of investment while 
European business cycles are less so. This result is 
also confirmed by the econometric analysis. 
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Annex 1.1: The sectoral data on investment 
The OECD Stan database provides internationally comparable data on industrial activity for 22 countries." The 
STAN database covers 49 manufacturing industries from 1970-1997. However, for many countries, 1997 
figures are available for the main industrial sectors only and are estimates based on short-term indicators. For 
the GFCF variable the situation is even more problematic. For some European countries (Austria, Italy, the 
Netherlands and Sweden) and for Japan, data are not reported beyond 1994. For the descriptive purposes of the 
competitiveness report, the analysis is carried out on the basis of 29 industrial sectors (included total 
manufacturing) classified according to ISIC rev. The sectors are: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Sectors 
Total manufacturing 
Food 
Beverages 
Tobacco 
Textiles 
Wearing apparel 
Leather and products 
Footwear 
Wood products 
Furniture and fixtures 
Paper and products 
Printing and publishing 
Industrial chemical 
Other chemicals 
Petroleum refineries 
ISIC 
Rev.2 
3000 
311/2 
3130 
3140 
3210 
3220 
3230 
3240 
3310 
3320 
3410 
3420 
3510 
3520 
3530 
Sectors 
16. Petrol, and coal prod. 
17. Rubber products 
18. Plastic products, nee 
19. Pottery, china etc 
20. Glass and products 
21. Non-metallic prod, nee 
22. Iron and steel 
23. Non-ferrous metals 
24. Metal products 
25. Non-electrical mach. 
26. Electrical machinery 
27. Transport equipment 
28. Professional goods 
29. Other manufacturing 
ISIC 
Rev.2 
3540 
3550 
3560 
3610 
3620 
3690 
3710 
3720 
3810 
3820 
3830 
3840 
3850 
3900 
The analysis of manufacturing investment as a share of value added confirms in part the stylised fact observed 
at the total economy. Starting from the eighties, Japan and the USA are determining the upper and lower 
bound in the investment activity. Only countries like Portugal and Greece overcame Japan in the early eighties 
(as an evident process of catching up), while Spain has recorded values of investment over output lower than 
the USA. 
Gross fixed capital formation in total manufacturing (as a percentage of value added) 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
1970 
21.9 
16.5 
15.8 
20.3 
n.a. 
17.6 
18.6 
20.6 
15.5 
33.6 
23.0 
15.5 
14.1 
10.3 
26.4 
1975 
18.6 
14.1 
10.5 
22.4 
n.a. 
13.3 
19.1 
14.3 
14.1 
28.7 
25.7 
17.3 
12.5 
11.5 
18.8 
1980 
13.5 
14.4 
12.5 
21.2 
6.0 
14.6 
19.4 
17.9 
15.6 
25.7 
18.0 
15.8 
13.3 
13.0 
18.9 
1985 
14.4 
17.2 
11.6 
13.3 
7.2 
14.1 
14.0 
19.9 
13.9 
15.9 
17.5 
16.8 
13.2 
11.4 
20.3 
1990 
25.7 
15.6 
14.3 
22.6 
9.4 
17.1 
16.9 
17.9 
16.6 
25.1 
20.7 
17.7 
12.8 
11.1 
23.1 
1991 
25.4 
16.7 
14.6 
20.8 
10.6 
16.6 
17.2 
16.9 
16.0 
22.5 
17.7 
14.8 
12.4 
11.0 
26.6 
1992 
24.0 
14.4 
13.7 
20.3 
9.8 
15.1 
16.2 
15.7 
15.7 
17.9 
15.3 
12.3 
11.3 
10.8 
24.7 
1993 
20.7 
12.9 
11.5 
18.5 
10.6 
12.3 
13.7 
13.6 
13.7 
16.6 
12.5 
12.2 
10.6 
10.2 
21.3 
1994 
18.4 
11.7 
10.2 
19.4 
9.4 
12.6 
14.1 
11.8 
12.9 
17.5 
12.5 
13.9 
10.8 
10.4 
18.3 
1995 
19.1 
12.4 
10.9 
20.8 
10.3 
12.4 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
13.2 
14.6 
n.a. 
12.4 
11.6 
n.a. 
1996 
20.9 
n.a. 
11.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12.8 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
16.7 
n.a. 
n.a. 
11.5 
u.a. 
1997 
20.4 
n.a. 
11.0 
n.a. 
n.a. 
12.3 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
n.a. 
Source: European Commission calculations using STAN. 
No data is available for some EU Member States (notably Ireland and Luxembourg). Chapter 2 
Intangible investment and structural patterns of European 
manufacturing industry 
This chapter explores the structural patterns of 
European industry in the context of the emerging 
information society and its associated qualitative 
changes. It is innovations and diffusion of new 
technologies which drive the emerging information 
society, economic growth and employment. The 
competitiveness of this type of economy depends 
increasingly on the capacity to generate, process and 
market knowledge-based products, which marks a shift 
from tangible to intangible - immaterial - factors of 
production. Consequently, industry structures move 
towards industries with higher intensities of intangible 
factors of production. The Commission has already 
taken important actions in supporting intangible 
investments (see Section 3 of this chapter). 
In a knowledge based economy, competitiveness of 
firms is in large extent based on their capability to 
innovate (introduce new or improved products or 
processes), produce qualitative changes and new 
products, to utilise ICT and marketing activities, to 
introduce new technologies and organisations. In a 
changing world the competitive advantage of firms is 
also determined by firm's specific "dynamic 
capabilities".
1 In particular, a firm's competitiveness is 
derived from firm-specific intangible assets. These 
assets include R&D capital, marketing capital, 
educational organisation, the innovative and 
entrepreneurial know-how embodied in the persons of 
the organisation as well as their capabilities to work as 
a competent team.
2 
Our understanding of the competitive process remains 
fundamentally incomplete until we acquire basic 
knowledge regarding the relationship between the 
economic performance, structural change and 
intangibles. This justifies the growing need to 
understand what types of intangibles, what role they 
play in the competitive race and what this implies for 
policy making. 
Paradoxically, our knowledge about intangibles is still 
rather poor. Intangibles are, by nature, difficult to 
measure, and the lack of reliable, comprehensive and 
internationally comparable data is a major barrier to 
broad-scale empirical analysis. 
Recently, intensive conceptual and empirical work on 
intangibles has been undertaken. From the conceptual 
viewpoint, Table 2.1 describes a range of possible 
compositions of intangible assets. 
Table 2.1: Possible components of intangibles 
1. Computer-related 
Software 
Large databases 
Other computer services 
2. Production and technology 
R&D 
Design and engineering 
New quality control systems 
Patents and licences 
Know-how 
3. Human resources 
Organised training 
Learning by doing 
Activities to improve health and motivation of the workforce 
Remuneration for innovative ideas 
4. Organisation of the firm 
New methods of organisation of the firm as a whole 
Setting up networks 
New working methods in administration and finance 
5. External: Marketing and sales 
Market research 
Advertising 
Brands 
Name and symbol of the firm 
Customer list, subscribers list and list of potential customers 
Product certification, quality certificates 
Goodwill 
6. Industry-specific 
Mineral exploration 
Entertainment, literary and artistic originals 
Milk quotas 
"The subset of the competencies/capabilities which allow 
the finn to create new products and processes, and respond 
to changing market circumstances." See Teece (1998). 
See Eliasson (1998). 
Source: Young (1998). 
From the empirical side, a very useful tool is presented 
in Peneder (1999a) that provides an industry typology 56- CHAPTER 2 
Box 2.1: The new WIFO taxonomy of manufacturing industry 
Peneder (1999a) introduces two new taxonomies which group individual industries according to their typical 
combinations of factor inputs and their different requirements for skilled labour, respectively. The first 
classification ('taxonomy F) reflects the distinction between (i) exogenously given competitive advantages 
based on factor endowments such as physical capital and labour on the one hand, and (ii) endogenously created 
advantages based on purposeful investment in intangible assets such as marketing and innovation, on the other. 
In contrast, the second classification ('taxonomy II') clusters industries by their respective skill requirements, 
being both intangible and largely location bound. Both classifications correspond to Eurostat's revised NACE 
system at the three-digit level. Both taxonomies are presented in Annex 2.1. 
The clustering process for taxonomy I is based on data for wages and salaries, investment in physical capital, 
advertising outlays and expenditures on R&D. Ratios to total value added are considered for wages and physical 
capital. Expenditures on advertising and R&D are represented by their ratios to total sales. The latter are directly 
derived from balance sheet data. Data sources are Eurostats DEBA database (for labour and capital inputs) and 
Standard & Poor's COMPUSTAT database (for advertising and R&D). Lacking a complete coverage of all 
dimensions for the EU, the clustering procedure refers exclusively to US manufacturing data. 
Taxonomy II reflects the human-resources perspective and is based upon occupational data from the OECD, 
distinguishing between white- and blue-collar workers and between high- and low-skill labour. The data refer to 
a non-weighted sample of selected OECD countries. 
Compared to earlier classifications, the new WIFO taxonomies are distinguished by the application of cluster 
analysis. This provides a powerful statistical technique specifically designed for classifying observations on 
behalf of their relative similarities with respect to a multidimensional array of variables. The basic idea is one of 
dividing a specific data profile into segments by creating maximum homogeneity within and maximum distance 
between groups. 
About 100 NACE three-digit manufacturing industries have been completely categorised (see Annex 2.1). 
Taxonomy I comprises the following five mutually exclusive groupings of mainstream manufacturing, labour-
intensive, capital-intensive, marketing-driven and technology-driven industries. In contrast, taxonomy II 
distinguishes typically low-skill, (medium-skill) blue-collar, (medium-skill) white-collar and high-skill 
industries. Like any broad classification, these new taxonomies must be interpreted with care, as industries 
within the categories can still be highly heterogeneous. 
by factor intensities (in tangible and intangible 
investment)
3 as well as in skills. These two new 
taxonomies of manufacturing industries have been 
created by means of statistical cluster techniques (see 
Box 2.1). 
The first focuses on comparative advantages 
depending on location, such as relative endowments of 
capital and labour, as well as firm-specific advantages 
endogenously raised by intangible investments in 
marketing or innovation. The second taxonomy 
classifies industries by their typical requirements for 
skilled labour. 
Based on such industry taxonomies, one can gain first 
information about the advancement towards a 
knowledge-based economy in the EU and about 
different degrees of advancement across Member 
States. In particular, these taxonomies enable us to test 
empirically to what extent intangibles matter for 
industrial competitiveness. Finally, the structure of 
industry with respect to the intangible and tangible 
factors of production provides information on the 
underlying sources of competitive strengths and 
weaknesses of a particular location. 
1. Performance by industry types 
An economy's dynamic capabilities to generate 
income are invariably linked to its human resources 
and accumulated intangible assets. Therefore, one 
expects that economic performances of industries 
differ according to their intensities in R&D, 
advertising and skills, in addition to physical capital 
intensity. 
In the following, the new WIFO taxonomies will be 
applied for investigating EU economic performance 
variables such as quality differentiation and labour 
productivity across the industry types. 
The intangible component in EU trade 
Unit values reflect the valuation of goods and services 
by consumers and are therefore directly linked to the 
potential for quality competition and vertical 
See also European Commission (1998). CHAPTER 2-57 
differentiation.
4 It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that industries characterised by high intangible 
investments and highly skilled labour also tend to 
exhibit the highest unit values. 
The overall picture of the different industry types 
corresponds well to these expectations (see Figure 
2.1). 
Figure 2.1: Unit values in EU trade: 1997, ECU/ kg 
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Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
Considering data on trade between the EU and the rest 
of the world, technology-driven industries show by far 
the highest unit values, presumably because of their 
ample opportunities for vertical differentiation. 
Mainstream manufacturing with its high share in the 
skill dependent and development oriented machinery 
sector comes second, followed by labour-intensive, 
marketing-driven and capital-intensive industries. 
Looking at the typical skill patterns in relation to the 
"intangible component", high-skill industries 
The calculation of unit values is based upon the ratio of 
nominal values to physical volumes and in this sense 
reflects the most literal measure of the relative importance 
of immaterial components. Unit values also tend to rise with 
respect to their position in the vertical organisation of 
production. 
outperform all the other types by a wide margin, but 
low-skill industries are just as good as (medium-skill) 
white-collar
5 industries. 
Besides the illustrative comparison of mean values, 
additional tests
6 confirm the important stylised fact, 
that industries indeed differ significantly in terms of 
the intangible component embedded in traded goods. 
In particular, technology-driven and high-skill 
industries exhibit significantly higher unit values 
relative to all the other groups, while capital-intensive 
and low-skill industries show significantly lower unit 
values. 
The real surprise is the particularly low unit values for 
marketing-driven industries, because of their 
reputation for creating intangible assets, such as 
specific brand affiliations. One plausible explanation 
for this is that the value chain is seldom "deep" for 
these industries.
7 Accordingly, initial material inputs 
are high as compared to the intangibles emerging 
along the value chain, and this is true for many 
industries included within this group, such as 
processed food products.
8 " 
In order to measure the degree of vertical product 
differentiation more directly, it is of interest to 
compare the standard deviations of unit values in 
European trade (see Figure 2.2). A rather robust 
stylised fact appears, which states that technology-
driven as well as high-skill and white-collar industries 
show significantly higher degrees of vertical product 
differentiation than any other industry type. 
From now on, "medium-skill" is dropped as implicit in both 
"white-collar" and "blue-collar". 
See Peneder (1999b). 
The "deeper" the vertical organisation of production (the 
value chain), the more processing stages precede 
downstream industries, the more likely that value added 
created along such production stages (which includes 
intangibles) is high relative to the initial material inputs. 
Another possible explanation follows from the twofold role 
of advertising. On the one hand, advertising may inform the 
customers about qualitative differences between products, 
that arise from introducing new products into the market. 
This presents vertical differentiation and increases the unit 
values. On the other hand, advertising may also influence 
consumer's loyalty to a particular brand. In this case, the 
product differentiation becomes horizontal, i.e. it creates 
quality differences for the consumers. Contrary to vertical 
differentiability, this does not increase unit values. This is 
also the case when advertising is aimed on selling large 
quantities of a rather simple product with a low unit value. 
Therefore, average unit values might be considerably 
dampened by the often dualistic nature of marketing-driven 
industries, where high-quality brands regularly coexist with 
low-priced unbranded products. 58 - CHAPTER 2 
Figure 2.2: Standard deviation of unit values in the 
EU, 1996 
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Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
factor other than labour. Consequently, this type ranks 
lowest in terms of labour productivity. Non-parametric 
tests of variance confirm that capital-intensive and 
technology-driven industries significantly outperform 
all the other categories. In capital-intensive industries, 
particularly high quantities of complementary capital 
inputs increase real production per employee. In 
technology-driven industries, a reasonable explanation 
draws on the vertical nature of product differentiation, 
as already observed in discussing the intangible 
component of traded goods. 
Figure 2.3: Labour productivity in the EU (ECU Ό00) 
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In contrast to unit values, which apply to particular 
goods, nominal labour productivity is an activity-based 
measure for economic performance indicating more 
directly the ability to generate income. The 
productivity of any single input factor depends on how 
efficiently it is used and on the amount of 
complementary inputs used for the production of 
economic value. Consequently, high amounts of 
physical capital, installed to support pure labour in 
production, should imply higher value added per 
employee. 
Comparing the aggregate values for the EU and 
ranking the industry types according to the level of 
labour productivity places capital-intensive industries 
first, followed by technology-driven and marketing-
driven industries, as well as mainstream manufacturing 
(see Figure 2.3). 
As shown in Peneder (1999a) the category of labour-
intensive industries is mostly characterised by the lack 
of a pronounced dependence on any additional input 
Total 
manufacturing 
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Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
With regard to human resources, white-collar 
industries show the highest levels of labour 
productivity, followed closely by high-skill industries, 
whereas low-skill industries as well as blue-collar 
industries perform considerably worse. In short, labour 
skills are positively related to productivity, but persons 
in typically white-collar professions appear to benefit, 
more than blue-collar workers, from productivity 
enhancing complementary inputs, such as capital 
investments, advertising or R&D. CHAPTER 2-59 
Besides of the correlation between industry type and 
labour productivity, an interesting question is whether 
the intangibles and skills influence positively the 
competitiveness. In order to answer this question, a 
regression analysis is earned out for the EU, the USA 
and Japan (see Box 2.2). The main outcome is that, 
while tangible investments in physical capital have a 
major influence on labour productivity, they still 
constitute only one among several contributing factors. 
Taking direct as well as indirect effects into account, 
the (white-collar) high-skill labour intensity has the 
strongest positive impact, followed by capital 
investment, research expenditures and finally, by 
advertising outlays. 
Box 2.2: Intangibles matter! 
A crucial question for economic policy is to understand what factors affect competitiveness. In particular, it is 
interesting to know whether intangibles have an impact on industry competitiveness, and, if so, what is the relative 
contribution of different types of intangibles. In order to investigate the impact of tangible versus intangible 
investments on labour productivity, a small econometric model tests what types of inputs appear to be the most 
rewarding. The traditional set of tangible factors (physical capital and labour) is extended to take into account 
intangibles, such as labour skills, R&D and advertising outlays. 
Specification details are provided in Peneder (1999b). Due to pronounced endogeneity problems between the two 
dimensions of intangible investment and human resources, two simultaneous equations were set up. The joint results of 
the two estimations are illustrated by path analysis represented here below. Arrows indicate the presumed causal links 
underlying the model. All the coefficients exhibited are significant at least at the 5% level. Numbers in brackets 
correspond to the total effect on labour productivity, as has been computed by multiplying the standardised coefficients 
of both regressions. Arrows in dotted lines signal that only an indirect effect via the demand for skilled labour could be 
established. Bowed lines indicate correlation between variables without any prior causal assumption. 
The empirical results confirm that tangible investments in physical capital have a major influence on labour 
productivity. But it also stresses that capital investments constitute only one among several contributing factors. The 
coefficients exposed give the percentage change in labour productivity due to an increase of the respective factor 
intensities (or employment shares) by one percentage point. Taking direct as well as indirect effects into account, the 
share of white-collar high-skill labour has the strongest positive impact (+0.54), followed by capital investment 
(+0.51), research expenditures (+0.37) and advertising outlays (+0.20). At the industry level, all of these factors 
significantly increase the productivity of labour. 
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2. Intangibles, skills and industry 
specialisation in the Member States 
Although competitive advantages from intangible 
assets are overwhelmingly determined by firm specific 
investments, the general economic, political, 
institutional and scientific framework conditions also 
have an impact on the extent and type of 
entrepreneurial opportunities. The specialisation 
patterns are likely to follow differences in the 
framework conditions between countries and economic 
areas. In other words, a comparative study of 
differences in industrial structure can provide clues on 
the underlying sources of competitive strengths and 
weaknesses of particular locations. 
Industry specialisation by skill intensities 
The value-added shares of industries classified by skill 
intensities in the EU (both by Member States and as a 
whole), USA and Japan are compared in Table 2.2. 
Table 2.2: Value added shares in total 
manufacturing by skill types in 1997, % 
Type of industry 
Country 
EU-15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
Low-skill 
30.43 
36.42 
34.96 
23.65 
50.81 
40.31 
29.15 
28.38 
35.87 
33.55 
33.01 
52.52 
23.40 
19.07 
32.07 
25.50 
29.15 
(Medium-skill) 
blue-collar 
21.76 
20.68 
19.48 
27.32 
12.73 
25.51 
21.37 
6.17 
19.19 
14.70 
22.84 
19.02 
15.25 
24.58 
17.90 
17.44 
21.71 
(Medium-skiil) 
white-collar 
31.06 
31.19 
23.51 
30.69 
29.66 
24.35 
32.92 
39.08 
26.89 
39.88 
31.83 
22.68 
46.30 
38.02 
32.77 
38.88 
33.67 
High-skill 
16.75 
11.71 
22.05 
18.35 
6.80 
9.82 
16.56 
26.37 
18.05 
11.87 
12.32 
5.79 
15.05 
18.33 
17.26 
18.19 
15.46 
Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
Germany and Sweden clearly exhibit the smallest 
shares of value added in the group of low-skill 
industries. In contrast, Portugal has the lowest share in 
high-skill and the highest share in low-skill 
manufacturing, immediately followed in both cases by 
Greece and Spain. The latter additionally enjoys 
significantly larger shares in blue-collar industries. The 
most pronounced characteristics of both Ireland and 
the United Kingdom are their low shares in blue-collar 
industries. In Italy, the overall pattern slightly favours 
the extreme poles of low-skill and high-skill industries. 
Looking at value added shares within the Triad, Japan 
exhibits an even distribution, whereas the USA enjoy 
significantly higher shares in both high-skill and 
white-collar industries. For the EU as a whole, the 
opposite holds true, as the shares of high-skill and 
white-collar industries are considerably lower than in 
the USA. Additionally, the share of low-skill industries 
is quite high in the EU (30.4%). 
The pattern of similarity of skill intensities across the 
Member States provides information relevant for the 
economic policy design. Figure 2.4 shows a map, 
which presents the industry specialisation of the 
Member States according to the labour skills 
classification. 
Germany and Sweden are most distinguished by their 
large shares of high-skill in total manufacturing, as 
well as both types of medium-skill industries. In 
contrast, Italy and Denmark have equal shares in high-
skill industries, but perform worse in the medium-skill 
categories. Finland, Ireland and the Netherlands 
constitute a heterogeneous group that is difficult to 
classify. However, their most pronounced common 
characteristic is that they have particularly small shares 
of blue-collar as opposed to particularly high shares of 
white-collar industries. Cluster analysis
9 shows that 
Austria, Belgium, France and the United Kingdom 
broadly represent the average pattern, whereas Spain, 
Portugal and Greece are the most specialised in low-
skill industries. 
Industry specialisation by tangible and intangible 
inputs 
Industrial specialisation of the EU Member States 
according to the distinction by tangible versus 
intangible factors of production is reported in Table 
2.3. 
Greece, Portugal and Spain (together with Austria) 
show value-added shares of technology-driven 
industries smaller than in any other grouping. Italy 
performs significantly worse in both marketing-driven 
and technology-driven industries, as compared to 
mainstream and labour-intensive manufacturing.
1
0 
Peneder (1999b) provides statistical cluster analysis 
grouping the individual Member States according to relative 
similarity of their specialisation patterns. 
Its share of capital-intensive industries is even lower, but 
similar to the overall share for the EU. CHAPTER 2 -61 
Table 2.3: Value added shares in total 
manufacturing by factor inputs in 1997, % 
Type of industry 
Country 
EU-15 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
USA 
Japan 
Mainstream 
manufacturing 
25.41 
22.12 
29.50 
28.06 
19.61 
21.17 
21.94 
12.06 
28.88 
21.50 
26.39 
21.92 
22.82 
21.95 
22.85 
21.26 
24.86 
Labour-
intensive 
15.31 
15.63 
14.68 
14.13 
17.71 
20.78 
13.57 
6.25 
19.84 
11.75 
18.83 
23.65 
14.98 
12.07 
13.21 
12.22 
16.00 
Capital-
intensive 
15.55 
22.24 
12.08 
15.46 
19.26 
16.47 
14.69 
12.56 
15.90 
19.23 
16.29 
13.94 
28.59 
21.25 
14.33 
13.51 
16.01 
Marketing-
driven 
21.28 
21.08 
28.60 
16.22 
35.36 
26.73 
22.10 
31.48 
17.65 
31.20 
24.61 
29.77 
17.54 
16.16 
25.52 
23 17 
21.00 
Technology-
driven 
22.46 
18.93 
1513 
26.13 
8.06 
14.84 
27.69 
37.66 
17.73 
16.32 
13.88 
10.72 
16.07 
28.57 
24.08 
29.84 
22.13 
Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
At the opposite end of the spectrum, Ireland does best 
precisely in marketing- and technology-driven 
industries. France also shows the most pronounced 
specialisation in technology-driven industries and the 
Netherlands in marketing-driven industries. Denmark 
is unique in its small share of capital-intensive 
industries. 
Cluster analysis shows two groups with rather similar 
specialisation patterns. The United Kingdom shares 
with the USA particularly high shares in both 
marketing- and technology-driven industries. In 
contrast, Germany and Sweden (and partly Japan) 
exhibit similar patterns of specialisation, with high 
shares in technology-driven industries and low shares 
in marketing-driven industries. The latter are 
compensated by high shares in mainstream 
manufacturing and (especially for Sweden) in capital-
Figure 2.4: Mapping European specialisation (I): value added shares by skill types in 1997 
IÜÜI High + mediumskilled 
High + low skilled 
Average pattern 
Medium skilled white collar 
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Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 62-CHAPTER 2 
Figure 2.5: Mapping European specialisation (II): value added shares by skill types and factor inputs 1997 
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production of EU manufacturing. 
Source: WIFO calculations based on SBS. 
intensive industries. 
Other country clusters show much lower similarity. 
Finland, Belgium and Italy are often grouped together, 
seemingly sharing an intermediate position in most 
variables. The Netherlands, Denmark and Greece on 
the one hand, and Austria, Portugal and Spain on the 
other are also often grouped together. In particular, all 
countries in the first group show high shares in typical 
marketing industries, while countries in the second 
group show small shares in technology-driven 
industries, compensated at different degrees by higher 
shares of labour-intensive or mainstream 
manufacturing (as in the case of Austria)." Figure 2.5 
The two latter cases illustrate the danger of overstating 
results based on rather broad classifications. The industries 
included therein can still be highly heterogeneous and 
countries may, to a large extent, differ in their actual factor 
combinations. 
compares the industrial structures across Member 
States on top of previous Figure 2.4 (containing 
information on skill intensities). 
3. Policy conclusions 
The empirical results of this study deliver strong 
evidence that intangible investments do matter for 
industrial competitiveness. 
The empirical results also account for differences in 
industrial structure across the Member States in terms 
of skill intensities, as well as of tangible versus 
intangible intensities. Different structural patterns 
reflect differences in utilisation of technology- and 
skill-intensive methods of production, which generate 
high labour productivity and high value units. When 
supporting change towards higher R&D- and skill-
intensive methods of production, the availability of CHAPTER 2 - 63 
and conditions for accumulating intangible assets are 
crucial.
1
2 Therefore, the policy has a role to play in 
supporting the sufficient supply of such intangibles. 
The Community already plays an important role in 
supporting intangible investments. In order to promote 
European innovation activities the Community has 
developed, among other initiatives, the "Action Plan 
for Innovation" as one of its main policy instruments. 
The mission and priorities of the Action Plan are set 
out in Box 2.3. 
Such activities want to promote innovation activities 
mainly by setting up a business environment 
the access of firms to finance. Here, there is scope for 
policy interventions in order to make capital markets 
function efficiently. In particular, the flexibility for 
internal changes is crucial as well as the question of 
whether the available labour force is equipped with the 
right skills for skill-intensive production or for using 
ICT efficiently. Most importantly, however, 
entrepreneurial skills matter. The creativeness and 
responsiveness of entrepreneurs is at the heart of 
creating adequate intangibles for competitiveness. 
Also here, policy makers can encourage investment in 
firm-specific intangibles. For example the Community 
Box 2.3: The "Action Plan for Innovation" 
The "Action Plan for Innovation" sets the Community framework for innovation policy. It aims at the 
definition and articulation of a genuine European strategy for promoting innovations. 
With this plan the Commission has mobilised instruments for promoting innovation in Europe, in particular 
with the help of the Framework Research Programme and the Structural Funds. 
The Action Plan splits the priorities into three main areas: 
• promotion of a real culture of innovation. 
• setting up a favourable environment for innovation. 
• creation of stronger links between research and innovation. 
Marked progress has been made in all three areas particularly for the development of innovation in enterprises, 
the analysis and exchange of good practices on innovation at the EU level and the financing of innovation." 
Additionally, the results of the second Community Innovation Survey
0 provide empirical evidence about the 
improving innovation performance of European enterprises in manufacturing and services."' 
In particular, the activities of the Action Plan for Innovation - which make possible to develop a policy geared 
to all European enterprises - take increasingly into account the strong position of the service sector in EU's 
production and employment. 
a European Commission (1999). Innovation and Technology Transfer Newsletter. Special issue on innovation October. 
b The Community Innovation Survey is a joint action of the European Commission and Eurostat and carries out surveys in a 
harmonised way in all Member States at a large scale. 
c Eurostat (1999), Statistics in Focus. Research and Development, No. 2. Mapping innovation performance of European 
enterprises. Preliminary results from the Community Innovation Survey 1997/1998 (CIS II), Luxembourg. 
favourable to innovative entrepreneurship. 
Furthermore, the science and business networks play a 
crucial role in supporting interactive learning and in 
providing business sector with additional technological 
knowledge. 
On the other hand, the supply and accumulation of 
firm-specific intangibles usually takes place within the 
firms. Their supply depends, among other things, on 
can play an important role in stimulating businesses to 
apply more intangibles by making them more aware of 
the need to invest in intangibles and assisting firms 
willing to do so. Such actions have already been 
designed and applied in the Commission. Box 2.4 
presents the activities already carried out or in 
planning in order to support the supply of intangibles. 
Certain characteristics of intangible assets and the 
possibility of unfavourable conditions for accumulation 
easily cause under-investment in intangibles. Policy 
measures become necessary. 64 - CHAPTER 2 
Box 2.4: Action Plan "Promoting Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness" 
The Action Plan "Promoting Entrepreneurship and Competitiveness" which was drawn up in response to the 
priority recommendations of BEST (Business Environment Simplification Task Force) was endorsed by 
Industry Ministers on 29" April 1999. The main thrust of the Action Plan is promoting enterprises as a mean of 
improving competitiveness and sustainable growth. Additionally, it foresees a number of actions supporting 
intangibles and entrepreneurship in Europe. It concentrates on the aspects which are most important to SMEs -
new approaches in education, training and the workplace, easier access to finance and innovation, and better 
public administration. As SMEs make up more than 99 % of enterprises, the measures in the Action Plan will 
also help to respond to the challenges identified in strengthening the competitiveness of the European economy 
in the face of globalisation. While the Action Plan sets a time frame within which measures have to be launched, 
it leaves Member States the decision on exactly what form the measures shall take. This takes account of the fact 
that national approaches to fostering entrepreneurship differ considerably. 
One of the measures included in the Action Plan is BENE, the Business Education Network for Europe. With 
BENE the Commission plans to set up a network of educational organisations directly involved either in 
teaching entrepreneurship or in training entrepreneurs. The network allows exchanging experiences, cross-
cultural learning, comparative analysis and identification of best practices. The network will also benefit 
entrepreneurs, who will have a direct access to the information gathered in the BENE database such as training 
courses on offer. Additionally, in 1999 pilot projects identifying and elaborating innovation management 
training methods in order to improve innovation management skills of small businesses are supported. Also, the 
Commission is launching a study on management training for heads of SMEs, hereby using information and 
communication technologies. As the Commission has recognised the importance of networking for companies, it 
carries out a study on networking between SME clusters and technology poles. 
This study revealed the contributions of intangible 
investments to the competitiveness. Yet, the diffusion 
and use of ICT-based knowledge products and services 
in the industry are also contributing to higher 
productivity through multiple effects such as lower 
transaction costs, reduced inventories and shorter 
production cycles, better access to information among 
others. Unfortunately, these themes had to be excluded 
from this report because, for the time being, the 
appraisal of these effects faces critical measurement 
problems and would consequently requires the 
development of new statistical indicators. 
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Annex 2.1: WIFO taxonomies 
TAXONOMY I: industries clustered by input combinations 
Mainstream manufacturing 
1730 Finishing of textiles 
1770 Knitted and crocheted articles 
1750 Other textiles 
1760 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
2120 Articles of paper and paperboard 
2430 Paints, coatings, printing ink 
2510 Rubber products 
2520 Plastic products 
2610 Glass and glass products 
2660 Articles of concret, plaster and cement 
2680 Other non-metallic mineral products 
2720 Tubes 
2870 Other fabricated metal products 
2910 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
2920 Other general purpose machinery 
2930 Agricultural and forestry machinery 
2950 Other special purpose machinery 
2960 Weapons and ammunition 
2970 Domestic appliances n. e. c. 
3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers 
3130 Isolated wire and cable 
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
3540 Motorcycles and bicycles 
3550 Other transport equipment n. e. c. 
Labour intensive industries 
1720 Textile weaving 
1740 Made-up textile articles 
1810 Leather clothes 
1820 Other wearing apparel and accessories 
1830 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 
2010 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 
2020 Panels and boards of wood 
2030 Builders' carpentry and joinery 
2040 Wooden containers 
2050 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc. 
2620 Ceramic goods 
2640 Bricks, tiles and construction products 
2670 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
2810 Structural metal products 
2830 Steam generators 
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal 
2750 Casting of metals 
2850 Treatment and coating of metals 
2940 Machine-tools 
3160 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
3420 Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 
3510 Ships and boats 
3520 Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
3610 Furniture 
3620 Jewellery and related articles 
Source: DEBA and COMPET. WIFO calculations. 
Advertising intensive industries 
1510 Meat products 
1520 Fish and fish products 
1530 Fruits and vegetables 
1540 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
1550 Dairy products; ice cream 
1560 Grain mill products and starches 
1570 Prepared animal feeds 
1580 Other food products 
1590 Beverages 
1600 Tobacco products 
1910 Tanning and dressing of leather 
1920 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
1930 Footwear 
2210 Publishing 
2220 Printing 
2230 Reproduction of recorded media 
2450 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 
2820 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and boilers 
2860 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
3350 Watches and clocks 
3630 Musical instruments 
3640 Sports goods 
3650 Games and toys 
3660 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 
Capital intensive industries 
1710 Textile fibres 
2110 Pulp, paper and paperboard 
2310 Coke oven products 
2320 Refined petroleum products 
2410 Basic chemicals 
2470 Man-made fibres 
2630 Ceramic tiles and flags 
2650 Cement, lime and plaster 
2710 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
2730 Other first processing of iron and steel 
2740 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
3430 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
Research intensive industries 
2420 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 
2440 Pharmaceuticals 
2460 Other chemical products 
3000 Office machinery and computers 
3120 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
3210 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic comp. 
3220 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 
3230 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
3310 Medical equipment 
3320 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 
3330 Industrial process control equipment 
3340 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
3410 Motor vehicles 
3530 Aircraft and spacecraft 66- CHAPTER 2 
Annex 2.1: WIFO taxonomies {continued) 
TAXONOMY II: industries clustered 
High skills 
2440 Pharmaceuticals 
2910 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
2920 Other general purpose machinery 
2930 Agricultural and forestry machinery 
2940 Machine-tools 
2950 Other special purpose machinery 
2960 Weapons and ammunition 
3000 Office machinery and computers 
3510 Ships and boats 
3530 Aircraft and spacecraft 
Medium/white collar skills 
2110 Pulp, paper and paperboard 
2120 Articles of paper and paperboard 
2210 Publishing 
2220 Printing 
2230 Reproduction of recorded media 
2310 Coke oven products 
2320 Refined petroleum products 
2410 Basic chemicals 
2420 Pesticides, other agro-chemical products 
2430 Paints, coatings, printing ink 
2450 Detergents, cleaning and polishing, perfumes 
2460 Other chemical products 
2470 Man-made fibres 
2970 Domestic appliances n. e. c. 
3110 Electric motors, generators and transformers 
3120 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
3130 Isolated wire and cable 
3140 Accumulators, primary cells and primary batteries 
3150 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
3160 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
3210 Electronic valves and tubes, other electronic comp. 
3220 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line telephony 
3230 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
3310 Medical equipment 
3320 Instruments for measuring, checking, testing, navigating 
3330 Industrial process control equipment 
3340 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
3350 Watches and clocks 
Medium/blue collar skills 
2010 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 
2020 Panels and boards of wood 
2030 Builders' carpentry and joinery 
2040 Wooden containers 
2050 Other products of wood; articles of cork, etc. 
2810 Structural metal products 
2820 Tanks, reservoirs, central heating radiators and boilers 
2830 Steam generators 
2840 Forging, pressing, stamping and roll forming of metal 
2850 Treatment and coating of metals 
2860 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
Source: DEBA and COMPET. WIFO calculations. 
2870 
3410 
3420 
3430 
3520 
3540 
3550 
3610 
1510 
1520 
1530 
1540 
1550 
1560 
1570 
1580 
1590 
1600 
1710 
1720 
1730 
1740 
1750 
1760 
1770 
1810 
1820 
1830 
1910 
1920 
1930 
2510 
2520 
2610 
2620 
2630 
2640 
2650 
2660 
2670 
2680 
2710 
2720 
2730 
2740 
2750 
3620 
3630 
3640 
3650 
3660 
by employment skills 
Other fabricated metal products 
Motor vehicles 
Bodies for motor vehicles, trailers 
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
Motorcycles and bicycles 
Other transport equipment n. e. c. 
Furniture 
Low skills 
Meat products 
Fish and fish products 
Fruits and vegetables 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
Dairy products; ice cream 
Grain mill products and starches 
Prepared animal feeds 
Other food products 
Beverages 
Tobacco products 
Textile fibres 
Textile weaving 
Finishing of textiles 
Made-up textile articles 
Other textiles 
Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
Knitted and crocheted articles 
Leather clothes 
Other wearing apparel and accessories 
Dressing and dyeing of ftir; articles of fur 
Tanning and dressing of leather 
Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
Footwear 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Glass and glass products 
Ceramic goods 
Ceramic tiles and flags 
Bricks, tiles and construction products 
Cement, lime and plaster 
Articles of concret, plaster and cement 
Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
Other non-metallic mineral products 
Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
Tubes 
Other first processing of iron and steel 
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
Casting of metals 
Jewellery and related articles 
Musical instruments 
Sports goods 
Games and toys 
Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. Chapter 3 
Competitiveness, restructuring and firm location flexibility 
Global competition, technological developments and 
the achievement of the Single Market have stimulated, 
within Europe, economic restructuring. This process is 
taking many forms: entry of new firms, downsizing 
and exit, mergers and acquisitions, as well as transfer 
of productive activities to other regions inside or 
outside the EU. 
In this chapter, the term "relocation" is taken to 
express the form of restructuring which arises from the 
transfers of productive activities. The chapter focuses 
on the phenomenon of relocation even if it does not 
seem to constitute the major mode of economic 
restructuring in Europe. For instance, in Belgium there 
is well-documented evidence that relocation is 
responsible for no more than 18% of the jobs lost due 
to collective layoffs of employees over the period 
1990-1995 (see Annex 3.1). 
The strong growth of foreign direct investments over 
the past decade, as well the recent developments in the 
organisation of MNEs suggest that the phenomenon 
may become of growing importance in the future. 
The chapter aims to show the most important elements 
that encourage MNEs to relocate. It is argued that 
relocations should be viewed against the background 
of a new paradigm of industry dynamics and the 
development of spatial networks. The analysis is 
concentrated on MNEs for three principal reasons. 
Firstly, what is happening to MNEs today may well be 
an indication of what may happen in other enterprises 
in the future. Secondly, the lack of data at this stage 
makes it impossible to analyse in detail the relocation 
phenomenon of any other type of enterprise. Thirdly, 
much of what follows is essentially confined to those 
firms and sectors that have already adopted a global or 
Euro-regional structure. 
The chapter is organised as follows: The first section 
discusses the importance of the productive process 
associated with automation and relocation in the 
context of the new industry dynamics paradigm. The 
second section deals with the passage from a "stand-
alone strategy" of MNEs to a "complex integration 
strategy", where enterprises operate within 
interdependent networks. In the third section it is 
argued that an important part of current international 
production restructuring follows the formation of two 
flexible networks: the "productive network" and the 
"subcontracting network". The fourth section stresses 
the role of operational flexibility as a key element for 
firms' competitiveness. Further implications for the 
location of productive activities are discussed in the 
fifth section. The final section concludes by providing 
some policy considerations. 
1. Industry dynamics and the location 
of economic activities 
The traditional explanation of the spatial location of 
productive activities refers to the "product life cycle 
theory".
1 The underlying hypothesis implies the 
following phases: 
INNOVATION O GROWTH O 
STANDARDISATION ¿> MATURITY ♦ 
DECLINE 
The theory stresses that technological innovation 
represents an advantage that allows finns to 
concentrate their initial production in the home market: 
products are manufactured where conceived. During 
the "growth stage" there is the first relocation for 
market reasons and production is gradually transferred 
to other developed countries. During the 
"standardisation phase" a second reason for relocation 
arises from cost factors and production moves towards 
low cost countries. The result is a specialisation of 
developed countries in the most growing sectors and a 
relocation of the other sectors to low cost countries. 
The product life cycle hypothesis implies that the 
relocation process is always carried out from north to 
south. This limited and pre-determined character 
represents the main weakness of the theory.
2
 
Additionally, it does not explain the dynamics of direct 
See Vernon (1966). 
Furthermore, it is not always true that relocations are 
unavoidable, as the theory of product life cycle states, since 
local developments, such as the location of productive 
activities, are specific to each place and cannot be pre-
determined. 68- CHAPTER 3 
investments or international specialisation.
3 
Furthermore, the effects of "rapture" connected with 
the diffusion of new technologies (automation), the 
quality improvements, the role of the flexibility of the 
productive process are not taken into account. These 
elements play an important role in so far as they enable 
the more industrialised countries to restore their 
competitiveness of traditional sectors (e.g. textile, 
leather, etc.).
4 
In effect, the maturity phase of a product, which is the 
imitation phase by the less advanced countries, 
coincides with the exhaustion of the old technological 
system and the distribution of the new system. This 
phase is then followed by a changing composition of 
product variety. Thanks to the introduction of new 
technologies, the manufacture of "high tech" varieties 
of the product will be carried out in the most advanced 
countries, which benefit from the effects of the new 
growth cycle.
5 On the other hand, the manufacture of 
all other "low tech" models of the product will take 
place within the framework of the old system and it 
will be relocated successively in less advanced 
countries.
6 
However, at this stage, it is incorrect to assume that for 
an industrialised country to obtain solid performances 
it has to give up traditional sectors (the standardised 
sectors) where demand is declining, and re-deploy 
resources in the high-growth sectors. Such a choice 
can lead to a deterioration of industrial 
competitiveness if a massive relocation of the 
traditional sectors in low factor costs countries is not 
followed by a quick re-deployment of the resources 
made available.
7 
3 Even the reformulation of the theory carried out 
successively remains insufficient since the deterministic 
character is maintained. See Krugman (1979), Vernon 
( 1979), Flam and Helpman (1987). 
Porter ( 1990) stresses that there are advantages (low wages 
for example) that firms can easily obtain through relocation, 
while other advantages are not so easily available (training, 
technology, R&D) and are mainly acquired through 
improvement, innovation and upgrading. 
The theory of the product life cycle regards these new 
models of products as "standardised". 
6 The progressive changes in the increasingly differentiated 
market demand, involves, on the one hand, the more rapid 
and less expensive adaptation of the offer and, on the other 
hand, a higher flexibility of the productive process. The 
latter often follows from the use of innovative technologies, 
such as biotechnology and new materials. Overall, the 
production process moves from "rigid" and standardised 
toward increasingly varied and "flexible". 
7 SeeElMouhoud(1992). 
It is sometimes important to increase investments in 
R&D and in the diffusion of new technologies, in 
order to carry out structural transformation within the 
traditional sectors that increasingly enter in connection 
with growth sectors. This is the case of the textile 
sector, often mentioned as an example of relocation 
movements, where the automation of the production 
process allows maintenance of certain operations in 
industrialised countries.
8 Moreover, the choice to 
concentrate on top-of-the-range or fashion-dependent 
sectors requires a proximity to consumer markets and 
sophisticated distribution systems. MNEs have 
internalised this logic of dynamic industry adjustment 
within their spatial organisation by means of setting up 
world wide or European wide networks. 
2. Spatial networks of multinational 
enterprises 
Intensification of international competition and the 
diffusion of new technologies have favoured the 
adoption of "complex integration strategies" by 
MNEs.
9 In the EU, where the European integration 
process has reduced the "economic distance" between 
Member States, this phenomenon is particularly 
evident. 
In order to engage in international production in this 
new economic environment, MNEs —that are a 
network of activities located in different countries-
have to adapt their organisational structures 
accordingly. Strategies for organising cross-border 
production involve choices about the international 
location of different activities and the degree of 
integration among the various entities that fall under 
the common governance of the MNE. As illustrated by 
Table 3.1, the range of possible strategies and 
structures has grown over time. 
The establishment of stand-alone affiliates based on a 
specific territory, operating autonomously and 
duplicating activities represents an old strategy.
1
0 On 
the contrary, at present an increasing number of MNEs 
co-operate and organise a much more complex form of 
integration: global networks. 
Italy for example modernised its textile sector by 
encouraging in particular the design and cut of the fabric. 
In 
See Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989); Rugman et al. (1995). 
With a stand-alone strategy, an MNE treats its foreign 
affiliates as autonomous/independent wealth creating units 
and each foreign affiliate serving a separate host economy. 
A stand-alone affiliate is responsible for most of the value 
added in its output. CHAPTER 3 - 69 
Table 3.1: Evolution of the strategies and structures 
of MNEs 
Form 
Stand-alone 
Simple 
integration 
Complex 
international 
production 
Types of intra-
firm linkages 
Ownership, 
technology 
Ownership, 
technology, 
markets, 
finance, other 
inputs 
All functions 
Degree of 
integration 
Weak 
Partially 
strong 
Potentially 
strong 
overall 
Environment 
Host country accessible 
to FDI; significant trade 
barriers; costly 
communications and 
transportation 
Bilaterally open trade 
and FDI; non-equity 
arrangements 
Open trade and FDI; IT; 
convergence in tastes; 
increased competition 
Source: World Investment Report, 1993. 
These networks involve the development of 
production/distribution networks, the setting up of 
joint subsidiaries and a multiplication of alliances. 
"MNEs may also use their foreign affiliates or partners 
as vehicles for seeking out and monitoring new 
knowledge and learning experiences."
1
1 Networking 
permits the MNE to become a more effective 
competitor. Intensified competition encourages firms 
to quickly adopt the best practice production 
methods,
1
2 including those related to production 
location, if they want to survive and prosper.
1
3
 
These methods basically consist of more intense 
international collaboration among producers, and 
between producers and customers, and less conflictual 
labour relations. "Alliances are an expedient way to 
crack new markets, gain skills and technologies, 
realise economies through reorganisation and 
exploitation of complementarities, share fixed costs 
and resources, as well as the ability to monitor and 
control competitive forces (...) strategic alliances allow 
firms to spread geographically at a much faster and 
flexible rate."
1
4
 
Networks combine intra- and inter-firm organisational 
structures. They involve flows of information and 
incentives, and complex combinations of horizontal 
and vertical linkages among firms comprising the 
networks. The effectiveness of the networks enables 
firms to reduce their costs, to minimise their risks and, 
therefore, to maximise their profits. Through networks 
MNEs can better organise themselves in order to avoid 
activity duplications. By splitting the productive 
process (from design to distribution) they can make 
See Dunning (1999). 
Firms could follow the example of those successfully 
organised in an international integrated manner. 
See Mucchielli (1992), Buckley and Mucchielli (1997). 
See Sleuwaegen et al. (1998), p. 145. 
better choices about where to locate a particular 
activity and thus improve efficiency. 
The development of global supply chains by means of 
setting up global networks reflects the deployment of 
global strategies. However, according to the United 
Nations, "In Europe, many MNEs have adopted 
regional strategies, partly in response to the Single 
Market initiative, which has lead to considerable 
restructuring and concentration of production".
1
5 In the 
EU, regional international production systems are 
present and can be called "European flexible 
networks" as illustrated by Figure 3.1. 
Figure 3.1: New Euro-organisation: from 
"everything everywhere" to one integrated system 
Nole: Small circles in the upper frame identify national markets, while 
big circles in the lower frame identify Euro-networks. The ♦ identifies 
the location of business activities (e.g. production, sales, R&D). 
Source: adapted from Vandermerwe (1993). 
In this new Euro-organisation, firms are not stand-
alone but they operate in an interdependent system. 
They have an ability to shift production or supply in 
response to changing market and cost conditions. 
Firms do so by paying close attention to the optimal 
location of the different elements of the value chain. 
See United Nations (1993). 70-CHAPTER 3 
In the European regional flexible networks, MNEs 
concentrate their activities on a limited number of 
regions and at the same time are able to increase 
productivity. A good example of this European 
restructuring production is provided by Unilever, 
which rationalised its manufacturing of toilet soap 
locations by cutting the number of factories from 13 in 
1973, to 2, in 1999.
1
6 (See Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3) 
Often, MNEs carry out mergers and acquisitions to 
reach a minimum size that enables them to mobilise 
the necessary resources and to count on wider sales 
networks.
1
7 Larger firms have more options than 
smaller ones in seeking access to new business 
opportunities. As compared to small and domestic 
firms, MNEs have geographically broader horizons, 
better cost information and larger financial resources 
to respond quickly to globalisation challenges and 
opportunities. 
3. Relocation in two types of networks 
It has been argued
1
8 that the new supply chain system 
consists of the integration of two networks: 
• the "production network" and 
• the "subcontracting network". 
Within this system, relocation can take the form of 
either FDI or subcontracting with independent partners 
(see Box 3.1). 
The production network 
In the production network, firms concentrate on the 
core business of the value chain and extend their 
supply network to new markets. They co-ordinate all 
production activities internally and are responsible for 
transmitting technological advances and innovation to 
the other firms in the network. The core firms control 
several affiliates in different markets and the decision 
to shift production is conditioned primarily by the 
presence of the network and by the level of the 
"efficiency environment" provided by the host region. 
Figure 3.2: Unilever locations in Europe 
1973 (#13) ' 
Note: Toilet soap manufacturing locations. 
Source: Henderson Croethwalte / Unilever Home & Personal Care 
Europe. 
In 1994, Unilever, with a turnover of 38.3bn ECU and 
304.000 employees, was the seventh most important group 
in Europe. 
Many finns invest abroad for strategic reasons. A large 
share of FDI in Europe occurs through mergers and 
acquisitions. 
See Klapwijk (1996). CHAPTER 3 -71 
Figure 3.3: Unilever European detergent 
productivity (tons per head, 1978=100) 
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Source: Henderson Croethwalte / Unilever Home & Personal Care 
Europe. 
The subcontracting network 
In the subcontracting network, subcontractors are 
usually specialised in the production of the more 
intensive labour phases. Subcontracting is cost-driven; 
therefore the choice of location is determined by the 
possibility of benefiting from lower cost factors. In this 
sense, subcontracting allows large firms to concentrate 
on technologically sophisticated and/or capital-
intensive activities and enables them to adjust 
production more flexibly. It provides large firms a 
financing advantage as it reduces their need for 
working capital. Subcontracting occurs frequently in 
the majority of industrial sectors.
1
9 
Within this perspective, subcontractors are linked with 
the MNE and are part of a more integrated production 
network.
2
0 
Relocation by means of international subcontracting 
represents the transfer of a stage of the production 
process abroad with subsequent import of the products 
that were manufactured before on the spot.
2
1 The 
increase of international subcontracting is among the 
most significant organisational innovations and it is an 
essential component of the above mentioned 
organisational practices. 
4. Operating flexibility 
A firm that forms part of a network is more 
competitive, due mainly to the degree of "flexibility" 
from which it benefits. 
Within this perspective, flexibility can be defined as 
"the ability to reallocate resources quickly and 
smoothly in response to changes"
2
2 and can also be 
seen as a response to uncertainty of international 
markets (such as government policies, competitors' 
decisions, or the arrival of new technologies).
2
3 
Operating flexibility is an advantage gained by a MNE 
in the co-ordination of its subsidiaries and partners 
present in the networks. It adds value to the finn in the 
sense that it gives MNEs the possibility to respond 
profitably to changing costs and demand conditions 
and to uncertain events. Furthermore, through the use 
of technological innovations
2
4 and flexible labour, 
firms can react more quickly to the growing volatility 
in world markets.
2
5 
The word "subcontracting" does not have any homogeneous 
translation in all European languages. However, it is 
possible to determine a general standard of the 
subcontracting agreement: "A subcontracting agreement 
exists whenever: 
• the principal contractor takes part in the design of the 
product by providing totality or a part of the specifications 
to the producer, these specifications which can go from 
detailed technical plans to broader specifications, and 
• the principal contractor is responsible for the marketing of 
the product". See European Commission (1997). 
It is important to note that under this chapter, the varieties 
of the phenomenon connected to the ownership/control are 
not taken into account. 
This would call for an appropriate attention to the specific 
needs of subcontractors, which is however out of the scope 
of this chapter. The European Commission is launching 
studies in the area of subcontracting, in particular on: 
subcontracting development poles, clustering, restructuring, 
networking, integrated suppliers training, 
internationalisation of European subcontracting. 
Relocation does not necessarily involve the transfer of all 
the production processes. 
See Buckley and Casson (1998), p. 23. 
See Kogut and Kulatilaka (1994). 
The growth of flexible production technologies allows finns 
to adapt their "offer" to the different local products. These 
differences influence the strategies of MNEs. 
The high variance of international markets increases the 
value of operating flexibility. 72-CHAPTER 3 
Box 3.1: Reasons justifying a FDI and sub-contracting agreements 
A recent survey
1
1 referring to the period 1990-96 shows that the main reason for investing abroad is the 
presence of new emerging markets or markets with strong growth (69% of the answers). The difference in 
labour cost, on the other hand, is of only secondary importance (12% of the answers). Companies with a high 
capital/labour ratio prefer to carry out their transfers of production in industrialised countries, while 
companies with a low capital/labour ratio prefer investing in less advanced countries in order to benefit from 
lower wages. 
The main reasons for choosing FDI, 1990-1996 
Olnt'l production 
distribution 
4% 
D Other 
7% 
^" 
■ Labour cost 
12% 
■ Raw materials / 
Energy 
4% 
\ I  / 
/ 
□ Land, 
réglementation, 
competitive 
devaluations 
4% 
D New or high growth 
markets 
69% 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau. Belgium. 
The main reasons for concluding sub-contracting agreements abroad are different from those justifying 
direct investment. The possibility of benefiting from lower wage costs and the geographical proximity of the 
place of establishment play a major role. 
The main motives for sub-contracting, 1990-96 
Π Raw materials / 
Energy 
I Attractive 
réglementation, 
competitive 
devaluations 
5% 
■ Land/ 
Environmental 
rules 
3% 
D Labour cost 
35% 
D Int'l production 
distribution 
20% 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau, Belgium. 
I Other 
29% 
a The survey carried out by the Belgian Federal Planning Bureau in 1997 was directed towards 3,000 companies established 
in Belgium. Its results are based on the answers of 466 companies. See Van Den Cruyce and Courcelle (1998), p. 16. 
b FDI often mirrors the willingness to penetrate the local market. Very often, a firm would only get a small share of this 
market through exports, if it were not supported by local investments. CHAPTER 3 - 73 
In the labour perspective, it can also be noted that 
management's desire to enhance flexibility, 
adaptability and the quality of production puts 
particular pressure on the labour force. Providing the 
necessary conditions for firms to exist and operate in 
more flexible networks could promote, in a parallel 
process, the adaptability of labour markets and 
stimulate new kinds of flexible jobs. For the same 
reason, the need for more and better qualifications 
implies the necessity to strengthen education policy in 
the EU and to promote a stronger partnership between 
firms, universities and public authorities. Furthermore, 
it also requires closer concertation and dialogue 
between employers and labour unions to adapt to new 
economic realities. 
In this context, in a welfare state it is important to find 
a proper balance between firms' flexibility and labour 
security.
2
6 This is an important issue that deserves 
serious attention. 
5. Further locational implications 
The development of networks helps to explain the 
continuing increase of intra-industry trade for most EU 
countries and sectors, particularly in the exchange of 
vertically differentiated products.
2
7 (See Table 3.2 and 
Figure 3.4) 
Within Europe the location of activities within the 
spatial networks will increasingly depend on the 
attractiveness of the industrial regions, in their 
capacity as nodal points within networks. 
Communication and transportation technologies and 
infrastructures are therefore essential to link the 
different nodes of the network. 
Table 3.2: Importance of intra-i 
total intra-EU trade by 
ndustry trade in 
sectors 
Sector 
Rubber and plastics products 
Other transport equipment 
Fabricated metal products 
Radio, TV and communication 
equipment 
Medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches 
Office machinery and computers 
Motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers 
Electrical machinery and 
apparatus n.e.c. 
Publishing, printing and 
reproduction 
Chemical and chemical products 
Wearing apparel; dressing and 
dyeing of fur 
Basic metals 
Textiles 
Machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
Furniture, manufacturing n.e.c. 
Other non-metallic mineral 
products 
Pulp, paper and paper products 
Food products and beverages 
Wood, products of wood and 
cork 
Tanning and dressing of leather 
Coke, refined petroleum and 
nuclear fuel 
Tobacco products 
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 
1988 
69.8 
69.5 
67.1 
67.9 
65.5 
69.2 
60.4 
61.3 
63.9 
62.2 
57.3 
61.4 
59.4 
57.9 
56.0 
54.1 
50.1 
43.4 
42.6 
37.8 
40.8 
31.2 
58.7 
1997 
74.3 
72.2 
71.4 
67.8 
67.4 
67.4 
66.7 
65.7 
65.5 
65.2 
64.6 
63.1 
63.0 
62.2 
57.5 
55.3 
54.4 
50.1 
45.0 
44.6 
44.4 
34.6 
62.8 
Change 
4.5 
2.7 
4.3 
-0.1 
1.9 
-1.8 
6.3 
4.4 
1.6 
3.0 
7.3 
1.7 
3.6 
4.3 
1.5 
1.2 
4.3 
6.7 
2.4 
6.8 
3.6 
3.4 
4.1 
Source: WIFO calculations using COMEXT 
As a consequence of these developments, the 
attractiveness of a region will, to a growing extent, 
depend on the agglomeration effects. Finns quite often 
choose sites where similar activities are already 
located. To explain this process, new economic 
geography theories combine trade costs with scale 
economies.
2
8 Moreover, the location, in the same 
geographical space, of producers and users facilitates 
reciprocal knowledge exchanges and creation of 
confidence relations between partners.
2
9 Positive 
externalities generated by agglomerations, in the form 
of external economies of scale and accumulative 
indirect effects, encourage concentration of 
production.
3
0 
What it is in interest of firms does not necessarily coincide 
with the best interests of the labour force. 
It could also be explained by the fact that the production 
made in the host country is not destined for the local 
market, but is exported to the origin country. 
See Krugman (1995) and Chapter 1 in Part One of this 
report. 
Strong agglomeration effects were found also in empirical 
analysis of Japanese FDI in Europe: they show that 
Japanese firms choose to locate in countries where initial 
investments had been made. See Head and Mayer (1998). 
See Friedman et al. (1992). 74 - CHAPTER 3 
Figure 3.4: Growth of intra-industry trade 
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The productive organisation and the attractiveness of a 
specific location depend increasingly on the diffusion 
of Information Communication Technology (ICT).
3' 
(See Table 3.3) 
Table 3.3: 
Belgium-
Luxembourg 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Austria 
Portugal 
Finland 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
EU 
USA 
Japan 
1995 
rt 
π —' 
υ 
825 
1234 
924 
295 
366 
866 
751 
595 
943 
772 
349 
857 
1256 
978 
785 
1498 
1196 
CL 
Q _ 
Ç _ 
y 
4.21 
4.95 
4.30 
3.70 
3.39 
4.35 
5.35 
3.65 
5.09 
3.62 
4.38 
4.68 
5.88 
5.73 
4.43 
6.76 
4.25 
ICT expenditure 
1996 
'S. Q 
rt —' 
-y u 
ρ _ 
_ """  913 
1340 
939 
340 
419 
917 
850 
642 
1034 
842 
379 
942 
1320 
1077 
840 
1630 
1283 
ο- α  o c? 
ρ _-
y 
4.53 
5.20 
4.18 
3.90 
3.69 
4.50 
5.63 
3.66 
5.45 
3.87 
4.46 
4.97 
6.03 
6.05 
4.55 
7.11 
4.56 
1997 
rt 
'Β, f? 
rt —
1
 
Ρ S. 
_ 
1004 
1454 
996 
391 
455 
991 
942 
697 
1136 
921 
432 
1026 
1404 
1163 
907 
1759 
1337 
_ 
Q 
α c?  ρ è. 
o 
4.82 
5.36 
4.31 
4.09 
3.82 
4.73 
5.78 
3.77 
5.75 
4.13 
4.76 
5.21 
6.20 
6.22 
4.76 
7.42 
4.68 
1998 
a TÍ 
1098 
1554 
1064 
452 
497 
1083 
1049 
782 
1233 
996 
477 
1119 
1520 
1250 
986 
1890 
1287 
_ 
a 
5.08 
5.52 
4.45 
4.42 
3.93 
5.00 
5.68 
4.06 
5.93 
4.32 
4.92 
5.26 
6.49 
6.39 
4.97 
7.62 
4.39 
Source: EITO 1999. 
These technologies revolutionise methods of 
production and enable firms to benefit from an 
economic environment favourable to the development 
of their activities, thanks in particular to the use of 
high-quality equipment. 
It allows value chains of finns under separate 
ownership to become more integrated and encourages 
higher labour productivity levels. 
The firms that are most advanced in flexible 
technologies are more inclined to locate in a region 
that has developed an innovative and coherent 
production system. With the introduction of advanced 
production technologies using ICT, the possible gains 
from relocating production to low wage countries are 
partly compensated by a reduction of the weight of 
these costs and by the possibility of being better able, 
through a flexible productive process, to adapt supply 
to demand, which is increasingly characterised by high 
differentiation. 
Similar to the introduction of ICT, the development of 
European multi-modal transport networks is essential 
to foster the creation of efficient production and 
subcontracting networks. 
6. Conclusions 
For the purpose of this chapter ICT refers to IT (the 
combined industries of hardware for office machines, data 
processing equipment, data communication equipment and 
of software and services) plus telecommunication 
equipment and telecommunication services. 
This chapter introduced the phenomenon of relocation 
of productive activities. It has been stressed that, as an 
element of economic restructuring, relocation is not an 
end in itself but a "means" for firms to increase their 
competitiveness. Relocation is closely connected with CHAPTER 3 - 75 
the current process of restructuring of international 
production and necessarily reflects the strategic 
behaviour of firms. These strategies involve forming 
integrated international supply structures, 
incorporating a production network and subcontracting 
network. In the former, firms concentrate on core 
activities while in the latter specialised subcontractors 
are responsible for the more labour intensive 
production phases. 
In this perspective the competitiveness of a firm and 
the attractiveness of a region are directly related to 
their level of integration within these networks. This 
integration can be fostered through the improvement of 
network infrastructures, the provision of efficient 
institutions and the formation of strategic alliances. 
Furthermore, more investments in R&D, the diffusion 
of new technologies and the promotion of better 
professional qualifications could encourage higher 
internal/external flexibility in European firms. 
In the network, firms benefit from specific advantages 
including: 
• strong interdependence; 
• easy transferability of proprietary advantages and 
knowledge; 
• agility. 
Firms can better rationalise their productive activities 
and so adapt more easily to changes in market and cost 
conditions. In short, flexible networks enable them to 
be more competitive. "To survive and prosper, firms, 
which are directly or indirectly responsible for creating 
jobs, are obliged to exist in a state of permanent and 
rapid adaptation (...) their competitiveness is a function 
of their agility".
3
2 
The presence of these networks leads to a number of 
implications for European industiy: 
• growth of vertical intra-industry trade within 
Europe; 
• increase FDI between Member States; 
• stimulation of structural change through 
operational flexibility. 
The completion of the Single Market will lead to a 
further reduction in the economic distance between 
Member States that, in turn, will stimulate the creation 
of flexible networks. Integration into these networks 
could also encourage higher economic cohesion 
between European regions. Certainly, this process 
should not impinge on social cohesion; there is a clear 
need to find a proper balance between a firm's 
flexibility and the aims of the welfare state. 
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Annex 3.1: The case of Belgian relocations 
A report issued in 1998 by the Belgian "Federal Planning Bureau"
1
1 studies the relocations of companies 
established in Belgium. It seem to be the first systematic attempt to put together information on: 
• establishment of foreign subsidiaries by companies already established in Belgium, 
• subcontracting agreements, 
• collective lay-off of employees. 
The information on foreign subsidiaries is drawn from the database "BELFOMI". It contains data on 9,204 
subsidiaries established abroad. It provides information on establishment location, type of activity, year of 
establishment abroad and reasons for investing outside Belgium. 
The reasons for investing outside Belgium are known in 57% of the cases (5,260 out of 9,204). They are 
classified in four categories: "strict" relocation (i.e. the transfer of (part of) the value chain abroad and the 
consequent closure/reduction of the activity in Belgium), FDI for expansion, FDI for diversification and "no 
relocation" (whenever the establishment abroad or subcontracting is strictly necessary, according to the 
definition of the Federal Planning Bureau). In what follows the term "relocation" will only be used when 
speaking about the first category. 
Table 3.Al shows that closure/reduction of the activity (and thus employment) affects only 1 out of 10 
establishments. Additionally, half of these strict relocations (256 out of 498) were carried out within the EU. 
The phenomenon of relocation is more frequent in manufacturing (25.2%) than in the service sector (1.6%). 
The contrary is true for FDI for diversification (21% in services and 2.4% in manufacturing). Lastly, FDI for 
expansion is relevant in both the service sector (26.6%) and manufacturing (59.4%). 
Concerning manufacturing, Figure 3.Al shows that the sectors most affected by relocations are clothing 
(21.4%) and textile (11.8%). 
Table 3.A2 shows that relocations are strongly concentrated within the EU (65%, i.e. 5,979 out of 9,204) and 
that less than 40% (i.e. 2,950 out of 7,941) took place after 1993. 
The information on subcontracting agreements is drawn from a survey promoted by the Federal Planning 
Bureau on 3,000 companies established in Belgium. Of the 466 companies that answered the survey, 35.6% 
subcontracted abroad while 31% carried out a transfer of activity towards the foreign countries. The survey 
also shows that type of activity and geographical proximity are the most important elements in the choice of 
subcontracting. Concerning the type of activity, subcontracting of high-tech and R&D activities is very limited 
(17% and 4%, respectively). Concerning geographical proximity, subcontracting with neighbouring countries 
represents 51% of the total, and the other EU and EFTA countries another 21%. 
The survey demonstrates that although subcontracting is not always synonymous with relocation, a relation 
does exist. 59% of the companies, for which a product formerly produced in Belgium was replaced by import 
from abroad, have a subcontracting link with foreign countries. This can be interpreted as relocation in the 
form of subcontracting. 
Finally, the information on collective lay-off of employees draws on another survey carried out by the Federal 
Planning Bureau with the three national trade unions. It targets Belgium during the period 1990-1995. Of 
92,480 redundant workers, some 17,279 (18.6%) are directly due to relocation. 
In summary, this study shows that some widespread fears related to relocation do not seem to be justified. In 
particular, the importance of relocation (the most dramatic ones) seems to be limited, and relocation is not the 
major reason for collective lay-off. 
See Van den Cruyce and Courcelle (1998); Bernard et al. (1998). 
These companies have more than 20 employees and 53% are multinationals. The period under observation is 1990-1996. The 
analysis of subcontracts through foreign trade data is rather complicated. Trade data capture only partially the relocation 
phenomenon. For instance, it is possible to measure vertical integration processes but not horizontal integration. Moreover, in 
the case of the small enterprises, the company that exports is often different from the one re-importing the semi-finished 
product. 78-CHAPTER 3 
Annex 3.1: The case of Belgian relocations (continued) 
Table 3.A1: Foreign establishments by relocation category and activity branch 
Relocation category 
"Strict" relocation 
FDI for expansion 
FDI for diversification 
No relocation 
Subtotal 
Relocation category not yet defined 
Total 
Activity branch 
Services 
Nr | % 
50 
<S 1 3 
641 
154') 
3053 
1.6 
26.6 
21.0 
50.8 
100.0 
1375 
4428 (65.3%) 
Production 
Nr | % 
434 
1023 
41 
225 
1723 
25.2 
59.4 
2.4 
13.0 
100.0 
254 
1977 (29.2%) 
Others 
Nr : % 
0 
144 
2 
0.0 
47.2 
0.7 
159 Í 52.1 
305 Í 100.0 
67 
372 (5.5%) 
Unknown 
14 
79 
2 
84 
179 
2248 
2427 
Total 
Nr | % 
498
la
l 
2059 
686 
2017 
5260 
9.5 
39.1 
13.0 
38.3 
100.0 
3944 
9204 
α 256 out of 498 cases (51%) represent strict relocations within the EU. 
Source: BELFOMI, Federal Planning Bureau. 
Figure 3.A1: Relocation by manufacturing sectors 
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Metallurgy 
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Other manufact. 
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* with an individual weight of < 1.5% 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau 
Table 3.A2: Foreign establishments by localisation and year 
of implementation 
Intra-EU 
Extra-EU 
Total 
Before 
1993 
After 
1993 
I Year not 
known 
3,451! 
1,540: 
4,9911 
1,873! 
1,077i 
2,950; 
655 
608 
1,263 
Total  % 
5,979! 
3,225; 
9,204! 
65.0 
35.0 
100 
Source: Federal Planning Bureau. CHAPTER 3 - 79 
Annex 3.2: Relocation in the "Made in Italy" sector 
A study on the Italian industrial districts
3 considers the relocations in the "Made in Italy" sector (mainly textile, 
leather and shoes). 
Firms that have relocated abroad seem to have better employment performances compared to local industries 
with a low degree of relocation. A possible explanation is an improvement of competitiveness in international 
markets, witnessed by increases of exports three times greater. 
The decrease in employment of low-skilled labour due to relocation has been counterbalanced by an increase 
in employment of high-skilled labour, a phenomenon that is not observed in areas characterised by low 
relocation. This happens although the wage differential between low- and high -skilled workers has increased 
much more where relocations happen more frequently. 
All this might be interpreted as a redesign of the international division of labour, allowing the country which 
holds the control of final markets to use a more qualified labour force that is paid higher wages. This allows 
for the achievement, at least in the short run, of higher levels of productivity and competitive skills. 
a See Schiattarella. (1999). 
Annex 3.3: Defining the concept of relocation 
There is no clear and unanimous definition of the concept of industrial "relocation", either in economic 
literature or in papers of international organisations. Because of the variety of meanings, an extensive 
definition of relocation could create confusion rather than clarity. However, it is still necessary to distinguish 
relocation from other direct investment concepts. For this reason, a strict definition of the phenomenon is 
proposed here.
a 
Relocation in the strict sense involves the transfer from one place to another (the host country), either to a new 
site or to an existing site, of all or part of the manufacturing process with the closing-down or reduction of 
activity and/or employment in the country of origin. The existence of a link could be indicated by the fact that 
closure or reduction takes place at the same moment or a short time after the setting in operation of the new 
factory abroad. The most typical relocation involves re-importation of the product that had previously been 
produced on the spot. 
Relocation can consist of simple displacement of production capacity from one site to another, but it involves 
usually modernisation, rationalisation or more complex restructuring (e.g. concentrating production within the 
same geographical location instead of in several different areas). A combination between these various forms 
is possible as well. Part Three 
The sensitivity of European industry to external shocks Chapter 1 
The impact of the financial and economic crisis in Southeast Asia on 
European industries 
Prior to the financial and economic crisis that hit the 
region in 1997, Asia had been viewed as one of the 
most dynamic regions of the global economy and was 
expected to make a significant contribution to world 
growth going into the next century. The financial and 
economic crisis in Southeast Asia, which threatened to 
develop into global crisis, has had major implications 
for the global economy and brought into question prior 
expectations regarding growth prospects for this and 
other emerging market regions. 
This chapter
1 seeks to assess some of the implications 
for European industries of the crisis in Southeast Asia 
through its impact on European trade. Although 
linkages between European industries and the affected 
region may take various forms, it is clear that one of 
the main avenues through which the crisis has affected 
the EU manufacturing sector has been via trade. Prior 
to the crisis, sustained growth in the Southeast Asia 
region had resulted in its increasing importance as a 
trade partner for the European Union. The crisis, 
however, changed the trade environment for European 
industries, the collapse in demand in Southeast Asia 
drastically reduced demand for many European exports 
and changes in relative exchange rates have boosted 
the price competitiveness of producers from the 
region. 
The questions to which this chapter will try to provide 
some answers are as follows: Has the crisis in Asia had 
an influence on the competitive position of European 
industries vis-à-vis the crisis-hit region? And, if so, to 
what extent are European industries sensitive to this 
type of shock and which industries are more sensitive 
than others? 
The analysis focuses on the impact of the crisis on 
bilateral (direct) trade between Europe and the 
Southeast Asia region. This choice has been made 
because the available trade data is for European 
exports and imports only and so trade between other 
regions cannot be analysed. Moreover, the analysis 
concentrates on trade patterns in value rather than 
volume terms due to the lack of appropriate 
information to analyse EU trade volumes to individual 
countries and regions. Nonetheless an attempt is made 
to provide an indication of the magnitude of the effects 
of the crisis on trade volumes. Finally, the implications 
of the crisis on European manufacturing production are 
assessed but in depth analysis is hampered by the lack 
of up to date consistent production data for European 
industries. 
1. Background to the crisis in 
Emerging Markets 
Over the last decade a progressive liberalisation of 
capital markets in developing countries has had a 
strong impact on the movement of external financial 
resources to these countries leading to increasing 
inflows of billions of dollars of short-term foreign 
loans. In 1993, these inflows were ten times that of 
1990 while in 1996 they were 15 times that of 1990.
2 
These movements resulted in overvalued currencies, 
assets and equities, unbalanced loan structures and 
many poorly performing investments. The situation 
was made even worse in those Asian economies whose 
currencies were pegged to the dollar — the rise of the 
dollar after 1995 led to a worsening of competitiveness 
in these Southeast Asian countries and significant 
current account deficits. Lacking the complementary 
domestic institutions to deal with the consequences of 
freer capital movements, the crisis in Asian financial 
markets that first became visible in mid-1997 spread 
quickly to other sectors with devastating effects for the 
economies of the region. 
The early reactions to the financial crisis were 
moderate capital withdrawals in Thailand, the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia and later in South 
Korea. This soon escalated into a financial panic 
exacerbated by the devaluation of local currencies, 
which spread across the countries of the region in mid-
1997. The devaluation of Asian currencies started 
This chapter draws on Baker et al. (1999).  Sec World Bank (1997). 84 - CHAPTER 1 
when short-term foreign debt significantly exceeded 
the official foreign exchange reserves, which have 
been drained by the combined effect of the loss of 
export competitiveness and the panic conversions of 
domestic assets into foreign exchange. The build-up of 
speculative pressure forced many currencies to 
abandon their close links to the US dollar and the 
volatility of these currencies, which had previously 
been almost non existent, shot up dramatically. 
The devaluation of currencies of emerging market 
countries (EMs) in the Southeast Asia region fed 
through to a wave of bankruptcies of domestic banks 
and firms and major shifts in capital flows. The 
outcome was a collapse in domestic demand and 
imports, high unemployment, stagflation and migration 
push. What made the Asian financial crisis particular 
was the speed and virulence with which it spread 
through the region and threatened to spread financial 
contagion to the global economic system through trade 
and financial linkages that had been strengthened by 
increased global economic interdependence. The 
apparent vulnerability of EMs in the Southeast Asia 
region also raised questions about the vulnerability of 
EMs in other regions. This led to exchange rate market 
pressure building-up elsewhere, notably in Latin 
America, Eastern Europe and Russia. In Russia, short-
term foreign debt significantly exceeded the official 
foreign exchange reserves in mid-1998, resulting in 
balance of payments pressures and devaluation of the 
Russian rouble. Short-term debt was also above 
official foreign exchange reserves in Brazil by 
September 1998. 
2.5% in 1998 while the growth in world trade volumes 
decreased from around 10.5% in 1997 to 3.5% in 
1998. The slowdown of output growth was less 
pronounced in developed countries than in the rest of 
the world. 
Table 1.1: Real GDP Growth, IMF projections 
(annual percentage change) 
World 
Industrialised countries 
USA 
EU-11 (Euro area) 
Newly Industrialised Asian economies 
Developing countries 
Africa 
Middle East and Europe 
Countries in transition 
CEECs
a 
Japan 
China 
Malaysia 
Indonesia 
Hong Kong 
Philippines 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Taiwan 
Thailand 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Chile 
Mexico 
Venezuela 
Russia 
1997 
4.2 
3.0 
3.9 
2.5 
6.0 
5.7 
3.1 
4.4 
2.2 
3.5 
1.4 
8.8 
7.7 
4.6 
5.3 
5.2 
8.0 
5.5 
6.8 
-0.4 
8.6 
3.2 
7.1 
7.0 
5.9 
0.8 
1998 
2.5 
2.5 
3.9 
2.9 
-1.5 
3.3 
3.4 
2.9 
-0.2 
2.6 
-2.8 
7.8 
-6.8 
-13.7 
-5.1 
-0.5 
1.5 
-5.5 
4.9 
-8.0 
4.2 
0.2 
3.3 
4.9 
-0.4 
-4.8 
1999 
2.3 
2.0 
3.3 
2.0 
2.1 
3.1 
3.2 
2.0 
-0.9 
3.0 
-1.4 
6.6 
0.9 
-4.0 
-1.3 
2.0 
0.5 
2.0 
3.9 
1.0 
-1.5 
-3.8 
2.0 
2.0 
-3.6 
-7.0 
2000 
3.4 
2.2 
2.2 
2.9 
4.5 
4.9 
5.1 
3.3 
2.5 
4.6 
0.3 
7.0 
2.0 
2.5 
3.1 
3.0 
4.2 
4.6 
4.8 
3.0 
3.0 
3.7 
4.6 
3.0 
1.8 
-
* Excluding Belarus and Ukraine 
Source: IMF (1999) 
2. Impacts of the crisis on global trade 
and growth 
The global effects of the Asian crisis have been felt 
through changes in demand. The EU and the USA 
have already seen significant falls in their exports to 
the Southeast Asian region. At the same time there has 
been a surge in imports of products originating not 
only from the Asian region but also from other regions 
that could not sell to Southeast Asian markets. The 
contraction of trade to the Southeast Asian region has 
already been translated into lower prices of traded 
goods and primary commodities in particular, excess 
global capacity, slower growth of global GDP and 
trade, and intensified competition. 
World output and trade growth slowed in 1998, largely 
as a result of the contraction of activity in Asia 
(including Japan) and also in other developing regions 
and the transition economies (see Tables 1.1 and 1.2). 
World output growth decreased from 4% in 1997 to 
Table 1.2: Growth in the volume of world 
merchandise trade by selected region, 1990-98 
(annual percentage change) 
Exports 
World 
North America
a 
Latin America 
Western Europe 
EU 
Transition 
economies 
Asia 
Japan 
Six East Asian 
traders
 b 
Average 
1990-95 
6.0 
7.0 
8.0 
5.5 
5.5 
5.0 
7.5 
1.5 
11.5 
1996 
5.5 
6.0 
11.0 
5.5 
5.5 
6.5 
5.0 
1.0 
7.5 
1997 
10.5 
11.0 
11.0 
95 
9.5 
12.5 
13.0 
12.0 
11.5 
1998 
3.5 
3.0 
6.5 
4.5 
5.0 
10.0 
1.0 
-1.5 
2.0 
Imports 
Average 
1990-95 
6.5 
7.0 
12.0 
4.5 
4.5 
2.5 
10.5 
6.5 
12.0 
1996 
6.0 
5.5 
8.5 
5.5 
5.0 
16.0 
6.0 
5.5 
4.5 
1997 
9.5 
13.0 
22.0 
7,5 
7.0 
17.0 
6.0 
1.5 
6.5 
1998 
4.0 
10.5 
9.5 
7.5 
7.5 
10.0 
-8.5 
-5.5 
. 
16.0 
° Canada and the USA. 
b Taiwan, Hong Kong, Malaysia, South Korea, Singapore and Thailand 
Source: WTO (1999) 
The volume of world merchandise exports increased 
by only 3.5% in 1998 in comparison to impressive 
growth rate of 10.5% in 1997 and an average growth 
rate of 6% in the period 1990-95 (see Table 1.2). The 
volume of world merchandise imports increased by 4% CHAPTER 1 - 85 
in comparison to 9.5% in 1997. Most regions, with the 
exception of the EU and Western Europe, recorded a 
slowdown in import growth in 1998. In North 
America, despite falling slightly in 1998, import 
growth remained above the average level for recent 
years. By contrast, Asian imports fell sharply by nearly 
8.5%, Japanese imports fell by 5.5 per and imports by 
the six Asian traders by 16%. Stagnation or a decrease 
in import volumes is estimated for Africa and the 
Middle East.
3In North America and Europe the initial 
worries stemming from the crisis in Southeast Asia 
were that the decrease in Asian demand and the 
increased competitiveness of Asian imports could lead 
to a substantial increase in the trade deficit of the USA 
and the EU with Southeast Asia. In turn it was feared 
that this could lead to slower economic growth. In the 
USA, the counter argument put forward by many 
economists was that US economy would be able to 
cushion itself against these negative external shocks. 
Moreover the crisis could have beneficial effects on 
the domestic economy. The arguments behind this 
reasoning were that the slowdown of US exports to 
Southeast Asian region and the pressure of cheap 
Asian imports would force domestic competitors to 
hold down their prices and, thus, produce a dampening 
effect on inflation. This dampening effect would 
remove the need to increase interest rates in order to 
slow down the US economic growth rate towards more 
sustainable levels. Economic growth in the USA over 
the last two years was above its estimated long-term 
trend, which resulted in the increasing pressure on 
labour markets. 
Indeed, the developments in 1998 confirm the 
expectations of those economists who believed in the 
ability of the US economy to successfully deal with the 
external shock brought about by the crisis in Southeast 
Asia. The US economy experienced acceleration in 
private consumption and continued double-digit 
investment growth. GDP growth stayed unchanged at 
4% in 1998. Weakening global demand together with 
excess supply of many goods has caused the decline of 
interest rates in the USA. In addition, other factors 
have worked in the direction of boosting the US 
economy. These include the diversion of foreign 
investments away from Asia to US government 
securities and expansion of two large industries, 
construction and motor vehicle industry. High 
consumer and investment spending and the low level 
of long-term interest rates stimulated capital spending 
and expanded productive capacity. The booming US 
economy stimulated intra-NAFTA trade, and exports 
and output growth of its main trading partners. 
Similarly to the USA, Western Europe has experienced 
an expansion of consumption and increasing growth of 
output. In 1998, stronger demand growth helped to 
maintain imports, which for the first time in the latest 
years grew faster than exports (see Table 1.2). The 
acceleration of consumption in the USA has stimulated 
EU exports and this helped the share of Western 
Europe in world merchandise trade to recover to 44%, 
following a marked decrease between 1990 and 1997. 
The overall macroeconomic picture, as influenced by 
events in EMs, is that the spread of negative effects of 
the Asian crisis world-wide have been offset by the 
economic growth in the USA and the EU countries. 
The diversion of capital flows from EMs to the USA 
and the EU also contributed to low interest rates in the 
USA and EU. In addition, falling primary 
commodities' prices led to weaker import prices and 
real income gains for net importers of these products. 
Apparently the crisis had a limited impact on the 
overall macroeconomic situation of developed 
countries. However, this does not mean that it had no 
important consequences for individual industries or 
countries. 
3. The composition of EU trade with 
emerging markets 
This section describes the overall composition of 
European trade to EM regions. Three specific 
emerging market regions
4 (Southeast Asia, Latin 
America and CEEC) and two additional individual 
countries (China and Russia) are analysed. 
The purpose of the section is to identify the most 
important manufacturing sectors and industries
5 in 
tenns of their shares of exports and imports to and 
from EMs. Moreover, the importance of EM regions 
within total imports and exports for individual sectors 
Sec World Trade Organisation (1999). 
4 In this and subsequent sections the following definitions are 
used for EM regions: Southeast Asia - Hong Kong, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, 
Taiwan, Thailand; Latin America - Argentina, Brazil, 
Chile, Columbia, Ecuador, Mexico, Uruguay, Venezuela; 
CEEC - Albania, Belarus, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 
Croatia, Czech Rep, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Macedonia, Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovak Rep., 
Slovenia, Ukraine, Yugoslavia. For convenience the tenn 
EMs is used to group these regions, even though in is more 
generally accepted to describe the CEEC countries and 
Russia as "transition economies". 
Throughout the analysis the following convention is used: 
higher aggregated levels corresponding to NACE two digits 
will be referred to as "sectors", while the term "industry" 
will be used for lower aggregations corresponding to NACE 
three digits. 86 - CHAPTER 
and industries will be examined. A more detailed 
analysis of trade with Southeast Asia will follow. 
All together, the main EM regions accounted for over 
a third of both extra-EU exports and imports in 1998; 
for manufactured goods they accounted for 36% of EU 
exports and 40% of imports. The importance of 
individual regions in terms of the shares of exports and 
imports by industry is as follows: 
■ Southeast Asia accounted for 9% of total extra-EU 
exports and nearly 13% of total EU imports in 
1998.'' In terms of the region's share in total EU 
exports by individual manufacturing sectors, 
Southeast Asia is a particularly important 
destination for EU exports of: tobacco products, 
radio, television and communication equipment, 
electrical machinery, medical precision and optical 
instruments and leather and leather products. On 
the import side, Southeast Asia accounts for over 
two-fifths of EU imports of office machinery and 
computers and is an important supplier of radio, 
television and communication equipment; textiles; 
rubber and plastic products and furniture and other 
manufactured goods. 
■ The Latin American region accounted for 6% of 
total EU exports but only 2.3% of total EU 
imports of manufactured products in 1998. The 
region is an important destination for EU exports 
of machinery and equipment, motor vehicles, 
publishing and printing and electrical machinery. 
For each of these sectors, Latin America 
accounted for around 8% of total EU exports in 
1998. With respect to the share of the region in 
total EU imports by sectors, nearly two-fifths of 
EU imports of food products and beverages and 
one-fifth of tobacco products come from this 
region. 
■ The CEECs accounted for over 14% of extra-EU 
exports and over 10% of EU imports in 1998. For 
most manufacturing sectors, the CEECs account 
for the highest share of total EU exports among 
the selected EM regions. For all but two sectors 
(other transport equipment and medical, precision 
and optical equipment) the region accounted for 
over 10% of extra-EU exports in 1998. Moreover, 
for around half of manufacturing sectors, the 
CEECs have the largest share in total EU imports 
originated from the EM regions. 
The main findings, with regard to European trade with 
EMs in general, are as follows: 
■ Trade in manufactured goods dominates European 
trade with EMs. 
■ European exports to EMs are concentrated in a 
limited number of sectors but imports are more 
diversified. At an industiy level, the concentration 
of exports to and imports from EMs is generally 
higher than for trade with the world as a whole. 
■ Industries that represent a high proportion of 
European exports to most EM regions are to be 
found in the sectors of chemicals, machinery and 
equipment, communication equipment and motor 
vehicles. 
" Industries that represent a high proportion of 
European imports from the majority of EM 
regions identified are to be found in the sectors of 
chemicals, basic metals, wearing apparel, office 
machinery and computers, communication 
equipment. 
4. The impact of the crisis on 
aggregate European trade 
During the nineties, the share of the main emerging 
market regions (Southeast Asia, Latin America and 
CEEC) in total extra-EU trade increased steadily 
(Figure 1.1 and 1.2). 
Figure 1.1: Emerging market shares of total extra-
EU exports: 1989 to 1998 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
DCEEC^s ■ Latin America D China BS.E. Asia 
Source: COMEXT, NEI Calculations 
By 1996, the share of extra-EU exports destined to the 
main EMs
7 had risen to 32% compared to 19% in 
1989. For imports, the corresponding change was from 
23 to 30%
8. 
The corresponding figures in 1996 were, exports 12.5% and 
imports 11.5%. 
Including China but excluding Russia for which trade data 
are not available for early years. 
The analysis of EU trade with the emerging markets and 
other selected countries has been based on extra-EU 15 trade 
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Figure 1.2: Emerging market shares of total extra-
EU imports: 1989 to 1998 
Table 1.4: Extra-EU manufacturing trade balance 
by region / country 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
D CEECs Β Latin America D China BS.E. Asia 
Source: COMEXT, NEI Calculations 
Prior to the crisis, the rapid growth in EU trade with 
the main emerging markets had resulted in growing 
EU trade surpluses with these regions (Table 1.3). The 
main exceptions have been China
9 and, to a lesser 
extent, Russia where the EU continued to show a trade 
deficit. 
Table 1.3: EU trade balance by region / country 
Southeast Asia 
China 
Latin America 
CEEC 
Russia 
USA 
Japan 
Total 
1989 
-7.4 
-3.0 
-10.4 
-0.9 
-2.0 
-6.7 
-29.6 
-37.3 
Value ECU bn 
1993 
0.1 
-8.8 
1.7 
9.1 
-4.1 
0.6 
-27.7 
5.2 
1996 
11.9 
-15.3 
4.7 
21.9 
-3.8 
1.7 
-16.8 
45.9 
1997 
10.2 
-21.0 
9.9 
27.2 
2.6 
3.5 
-23.7 
48.5 
1998 
-24.7 
-24.5 
12.5 
28.9 
-2.0 
8.7 
-34.1 
19.2 
Source: COMEXT, NEI calculations 
A similar picture emerges for trade in manufactured 
goods which dominates EU trade with EMs, especially 
as far as EU exports are concerned (Table 1.4). 
Between 1996 and 1998, however, the EU trade 
surplus fell from ECU 46bn to ECU 19bn (Table 1.3). 
Over the same period, the trade balance for 
manufacturing fell from ECU 135bn to 105bn (Table 
1.4). 
Southeast Asia 
China 
Latin America 
CEEC 
Russia 
USA 
Japan 
Total 
1989 
-7.3 
-2.8 
-1.9 
0.0 
4.9 
-0.2 
-30.6 
35.9 
Value ECU bn 
1993 
-0.1 
-8.5 
8.9 
9.2 
4.3 
4.9 
-28.7 
82.3 
1996 
11.3 
-15.1 
12.8 
21.9 
7.1 
7.6 
-17.9 
135.0 
1997 
10.3 
-20.7 
20.3 
28.0 
11.5 
8.6 
-24.9 
147.3 
1998 
-22.8 
-24.0 
22.3 
27.8 
8.7 
14.6 
-34.3 
105.2 
Source: COMEXT, NEI calculations 
Underpinning this decrease was a fall in the 
manufacturing trade balance between the EU and 
Southeast Asia from a surplus ECU 1 lbn to a deficit of 
ECU 23bn (see Table 1.4). At the same time, the EU 
trade deficit with Japan increased from ECU 18bn to 
ECU 34bn and with China from ECU 15bn to ECU 
24bn. These negative movements were only partially 
offset by increases in the EU trade surplus with Latin 
America, CEEC and the USA (see Table 1.3). 
5. The impact of the crisis by 
manufacturing industry 
Trade patterns prior to the crisis can provide an 
indication of the potential exposure of European 
industry to direct trade effects resulting from economic 
crisis in Southeast Asia. Industries for which the 
Southeast Asia region represented an important 
destination for production (high export ratio) may, a 
priori, be thought to be particularly sensitive to a 
collapse in demand in the region. Similarly, industries 
that are already exposed to a high degree of 
competition from Southeast Asia within European 
markets (high import penetration) may also be 
expected to be more sensitive to the crisis. 
At an aggregate level, growth in the economies of 
Southeast Asia has resulted in an increase in their 
importance as a trade partner for Europe. Between 
1989 and 1996 the share of exports to Southeast Asia 
in total manufactured goods increased from 9 to 13% 
and the equivalent share for imports increased from 12 
to 14%. 
Specific trade patterns apply for China due to the fact that 
goods destined for and coming from the country pass via 
third countries (Hong Kong, Singapore etc.), which tends to 
overstate the EU trade deficit. CHAPTER 1 
Table 1.5: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast Asia, 
high export coverage and import penetration industries (1996) 
Production 
(ECU bn) 
Export 
Ratio 
(%) 
Export 
Specialisation 
Import 
Penetration 
(%) 
Import 
Specialisation 
Net Trade 
Ratio 
(%) 
High export - high import, exports > imports 
322 TV, and radio transmitters, apparatus for line 
telephony 
294 Machine-tools 
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
262 Ceramic goods 
362 Jewellery and related articles 
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 
High export - high import, imports > exports 
300 Office machinery and computers 
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories 
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
321 Electronic valves and tubes, electronic comp. 
351 Ships and boats 
172 Textile weaving 
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 
334 Optical instruments and photographic 
equipment 
314 Accumulators, primary cells and batteries 
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
335 Watches and clocks 
363 Musical instruments 
181 Leather clothes 
Export dominant industries 
241 Basic chemicals 
295 Other special purpose machinery 
292 Other general purpose machinery 
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 
246 Other chemical products 
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, etc. 
175 Other textiles 
331 Medical equipment 
313 Isolated wire and cable 
272 Tubes 
283 Steam generators 
352 Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
263 Ceramic tiles and flags 
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 
267 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
Import dominant industries 
251 Rubber products 
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
193 Footwear 
171 Textile fibres 
201 Sawmilling, planing and impregnation of wood 
202 Panels and boards of wood 
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 
152 Fish and fish products 
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 
365 Games and toys 
205 Other products of wood 
364 Sports goods 
Other industries 
341 Motor vehicles 
159 Beverages 
343 
361 
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
Furniture 
49.7  5.7  1.7  3.0  1.3  3.1 
27.7 
22.2 
10.7 
10.4 
7.6 
5.1 
0.8 
56.9 
50.2 
27.3 
27.1 
23.5 
20.2 
19.5 
9.1 
8.5 
5.1 
3.6 
1.4 
0.9 
0.6 
153.2 
90.6 
83.0 
74.0 
67.1 
65.1 
52.8 
44.9 
43.1 
32.7 
32.6 
19.3 
17.8 
17.6 
17.6 
13.3 
9.7 
8.0 
6.9 
6.1 
32.3 
25.4 
22.7 
21.1 
15.4 
12.7 
12.3 
11.2 
11.0 
6.7 
6.2 
5.4 
2.9 
255.5 
80.3 
75.7 
61.4 
6.2 
7.0 
2.7 
3.8 
19.7 
10.6 
32.1 
2.9 
2.6 
3.7 
2.7 
20.6 
2.5 
4.6 
3.6 
8.0 
3.1 
3.3 
18.7 
4.8 
4.6 
2.6 
7.4 
4.9 
2.4 
4.6 
2.5 
2.3 
3.0 
6.4 
5.8 
5.2 
2.3 
3.2 
3.7 
2.7 
4.3 
3.0 
3.4 
14.1 
5.7 
1.1 
2.0 
0.2 
2.0 
1.7 
0.3 
0.8 
1.6 
1.1 
0.7 
1.0 
0.6 
1.8 
1,2 
1.6 
1.7 
0.8 
1.3 
1.6 
1.0 
1.1 
1.4 
1.8 
2.9 
0.8 
0.9 
1.2 
1.1 
3.2 
0.6 
0.8 
0.9 
1.3 
1.2 
0.8 
1.6 
0.9 
1.1 
1.0 
1.4 
1.4 
1.2 
1.2 
1.4 
1.1 
1.0 
0.8 
1.1 
1.2 
0.8 
0.6 
1.8 
0.9 
1.9 
1.5 
1.1 
2.8 
2.0 
0.7 
0.8 
0.2 
0.6 
1.1 
0.2 
0.8 
0.8 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.4 
0.4 
0.6 
1.1 
0,7 
0,6 
2.0 
5.0 
2.4 
2.4 
22.1 
7.8 
7.8 
18.5 
6.4 
13.1 
5.6 
21.7 
3.5 
6.5 
7.0 
8.4 
4.3 
4.3 
21.6 
13.9 
5.0 
0.9 
0.7 
1.1 
0.2 
0.9 
0.8 
0.2 
0.9 
1.3 
1.7 
1.9 
0.9 
1.3 
1.3 
0.4 
0.0 
0.0 
0.1 
1.4 
0.1 
3.5 
2.6 
5.4 
6.6 
2.1 
3.1 
2.7 
9.0 
4.3 
8.2 
6.9 
3.7 
13.4 
0.7 
0.0 
0.3 
1.3 
0.5 
1.4 
1.0 
1.2 
1.4 
1.1 
0.7 
2.8 
1.1 
2.5 
1.7 
2.5 
1.3 
1.6 
1.5 
1.3 
1.1 
2.0 
1.6 
1.8 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.7 
0.2 
0.4 
0.7 
0.1 
0.2 
0.2 
0.4 
0.5 
0.4 
0.3 
0.8 
0.3 
0.1 
0.1 
0.2 
0.3 
0.2 
2.0 
1.3 
1.9 
1.7 
0.9 
0.9 
1.4 
2.1 
0.7 
1.6 
1.1 
1.3 
1.9 
0.7 
0.1 
0.2 
1.1 
4.6 
2.6 
0.4 
1.7 
5.0 
2.2 
27.9 
-22.4 
-5.9 
-11.9 
-3.3 
-7.9 
-0.2 
-0.4 
-3.6 
-0.5 
-1.6 
-0.2 
-33.0 
-14.0 
-9.2 
1.7 
7.0 
4.1 
2.2 
3.9 
1.7 
2.1 
1.8 
5.4 
4.4 
3.4 
1.5 
2.0 
2.5 
2.4 
4.3 
3.0 
3.4 
12.8 
5.6 
-2.5 
-0.5 
-5.9 
-4.7 
-0.4 
-3.3 
-2.1 
-9.4 
-5.3 
-10.4 
-9.4 
-3.5 
-14.7 
0.6 
1.6 
1.4 
-0.4 
Source: COMEXT, NEI calculations and estimates. CHAPTER 1 - 89 
These increases have been reflected in higher export 
and import penetration ratios for EU trade with the 
region. Between 1989 and 1996, the level of EU 
manufactured goods exports to the region as a share of 
production doubled from 1.1% to 2.2%. The 
penetration of imports from the region in EU 
consumption of manufactured goods also increased, 
albeit less rapidly, from 1.4% in 1989 to 1.9% in 1996. 
Table 1.5 reports EU export and import penetration 
ratios in Southeast Asia (for 1996).'° The industries 
reported are those with at least one of such ratios 
above the overall manufacturing average". Four 
additional industries (categorised as "other") are also 
included, because the subsequent analysis reveals that 
they experienced large absolute deterioration in their 
trade balances with Southeast Asia since 1996. 
Industries have been categorised according to whether 
both indicators are above average (high export, high 
import), have only an above average export ratio 
(export dominant) or have only an above average 
import penetration ratio (import dominant). The first 
category has been subdivided depending on whether 
the net trade balance is positive (exports > imports) or 
negative (imports < exports). Within each category, 
industries have been ranked according to their value of 
production in 1996 (first column of data). 
Two distinct groups make up the majority of industries 
for which both indicators are greater than average. 
First are relatively sophisticated research-intensive 
industries (e.g. office machinery, electronics and 
electronic components, optical instalments) and which 
are typically R&D intensive. The second group 
consists of labour intensive industries (e.g. clothing, 
textile weaving, leather and ceramic goods). 
The export ratio measures exports as a share of production, 
while the import penetration ratio measures imports as a 
share of apparent consumption. In addition, Table 1.5 
provides indicators of the regional specialisation of export 
and imports to Southeast Asia. These indicators are defined 
as the share of each industry's exports (imports) to the 
Southeast Asia region in total extra-EU exports (imports) of 
the industry normalised by dividing the equivalent share for 
total manufacturing trade. Values of these indicators that are 
greater than one indicate that the industry is relatively 
specialised in trade with the region in the sense that the 
share of exports (imports) with the region for the industry is 
greater than the weight of the region in total manufactured 
goods exports (imports). Finally, an indication of the overall 
trade situation of industries is provided by the net trade ratio 
that measures the net trade balance (exports less imports) 
with Southeast Asia as a share of European production. The 
net trade ratio may also be used as a measure of the 
revealed comparative advantage of industries. 
" The export ratio for manufacturing as a whole is 2.2% and 
the import penetration ratio is 1.9%. 
The category of industries for which European exports 
dominate also includes a relatively high number of 
research intensive industries such as aircraft and 
spacecraft, measuring instruments, medical equipment 
and other chemicals. By contrast, the category of 
industries for which imports from Southeast Asia 
dominate over European exports includes a high 
proportion of final consumption goods such as 
footwear, motorcycles, games and toys and sports 
goods. Final consumption goods industries are almost 
entirely absent among those sectors for which 
European exports dominate over imports'
2. 
Taken together, the changes for these industries 
amount to 91% of the total fall in exports and 95% of 
both the increase in imports and the change in the 
aggregate trade balance for manufacturing. 
In absolute terms the greatest falls in trade balances are 
mainly to be observed in the following broadly defined 
sectors: 
■ mechanical engineering (special purpose 
machinery, general purpose machinery, machine 
tools, machinery for the production and use of 
mechanical power); 
■ motor vehicles (motor vehicles, parts and 
accessories, motorcycles); 
■ electrical engineering and electronics (television 
and radio transmitters, electric motors and 
generators, electronic components, computers); 
■ chemicals (basic chemicals); 
■ basic metals (basic iron and steel, basic precious 
metals); 
■ clothing (other wearing apparel). 
The changes in trade balances with respect to 
Southeast Asia may be compared with those for extra-
EU trade as a whole. Despite the slowdown in export 
growth in 1998, many EU industries showed an 
improvement in their overall trade balance between 
1996 and 1998 (Table 1.6). 
Of the 20 EU industries showing the greatest increase 
in their trade balance between 1996 and 1998 only 2 
industries, namely refined petroleum products and 
vegetable and mineral oils and fats, had a trade deficit 
in 1998. Of those industries that saw the greatest 
deterioration in their trade balance, most were 
industries with an existing trade deficit in 1996. 
Analysis across all 95 (NACE three-digit) industries 
confirms the general pattern shown in Table 1.6. On 
the one hand, industries with pre-existing trade 
Both tobacco and beverages have export specialisation 
ratios for Southeast Asia that are above one but both have 
export ratios well below the average for total 
manufacturing. 90-CHAPTER 
Table 1.6: Total extra-EU trade, manufacturing industries with greatest change in trade 
balance between 1996 and 1998 
20 industries with largest improvement 
244 Pharmaceuticals 
322 TV and radio transmitters, line telephony 
232 Refined petroleum products 
343 Parts, accessories for motor vehicles 
252 Plastic products 
246 Other chemical products 
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
272 Tubes 
160 Tobacco products 
292 Other general purpose machinery 
158 Other food products 
351 Building and repairing of ships and boats 
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, etc. 
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
172 Textile weaving 
342 Bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles 
243 Paints, varnishes etc. 
245 Soap, detergents, etc. 
281 Structural metal products 
263 Ceramic tiles and flaqs 
Total of above 
Trade Balance 
1996 
8.9 
5.8 
-0.5 
6.5 
3.4 
5.8 
-2.9 
3.0 
0.9 
15.4 
62 
4.1 
1.8 
4.3 
4.6 
0.8 
2.5 
5.4 
1.8 
1.8 
79.4 
(ECU bn) 
1998 Change 
14.6 
8.0 
1.6 
8.1 
4.5 
6.7 
-2.1 
3.8 
1.7 
16.1 
6.9 
4.7 
2.4 
4.7 
5.0 
1.2 
2.9 
5.8 
2.2 
2.1 
101.0 
5.7 
2.2 
2.1 
1.6 
1.1 
0.9 
0.8 
0.8 
0.8 
0.7 
0.7 
0.6 
0.6 
0.5 
0.5 
0.5 
04 
0.4 
0.4 
0.4 
21.6 
20 industries with largest deterioration 
201 Sawmilling, planing of wood, etc. 
316 Electrical equipment n.e.c. 
335 Watches and clocks 
247 Man-made fibres 
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery etc. 
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 
193 Footwear 
361 Furniture 
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 
365 Games and toys 
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
294 Manufacture of machine-tools 
152 Fish and fish products 
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 
241 Basic chemicals 
341 Motor vehicles 
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories 
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
300 Office machinery and computers 
Total of above 
Trade Balance 
1996 
-2.1 
-1.7 
-1.9 
-0.5 
-0.4 
-2.4 
-0.3 
2.0 
-2.5 
-3.1 
-54 
4.6 
-5.6 
6.9 
7.4 
26.8 
-16.4 
6.3 
-13.7 
-20.8 
-22.9 
(ECU bn) 
1998 
-2.7 
-2.3 
-2.6 
-1.3 
-1.2 
-3.4 
-1.2 
1.0 
-3.5 
-4.3 
-6.9 
2.9 
-7.8 
3.8 
4.1 
22.6 
-21.2 
1.0 
-20.0 
-31.2 
-74.4 
Change 
-0.6 
-0.6 
-0.7 
-0.8 
-0.9 
-0.9 
-1.0 
-1.0 
-1.1 
-1.3 
-1.5 
-1.7 
-2.2 
-3.0 
-3.3 
-4.3 
-4.9 
-5.3 
-6.3 
-10.4 
-51.5 
Source: COMEXT; NEI calculations. 
surpluses generally show positive changes in their 
extra-EU trade balances. On the other hand, those 
industries for which the EU is a net importer further 
increased their trade deficits. 
There are however some important exceptions to the 
above finding. In particular, among the industries 
showing a large absolute deterioration in their trade 
balances are several for which the EU was a large net 
exporter in 1996, such as motor vehicles, basic 
chemicals, aircraft and spacecraft, basic iron and steel, 
and machine tools. 
For many of the industries recording the largest 
absolute deterioration in overall extra-EU trade 
balances, the deterioration of trade with Southeast Asia 
was a contributing factor. Of the ten industries with the 
largest decrease in total extra-EU trade balances, seven 
fall into the same category with respect to trade with 
Southeast Asia. At the same time, and in contrast to 
the general picture, the group of ten industries with the 
largest falls in total extra-EU trade balances also 
includes the two industries with the largest increase in 
the absolute level of trade balances with Southeast 
Asia, namely aircraft and spacecraft and television and 
radio receivers. 
Overall, although the contraction of export markets in 
Southeast Asia did contribute to a deterioration in the 
overall trade balance of some industries, it did not 
prevent many leading EU export industries from 
improving their overall extra-EU trade surpluses. 
The analysis in this section considers changes in the 
value of trade between the EU and Southeast Asia. If, 
as may be expected, the crisis led to changes in the 
price of traded goods, the observed changes in trade 
values may understate the impact of the crisis on the 
volume of trade. Unfortunately, information on trade 
volumes and price changes (unit value estimates) is not 
available at an industry level for EU trade with 
Southeast Asia, but is available for total extra-EU 
trade. Volume estimates for industry level trade with 
Southeast Asia are therefore obtained by using as a 
proxy for the (unavailable) price deflators of Southeast 
Asia, the implicit industry level price deflators for total 
extra-EU trade.
1
3 
This broad analysis of price and volume effects 
suggests that falls in the volume of exports were 
greater than indicated by changes in export values. 
Moreover, there appears to be a negative relationship 
between price and volume changes for exports, 
implying that EU industries that were best able to hold 
down their prices suffered less in terms of loss of 
export volumes. A relationship between price and 
volume changes is less evident for EU imports, 
although imports for some products do appear to be 
highly price elastic. 
The preceding analysis looked at industries with the 
largest absolute changes in their trade balances. 
Focusing on absolute changes naturally tends to draw 
attention to the largest trading industries and away 
from smaller industries for which changes to their 
trade balances may be no less important in relation to 
the size of their total trade (exports plus imports). It is 
therefore worthwhile taking a further look at changes 
in trade balances by using an indicator of revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA). This indicator takes 
into account the level of total trade as well as the 
overall trade position for manufacturing as a whole. 
This latter characteristic allows ranking industries 
See Baker et al. (1999). CHAPTER 1-91 
according to their trade performance.
1
4 In the current 
context, an industry may be observed to suffer a large 
absolute deterioration in its trade balance but if, for 
example, this has only compounded an existing weak 
position then it need not imply a major change in its 
RCA ranking. On the contrary, significant changes in 
the RCA ranking of a particular industry may signal 
that the direct trade impacts of the crisis had an 
influence on its overall trade performance, although 
this does not provide conclusive proof. 
Ninety-five three-digit NACE industries were analysed 
(for each year between 1989 and 1998) for both total 
extra-EU trade and trade with Southeast Asia. They 
were then classified according to whether their RCA 
ranking remained stable or was unstable during the 
period prior to the crisis (i.e. from 1989 to 1996),
1
5 as 
well as according to a typology based on factor input 
intensities.
1
6 
The general picture that emerges is that those 
industries that saw an improvement in their trade 
position vis-à-vis Southeast Asia fall into two groups: 
■ technically sophisticated, research intensive 
industries (e.g. pharmaceuticals, medical and 
surgical equipment, measuring instruments, 
television and radio receivers, television and radio 
transmitters); and 
■ industries closely related to traded commodities 
(e.g. animal and vegetable oils and fats, animal 
feeds, other foods, wood, wood containers), for 
which the EU is a net importer and for which the 
improvement in the RCA ranking appears to have 
been driven by falls in world commodity prices. 
Industries for which their RCA position vis-à-vis 
Southeast Asia deteriorated are the following: 
■ capital intensive industries: pulp and paper, 
cement, lime and plaster, basic iron and steel 
■ labour intensive industries: bodies for motor 
vehicles; 
■ advertising intensive: beverages, fish products and 
meat products; 
* mainstream: paper articles. 
The most significant category is capital intensive 
industries. Products from these industries are typically 
1
4 Although RCA measures do not provide an indicator of 
overall competitiveness, for which many factors should be 
taken into account, they do provide an indication of the 
relative trade performance of industries. 
1
5 See Baker et al. (1999). The basic rule observed is that 
industries showing an upward movement in five or more 
years were classified as improving and those showing a 
downward movement in five or more years as deteriorating. 
1
6 See Peneder (1995, 1998) and European Commission 
(1998). 
relatively homogeneous and markets resemble those 
for traded commodities and hence prices are 
particularly sensitive to changes in aggregate demand. 
Moreover, given the capital intensive nature of 
production and important economies of scale, short-
term adjustments to capacity are difficult to undertake, 
thus there is an incentive in the short run to allow 
prices adjustments rather than changes in output levels 
to clear markets. 
This finding would suggest that despite the overall 
negative impact of the crisis on European trade with 
Southeast Asia, the general pattern of comparative 
advantage has so far been maintained. Most of the 
obsei-ved movement in the RCA ranking is found to be 
among middle ranked industries and those for which 
the historical pattern indicates a volatile or cyclical 
pattern. Thus, most industries with either a (stable) 
strong revealed comparative advantage or 
disadvantage did not significantly change their RCA 
ranking. 
In order to estimate the direct trade implications of the 
crisis on European production three methodologies are 
used. 
■ Methodology 1 is based on changes in the 
observed values of exports and imports. 
■ Methodology 2 uses implicit price deflators for 
total extra-EU trade to estimate changes in 
volumes, as previously discussed. 
■ Methodology 3 uses estimates of the expected 
value of exports and imports had the crisis in 
Southeast Asia not occurred. 
The calculated changes using each methodology have 
then been compared to production levels prior to the 
crisis in order to estimate the impact on European 
production.
1
7 
With regard to the third methodology, it has been 
chosen because estimates of the impact of the crisis 
based on observed trade changes do not take into 
account the fact that EU trade with the Southeast Asia 
region had been growing strongly prior to the crisis"*. 
It can be argued that an assessment of the full impact 
of the crisis should take into account not only the 
actual change in exports and imports but also the 
difference between 1996 values and those that would 
have been expected in 1998 had the crisis not 
occurred. To estimate the expected values of exports 
and imports we use the simplifying assumption that 
It is not possible to make use of production data for 1998 as 
these are not available on a basis consistent with the trade 
data used. Accordingly data for 1996 (i.e. the last full year 
before the crisis) are used throughout. 
1
8 The average annual growth rate of exports, in value, 
between 1991 and 1996 was 16% and for imports 7%. 92 - CHAPTER 1 
exports and imports would have continued to grow in 
1997 and 1998 at the same average rate as observed in 
the five years prior to the crisis. This permits the 
calculation of "expected" values of exports and 
imports for 1998. The differences between the 
expected and observed outcomes provide an additional 
measure of the direct trade impact of the crisis. 
Details of the estimated impact for individual 
industries using the first two methodologies are shown 
in Table 1.7. The changes to exports and imports and 
the trade balance are expressed as a percentage of 1996 
production levels. Results for the third methodology 
("expected values"), are shown in Table 1.8. Each 
table shows both the difference between the expected 
and recorded values for 1998 and these differences as a 
share of 1996 production levels. 
As far as the relationship between changes in trade and 
changes to production are concerned, on the one hand, 
it seems reasonable to assume that falls in exports from 
the EU to Southeast Asia represent a direct loss in 
European production. On the other hand, the link 
between imports and European production is more 
tenuous. 
For individual products (or industries), the impact of 
increased imports on European production will depend 
upon the extent that these imported products are in 
competition with European production. It may be that 
increased imports from Southeast Asia, rather than 
displacing European production, displace imports that 
would otherwise have come from elsewhere. 
Alternatively, increases in cheaper imported inputs 
into European production may serve to boost rather 
than diminish production. 
Moreover, globalisation of production implies 
increases in linkages within the production chain 
among firms and production facilities from different 
geographical locations. Particularly for research and 
capital intensive industries, but also for other labour 
intensive industries such as clothing, imported 
products may in fact contain a significant amount of 
domestic (European) content
19. 
As a final point, increased imports from Southeast 
Asia may result from increased demand in Europe that 
domestic production is unable to meet and, hence, do 
not represent a loss of potential market for European 
producers, at least in the short run.
2
0
 
Comparing across the different estimates of the impact 
of the crisis on production for individual industries 
there is little difference across the calculations based 
on actual values and estimated volumes 
(methodologies 1 and 2). For the third methodology, 
based on expected trade values for 1998, the estimated 
negative impacts of falls in exports are greater than for 
the other methodologies. For imports, however, the 
effects tend to be similar to or smaller than those found 
using the other methodologies. Thus, the minimum 
(export effect) and upper bounds (exports and imports) 
for individual industries are generally higher for 
methodology 3 but differences between the two are 
similar to or smaller than those found using the other 
methodologies. 
Considering the impact on individual industries, 
measured as a proportion of production, many of the 
greatest losses from reduced exports are to be found in 
luxury goods industries: 
■ specialised clothing sectors (furs, leather clothes); 
■ leather goods (luggage and handbags, tanning and 
dressing of leather); 
■ miscellaneous manufacturing (jewellery, watches 
and clocks, beverages). 
See OECD (1996). 
If all of the change in exports but only part of the increase 
in imports represents a loss of European production, then 
combining the two figures may overstate the impact of trade 
changes on European production. Thus, for each 
methodology described above, the export effect can be 
considered as a minimum estimate of the direct trade impact 
of the crisis and the trade balance (exports less imports) 
should be viewed as an indicator of the upper bound for the 
estimated direct trade impact of the crisis. CHAPTER 1 - 93 
Table 1.7: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast Asia (methodologies 1 and 2) 
Estimated impact of the crisis on European production by industry, 1996-1998 
High export - high import, exports > imports 
322 TV, and radio transmitters, line telephony 
294 Machine-tools 
311 Electric motors, generators and transformers 
315 Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
262 Ceramic goods 
362 Jewellery and related articles 
192 Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
183 Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 
High export - high import, imports > exports 
300 Office machinery and computers 
182 Other wearing apparel and accessories 
323 TV, radio and recording apparatus 
316 Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
321 Electronic valves and tubes, electronic comp. 
351 Ships and boats 
172 Textile weaving 
366 Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 
334 Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
314 Accumulators, primary cells and batteries 
176 Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
335 Watches and clocks 
363 Musical instruments 
181 Leather clothes 
Export dominant industries 
241 Basic chemicals 
295 Other special purpose machinery 
292 Other general purpose machinery 
271 Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
291 Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
312 Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
211 Pulp, paper and paperboard 
274 Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
353 Aircraft and spacecraft 
246 Other chemical products 
332 Instruments for measuring, checking, etc. 
175 Other textiles 
331 Medical equipment 
313 Isolated wire and cable 
272 Tubes 
283 Steam generators 
352 Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
263 Ceramic tiles and flags 
191 Tanning and dressing of leather 
267 Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
Import dominant Industries 
251 Rubber products 
286 Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
154 Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
193 Footwear 
171 Textile fibres 
201 Sawmilling, planing of wood etc. 
202 Panels and boards of wood 
177 Knitted and crocheted articles 
152 Fish and fish products 
354 Motorcycles and bicycles 
365 Games and toys 
205 Other products of wood 
364 Sports goods 
Other industries 
341 Motor vehicles 
159 Beverages (-) 
343 Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
361 Furniture 
Change In value 
(share of production In 
Exports 
0,3 
-3,4 
-0,7 
-0,4 
-1,7 
-5.7 
-3,7 
-24,2 
0,2 
-0.9 
-0.1 
-0,2 
5,4 
-0,1 
-1.6 
-1,2 
0,9 
-0,2 
0.0 
-3,8 
-1,8 
-2,9 
-0,6 
-3,1 
-1,5 
-1,6 
-0,9 
0,3 
-0,7 
0,5 
4,0 
-0.1 
0.8 
-0.6 
-0,2 
-1,5 
-0,5 
-0,7 
1,0 
-1,1 
-6,0 
-2,2 
-0.3 
-0,6 
0,8 
-0.8 
-0,3 
0,6 
0.1 
-0.7 
-0,4 
-0,2 
-0,1 
-0,2 
-0,7 
-0.6 
-0.7 
-0.5 
-0,3 
Imports 
0,9 
0,7 
1,2 
0,2 
0,3 
0,3 
0,3 
0,4 
14,7 
1,2 
-1,4 
-0.3 
6.8 
0,3 
0,6 
0,9 
1,7 
0.7 
8,5 
5,8 
-2,3 
-3,6 
0.6 
0.3 
0.1 
1,2 
0,1 
0.3 
0.4 
2,9 
2,6 
0,6 
0.3 
0,3 
0,5 
0,3 
0,2 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0.1 
0,0 
0,7 
0.6 
0,8 
0.2 
0.4 
0,1 
0.6 
1,8 
4,1 
5.8 
-1,8 
0,2 
-1,1 
0.6 
0.0 
0.0 
0,6 
1996,%) 
Trade 
balance 
-0,7 
-4,2 
-1,9 
-0,6 
-2,0 
-6,0 
-4,0 
-24,6 
-14,5 
-2,1 
1,3 
0,1 
-1,4 
-0,4 
-2,1 
-2,0 
-0.8 
-0,9 
-8.5 
-9.6 
0.5 
0.7 
-1.2 
-3.4 
-1,6 
-2,8 
-1,1 
-0,6 
-1,1 
-2,4 
1,4 
-0,7 
0,5 
-0,9 
-0,7 
-1,8 
-0,7 
-0,7 
0,9 
-1,2 
-6,2 
-2,2 
-1,0 
-1,2 
-0,1 
-1,0 
-0,7 
0,5 
-0,5 
-2,5 
-4,4 
-6,0 
1,7 
-0,4 
0,4 
-1,2 
-0,7 
-0,6 
-0,9 
Change in volume 
(share of production 
Exports 
-0,2 
-3,9 
-0,6 
-0,5 
-1,9 
-3,8 
-25,3 
-0,2 
-0,9 
-0,3 
-0,3 
6,3 
-1,7 
-1,2 
2,0 
0,0 
0,1 
1,8 
-1,6 
-3,0 
-0,6 
-3,7 
-1,8 
-1,7 
-1,2 
-0,4 
-0,7 
0,4 
3,5 
-0,3 
0,4 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-1,4 
-0,7 
-1,1 
0,6 
-1,1 
-6,4 
-2,3 
-0,3 
-0,6 
0,8 
-0,9 
-0,3 
0,6 
0,1 
-0,7 
-0,5 
-0,2 
-0,2 
-0.3 
-0,8 
-0,6 
-0,7 
-0,6 
-0,3 
Imports 
0.3 
0,6 
0,9 
0,1 
0,1 
0.0 
0,3 
13,8 
0.4 
-1,6 
0,1 
9.4 
0,4 
0.6 
0.9 
1,1 
8,1 
1,7 
-3,4 
-4,3 
0,5 
0,2 
0,0 
1,1 
0,1 
0,2 
0,4 
2.9 
1,6 
0,5 
0,2 
0.2 
0.4 
0.2 
0.2 
0.0 
0,0 
0,1 
0.1 
0.0 
0,7 
0.4 
1.1 
-0,2 
0,3 
-0,1 
0,4 
0,6 
2,6 
4.8 
-2.3 
-0,1 
-3.2 
0,6 
0.0 
0.0 
0,5 
in 1996%) 
Trade 
balance 
-0,5 
-4.4 
-1.5 
-0,6 
-2,0 
-3.8 
-25,6 
-14,0 
-1.3 
1.3 
-0.4 
-3.1 
-2.1 
-1,8 
1.1 
-1.1 
-8.0 
0.1 
1.7 
1.3 
-1,1 
-3.9 
-1,8 
-2,8 
-1,3 
-0,6 
-1,1 
-2.5 
1.9 
-0.8 
0,2 
-0,9 
-0.7 
-1,7 
-0,9 
-1,1 
0,6 
-1.2 
-6.5 
-2,3 
-1,0 
-1,1 
-0,3 
-0,7 
-0,6 
0,7 
-0.3 
-1,3 
-3,1 
-5.1 
2.0 
-0,2 
2.4 
-1.2 
-0,8 
-0,6 
-0,8 
Source: NEI calculations based on COMEXT, Linda and Panorama. 94 - CHAPTER 1 
Table 1.8: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast Asia (methodology 3) 
Estimated impact of the crisis on trade values and European production by industry 
High export - high import, exports > imports 
322 
294 
311 
315 
262 
362 
192 
183 
TV, and radio transmitters, line telephony 
Machine-tools 
Electric motors, generators and transformers 
Lighting equipment and electric lamps 
Ceramic goods 
Jewellery and related articles 
Luggage, handbags, saddlery and harness 
Dressing and dyeing of fur; articles of fur 
High export - high import, imports > exports 
300 
182 
323 
316 
321 
351 
172 
366 
334 
314 
176 
335 
363 
181 
Export 
241 
295 
292 
271 
291 
312 
211 
274 
353 
246 
332 
175 
331 
313 
272 
283 
352 
263 
191 
267 
Import 
251 
286 
154 
193 
171 
201 
202 
177 
152 
354 
365 
205 
364 
Office machinery and computers 
Other wearing apparel and accessories 
TV, radio and recording apparatus 
Electrical equipment n. e. c. 
Electronic valves and tubes, electronic comp. 
Ships and boats 
Textile weaving 
Miscellaneous manufacturing n. e. c. 
Optical instruments and photographic equipment 
Accumulators, primary cells and batteries 
Knitted and crocheted fabrics 
Watches and clocks 
Musical instruments 
Leather clothes 
dominant industries 
Basic chemicals 
Other special purpose machinery 
Other general purpose machinery 
Basic iron and steel, ferro-alloys (ECSC) 
Machinery for production, use of mech. power 
Electricity distribution and control apparatus 
Pulp, paper and paperboard 
Basic precious and non-ferrous metals 
Aircraft and spacecraft 
Other chemical products 
Instruments for measuring, checking, etc. 
Other textiles 
Medical equipment 
Isolated wire and cable 
Tubes 
Steam generators 
Railway locomotives and rolling stock 
Ceramic tiles and flags 
Tanning and dressing of leather 
Cutting, shaping, finishing of stone 
dominant industries 
Rubber products 
Cutlery, tools and general hardware 
Vegetable and animal oils and fats 
Footwear 
Textile fibres 
Sawmilling, planing of wood etc. 
Panels and boards of wood 
Knitted and crocheted articles 
Fish and fish products 
Motorcycles and bicycles 
Games and toys 
Other products of wood 
Sports goods 
Other industries 
341 
159 
343 
361 
Motor vehicles 
Beverages 
Parts and accessories for motor vehicles 
Furniture 
Exports 
-1963 
-1515 
-934 
-180 
-300 
-854 
-439 
-326 
-692 
-1178 
-541 
-371 
-1102 
-174 
-559 
-172 
-372 
-97 
-66 
-65 
-29 
-24 
-1876 
-4811 
-2759 
-1484 
-1475 
-752 
-643 
-111 
712 
-540 
-326 
-203 
-272 
-640 
-194 
-678 
-36 
-155 
-817 
-272 
-228 
-296 
172 
-373 
-149 
22 
-91 
-156 
-67 
-29 
-22 
-23 
-46 
-2824 
-861 
-893 
-435 
Change In val 
(ECU mio) 
Imports 
-61 
112 
-124 
32 
39 
-153 
88 
5 
3034 
1154 
-413 
-872 
-1501 
27 
99 
177 
38 
-31 
264 
59 
-31 
16 
466 
189 
-377 
855 
-13 
55 
67 
922 
756 
205 
-65 
45 
50 
30 
21 
-1 
2 
10 
8 
3 
-129 
121 
-104 
257 
29 
71 
113 
263 
473 
371 
-46 
23 
-17 
235 
14 
-50 
261 
je 
Trade 
balance 
-1902 
-1626 
-810 
-212 
-339 
-702 
-526 
-331 
-3726 
-2332 
-128 
501 
399 
-201 
-658 
-349 
-410 
-66 
-330 
-124 
2 
-40 
-2342 
-5001 
-2381 
-2339 
-1462 
-807 
-710 
-1033 
-44 
-745 
-261 
-248 
-322 
-670 
-215 
-677 
-37 
-166 
-825 
-275 
-98 
-417 
276 
-631 
-178 
-49 
-204 
-419 
-539 
-400 
24 
-46 
-28 
-3058 
-875 
-843 
-696 
Change as a share of production 
Exports 
-3,9 
-5,5 
-4,2 
-1,7 
-2,9 
-11,2 
-8,7 
-41,9 
-1,2 
-2,3 
-2,0 
-1,4 
-4,7 
-0,9 
-2,9 
-1,9 
-4,4 
-1,9 
-1,8 
-4,7 
-3,4 
-4,3 
-1,2 
-5,3 
-3,3 
-2,0 
-2,2 
-1,2 
-1,2 
-0,2 
1,7 
-1,7 
-1,0 
-1,1 
-1,5 
-3,6 
-1,1 
-5,1 
-0,4 
-2,0 
-11,8 
-4,5 
-0,7 
-1,2 
0,8 
-1,8 
-1,0 
0,2 
-0,7 
-1,4 
-0,6 
-0,4 
-0,4 
-0,4 
-1,6 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-1,2 
-0,7 
in1996(%) 
Imports 
-0,1 
0,4 
-0,6 
0.3 
0,4 
-2.0 
1,7 
0,7 
5,3 
2,3 
-1,5 
-3,2 
-6,4 
0,1 
0,5 
1,9 
0,4 
-0,6 
7,3 
4,3 
-3,6 
2,7 
0,3 
0,2 
-0,5 
1,2 
0,0 
0,1 
0,1 
2,1 
1,8 
0,6 
-0,2 
0,2 
0,3 
0,2 
0,1 
0,0 
0,0 
0,1 
0,1 
0,0 
-0,4 
0,5 
-0,5 
1,2 
0,2 
0,6 
0,9 
2,3 
4,3 
5,5 
-0,7 
0,4 
-0,6 
0,1 
0,0 
-0,1 
0,4 
Trade 
balance 
-3,8 
-5,9 
-3,7 
-2,0 
-3,3 
-9,2 
-10,4 
-42,5 
-6,5 
-4,6 
-0,5 
1,8 
1,7 
-1,0 
-3,4 
-3,8 
-4,8 
-1,3 
-9,2 
-9,0 
0,2 
-7,0 
-1,5 
-5,5 
-2,9 
-3,2 
-2,2 
-1,2 
-1,3 
-2,3 
-0,1 
-2,3 
-0,8 
-1,3 
-1,8 
-3,8 
-1,2 
-5,1 
-0,4 
-2,1 
-11,9 
-4,5 
-0,3 
-1,6 
1,2 
-3,0 
-1,2 
-0,4 
-1,7 
-3,7 
-4,9 
-6,0 
0,4 
-0,9 
-1,0 
-1,2 
-1,1 
-1,1 
-1,1 
Source: NEI calculations and estimates based on COMEXT, Linda and Panorama. CHAPTER 1 - 95 
For engineering industries, falls in exports as a share 
of production are relatively large for machine tools and 
special purpose machinery irrespective of the 
methodology used. However, taking into account 
expected growth in exports (methodology 3) a much 
greater number of industries are found to have had 
suffered large losses in production. 
In terms of increased imports as a share of production, 
a number of individual industries stand out: 
■ office machinery and computers, for which it is 
noticeable that the increase in imports is 
significantly less when using expected measure of 
imports; 
■ electronic components, for which a large increase 
in imports as a share of production is found using 
actual values for 1996 and 1998, but for which the 
value of imports is estimated to be below its 
expected value for 1998. 
■ knitted and crocheted fabrics; 
■ basic iron and steel, and basic precious metals; 
■ fish and fish products; 
■ motorcycles and bicycles. 
In terms of the aggregate impact on aggregate 
manufacturing production as whole (see Table 1.9), 
this is smallest when calculated using the actual 
differences in values between 1996 and 1998 
(methodology 1 ) and highest when using the difference 
between expected and actual values for 1998 
(methodology 3). Overall, the analysis suggests that 
the direct trade impact of the crisis represented a loss 
of around 0.4% of European production with an upper 
bound somewhere in excess of 1% of European 
production. To place this figure in perspective, during 
the 1990s the average absolute annual change in 
manufacturing production was 3.0% in volume and 
4.5% in value. In 1993, the low point of the last 
recession, manufacturing production fell by 3.3% in 
volume and 4.5% in value. 
Overall the analysis indicates a rather diverse pattern 
of production effects across industries. Nonetheless 
some important findings do appear to stand out. First, 
luxuiy goods industries stand out as being hit hardest 
in terms of the potential impact on production, 
especially furs and leather industries. Second, 
engineering industries also appear to have been highly 
exposed to the crisis, especially taking into account the 
loss of potential growth of exports to the Southeast 
Asia region. Third, basic metals industries appear to 
have been exposed to the crisis, not only as a result of 
lost exports but also from increased imports from the 
region. 
Table 1.9: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast 
Asia (Estimated aggregate impact of the crisis on 
European manufacturing production) 
Method 1 : 
actual values 
Method 2: 
estimated volumes 
Method 3: 
expected values 
Change as a share of production in 1996 
Exports 
(lower bound) 
-0.36 
-0.44 
-1.18 
Imports 
0.66 
0.59 
0.22 
Trade balance 
(upper bound) 
-1.03 
-1.02 
-1.40 
Note: Total manufacturing production has been calculated on the 
basis of production for those industries covered by the analysis and 
excludes some industries with no recorded trade. For volume 
changes total manufacturing excludes, also, those industries for 
which no price information is available. 
Source: NEI calculations 
The analysis of the aggregate impact of the crisis on 
manufacturing suggests that it was equivalent to a loss 
of between a half to one percent of aggregate 
production. Moreover, as the impact of the crisis is not 
concentrated in sectors with high labour shares 
relative to the value of production, there is little 
reason to believe that the aggregate impact of the 
crisis on employment will be significantly greater than 
that found for production. 
6. The impact of the crisis by Member 
State 
In 1996, in most EU Member States exports destined 
to Southeast Asia accounted for between 10% and 
16% of their respective total extra-EU exports (except 
for Greece, Portugal, Spain and Austria, where the 
share was between 5% and 9%). For most Member 
States the share of Southeast Asia in total extra-EU 
imports was between 9% and 12%, with lower shares 
for Italy, Finland and Austria (less than 8%) and 
higher shares for the United Kingdom, the Netherlands 
and Ireland (above 15%). 
The relative importance of the Southeast Asia region 
for Member States extra-EU trade can be seen from 
Table 1.10, which shows the value of trade with the 
region by Member State and an indicator of the 
regional specialisation of trade. 96 - CHAPTER 1 
Table 1.10: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast Asia, 1996 and 1998 
Exports 
1996 1998 
Imports 
1996 1998 
Trade Balance 
1996 1998 
France 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Netherlands 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Germany 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Italy 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
United Kingdom 
ECU bn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Ireland 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Denmark 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Greece 
ECU bn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Portugal 
ECU bn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Spain 
ECU bn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Sweden 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Finland 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
Austria 
ECUbn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
EU 
ECU bn 
Region Specialisation (index) 
Sector Exposure (%) 
10.90 
0.99 
40.0 
3.17 
0.95 
51.1 
4.27 
1.13 
56.9 
21.79 
1.01 
63.6 
11.26 
1.04 
71.3 
11.31 
1.15 
52.5 
1.46 
1.16 
34.2 
1.14 
0.82 
45.1 
0.12 
0.28 
69.6 
0.22 
0.49 
32.6 
2.38 
0.72 
62.0 
3.33 
0.93 
53.2 
2.01 
1.15 
53.6 
1.12 
0.57 
52.7 
74.5 
1.00 
56.8 
11.29 
1.20 
30.6 
2.74 
0.91 
53.9 
3.42 
1.18 
45.2 
17.40 
0.94 
54.6 
6.89 
0.83 
66.4 
11.27 
1.32 
45.6 
1.78 
1.21 
33.5 
1.06 
0.92 
32.9 
0.09 
0.24 
42.5 
0.16 
0.47 
36.8 
1.42 
0.61 
48.0 
2.55 
0.94 
40.7 
1.46 
0.96 
53.2 
0.88 
0.51 
48.4 
62.4 
1.00 
47.5 
6.71 
0.81 
49.47 
3.00 
0.80 
38.7 
9.06 
1.47 
59.1 
15.81 
0.96 
46.6 
4.13 
0.64 
53.8 
15.46 
1.26 
48.8 
1.91 
1.67 
69.0 
1.03 
0.89 
47.2 
0.98 
1.29 
32.4 
0.60 
1.05 
29.4 
2,28 
0.89 
49.7 
1.47 
0.77 
44.1 
0.59 
0.68 
45.8 
0.78 
0.50 
49.7 
63.8 
1.00 
49.7 
9.25 
0.84 
43.44 
4.00 
0.78 
48.6 
14.05 
1.63 
70.7 
18.12 
0.84 
48.4 
5.93 
0.71 
52.9 
21.18 
1.24 
57.9 
3.36 
1.70 
63.4 
1.40 
0.96 
39.6 
1.13 
1.19 
33.0 
0.70 
0.89 
35.8 
3.64 
1.02 
47.2 
1.64 
0.72 
44.6 
0.70 
0.63 
35.0 
0.85 
0.42 
48.1 
85.9 
1.00 
54.1 
4.20 
0.17 
-4.79 
5.98 
7.13 
-4.14 
-0.45 
0.12 
-0.85 
-0.38 
0.10 
1.86 
1.43 
0.35 
10.7 
2.04 
-1.27 
-10.62 
-0.71 
0.95 
-9.90 
-1.58 
-0.34 
-1.04 
-0.53 
-2.22 
0.91 
0.76 
0.02 
-23.5 
Note: The calculations exclude trade in "other manufactured" goods that are not assigned to a specific industry or sector. For this 
reason, EU trade balances shown in Table 1.10 do not match exactly those shown in Table 1.4. 
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The indicator of specialisation is defined as the share 
of each Member States trade (exports or imports) to 
Southeast Asia in total extra-EU trade to the region, 
normalised by dividing by the Member States share in 
total extra-EU trade. A value of the indicator greater 
than one indicate that the Member State is relatively 
specialised in trade with the region. Finally, for each 
Member State, the aggregate share of total exports and 
imports for those sectors containing a high proportion 
of industries identified as being most adversely 
affected by the crisis is shown. 
For this indicator, denoted as "sector exposure", the 
relevant sectors are defined as: textiles, wearing 
apparel and furs etc., leather and leather products, 
pulp, paper and paper products, chemicals, basic 
metals, machinery and equipment, office machinery 
and computers, and motor vehicles. 
Among Member States, the United Kingdom, the 
Netherlands and Ireland are revealed as being 
relatively specialised in trade to Southeast Asia, both 
for exports and imports and both prior to the crisis and 
in 1998. The latter two countries and also France saw 
their relative specialisation increase between 1996 and 
1998. Spain, Greece, Portugal and Austria are found to 
have the lowest specialisation of exports to the 
Southeast Asia region but, with the exception of 
Austria, have a higher degree of specialisation for 
imports from the region. 
Between 1996 and 1998 all Member States with the 
exception of France and Ireland saw the value of their 
manufacturing exports to the Southeast Asia region 
fall, the greatest percentage falls being recorded by 
Spain and Italy (see Table 1.11, actual changes). 
Imports increased for all Member States but growth 
rates were highest for Ireland, Spain, the Netherlands 
and Italy. 
With the exception of Greece, Portugal and Belgium-
Luxembourg, falls in the machinery and equipment 
sector made a significant contribution to overall falls 
in exports for all Member States. For countries 
relatively specialised in the export of textiles, clothing 
and leather products (Spain, Italy and Portugal) these 
sectors also made a significant contribution to the 
aggregate drop in exports. Declines in exports of 
chemicals were important for the Netherlands and 
Greece as were falling exports of basic metals, which 
were also important for Belgium-Luxembourg, Spain, 
Sweden and Finland. Motor vehicles made an 
important contribution to aggregate falls in exports 
from Germany, Spain and Sweden. 
Table 1.11: EU manufacturing trade with Southeast 
Asia, 1996 and 1998 (actual and adjusted changes 
to exports and imports) 
France 
Belgium-Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Germany 
Italy 
United Kingdom 
Ireland 
Denmark 
Greece 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Finland 
Austria 
Exports 
% change 
Actual 
3.5 
-13.5 
-19.8 
-20.1 
-38.8 
-0.3 
21.7 
-7.4 
-26.7 
-26.5 
-40.2 
-23.5 
-27.7 
-22.1 
1996-1998 
Adjusted 
-1.5 
-20.1 
-14.7 
-19.8 
-26.8 
-14.4 
3.8 
-16.9 
-24.9 
-6.0 
-20.4 
-15.6 
-15.6 
-19.7 
Imports 
% change 1996-1998 
Actual 
37.9 
33.6 
55.1 
14.6 
43.9 
37.0 
75.4 
36.7 
15.6 
16.0 
59.6 
11.8 
19.0 
9.8 
Adjusted'
1 
.ï 3. S 
28.1 
37.7 
33.6 
36.0 
34.1 
43.3 
32.1 
56.3 
27.3 
37.4 
28.8 
29.3 
32.1 
" Using actual weights (sector shares in total extra-EU imports and 
exports in 1996) for the Member State concerned but assuming 
average EU growth rates (1996-1998). 
Source: COMEXT, NEI calculations. 
Increased imports within the chemicals sector made an 
important contribution to the overall increase in 
manufacturing imports for France, Belgium-
Luxembourg, Spain and Italy. Increased imports of 
basic metals were important for Belgium-Luxembourg, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and Spain. Imports of office 
machinery and computers were particularly important 
for Ireland and the Netherlands, where they accounted 
for two fifths of the total increase in imports from 
Southeast Asia between 1996 and 1998. Increased 
imports of office machinery and computers were also 
important for Germany, the United Kingdom and 
Austria. Motor vehicles made an important 
contribution to aggregate increases in imports for Italy, 
Spain, Greece and Portugal.
2
1 
The analysis of trade values" does indicate that the 
sector specialisation of exports was an important 
contributing factor to aggregate falls in the value 
manufacturing exports to Southeast Asia for Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Sweden, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg 
and Portugal. Concerning Italy and Spain an even 
For individual Member States that, for example, suffered 
greater percentage falls in their exports (or increases in 
imports) relative to other Member States, the falls may be 
due to the fact that the country is specialised in exports 
(imports) from industries most adversely affected by the 
crisis. Alternatively, it may simply be that exports from the 
industries of a Member State performed worse (i.e. suffered 
large percentage falls) than the same industries elsewhere in 
the EU. 
The analysis of effects by country has been undertaken 
using trade values rather than volumes and it is possible that 
different results would have been obtained using the latter 
basis of measurement. 98 - CHAPTER 1 
stronger negative effect came through the poor 
performance of individual industries relative to the EU 
as a whole. 
The analogue effect through import specialisation is 
much weaker. 
7. Conclusions 
Viewed from the perspective of European industries, 
the crisis in Southeast Asia represents an exogenous 
shock that reduced aggregate demand for its products 
and influenced their relative price competitiveness. In 
this sense, the analysis contained in this chapter differs 
from the main body of this report, in that it is 
concerned with exogenous rather than endogenously 
driven changes to European industry. The analysis is 
also, relatively speaking, short-run. The data used only 
cover the period up to the end of 1998, thus only a year 
a half of data is available since the crisis began and 
even less since the impact on European trade became 
clearly visible. 
The shortness of the period should also be borne in 
mind when considering the conclusions that may be 
drawn from the analysis. In the longer term, the 
prospects for European trade with Southeast Asia will 
depend, in part, on the strength of recovery which 
seems to be underway in the region
2
3 and its future 
prospects. Moreover, industries within Southeast Asia 
have as a result of the crisis been forced to undertake 
major restructuring of production. Ultimately, if this 
restructuring is orientated towards enhancing the 
competitiveness and export capacity of industries in 
the region, it may have a more pronounced influence 
on European trade than has already been observed. 
1. At a macroeconomic level, the apparent impact of 
the crisis in Southeast Asia on aggregate growth in 
developed countries, with the exception of Japan, 
has been limited. Domestic growth in North 
America and Europe offset the negative impacts of 
the crisis on these regions. For manufactured 
goods, the dominant component of trade with the 
region, the EU trade balance with Southeast Asia 
fell dramatically between 1996 and 1998, from a 
surplus of ECU 1 lbn to a deficit of 23bn. Despite 
this decline, and declines with respect to Japan and 
China, the EU maintained a healthy trade surplus 
in manufactured goods of ECU 105bn in 1998. 
See International Monetary Fund (1999). 
2. The analysis of changes in the revealed 
comparative advantage (RCA) of EU industries 
tends to confirm the finding that the crisis in 
Southeast Asia has tended to reinforce the existing 
relative trade position of EU industries with 
respect to the region. Those industries with either 
a stable high or a low RCA ranking prior to the 
crisis did not for the most part see significant 
changes in their ranking. However, more 
technically sophisticated research intensive 
industries do appear to have suffered the least 
from the effects of the crisis. 
3. Four industries are found to have had large 
decreases in their trade balances with Southeast 
Asia and a significant deterioration in their RCA 
ranking for trade with the region. The change in 
the RCA ranking for pulp and paper, as is the case 
for iron and steel, came about as a result both of 
the collapse in exports and a surge in imports from 
Southeast Asia. The deterioration in the RCA 
ranking of the beverages industry was driven 
almost exclusively by the collapse in exports, as 
imports from the Southeast Asia region are 
virtually insignificant. Finally, for the fish 
products industry, it is the increase in imports 
rather than falling exports that has been 
responsible for the change in Europe's revealed 
comparative advantage vis-à-vis Southeast Asia. 
For this industry, however, the increase in 
European imports from Southeast Asia was part of 
a much greater increase in total European imports, 
suggesting that the change may not entirely be due 
to the crisis. 
4. The impact of the crisis on aggregate European 
manufacturing production is found to relatively 
small. Overall the effects of the crisis is estimated 
to a loss between 0.4% and 1.4% (upper bound) of 
manufacturing production. Although this figure is 
not trivial is does not indicate a major crisis for the 
EU. Moreover, there seems little reason to expect 
a more pronounced effect on employment than 
that for production. However the aggregate impact 
is found to be highly concentrated in a relatively 
small group of sectors: machinery and equipment, 
motor vehicles, chemicals and basic metals. 
5. The analysis of the impact on production for 
individual industries indicates a rather diverse 
pattern, both in terms of the overall effect and the 
relative importance of changes to exports and 
imports. Luxury goods industries (furs, tanning of 
leather, luggage and handbags etc., jewellery) 
appear to have been hardest hit in terms of the 
impact on production. Engineering industries also 
appear to have been highly sensitive to the crisis, CHAPTER 1 - 99 
especially when taking into account the loss of 
potential growth of exports to Southeast Asia. 
Basic metals industries appear to have been highly 
exposed to the crisis, not only as a result of lost 
exports but also from increased imports from the 
region. 
6. Sector specialisation of exports appear to have 
been an important contributing factor to aggregate 
falls in the value manufacturing exports to 
Southeast Asia for Germany, Italy, Spain, Sweden, 
Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg and Portugal. 
Among these countries, the specialisation of 
exports for Italy and Spain appears to have had a 
smaller influence than the poor performance of 
individual industries relative to the performance of 
the same industries for the EU as a whole. For 
imports, it is less evident that the Member States' 
specialisation of imports (prior to the crisis) was 
an important factor in determining growth rates for 
the value of imports from Southeast Asia between 
1996 and 1998. 
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Annex 1.1: Potential trade related effects of the crisis on European industry 
Given the impacts of the crisis on global trade and growth, the potential effects for European industries may be categorised as 
follows: direct trade effects stemming from trade with affected regions, indirect effects resulting from trade diversion and, finally, 
effects resulting from the slowdown in global economic growth. 
The main negative direct trade-related effects (i.e. effects resulting from bilateral trade with the region) that may be expected as a 
result of the crisis in Southeast Asia may be summarised as follows: 
■ lower demand for European exports in crisis-hit countries as a result of the collapse in demand and increased price 
competitiveness of domestic producers due to the devaluation of local currencies; 
■ increased imports into the EU from crisis-hit countries as a result of local producers giving a higher priority to exporting in 
order to counter depressed activity in the region and alleviate excess supply; supported by increased competitiveness from lower 
exchange rates. 
To these may be added the following indirect trade related effects: 
■ increased imports from third countries that divert exports from the crisis affected countries to European markets; 
■ increased competition in other foreign markets due to both exports from the affected region and from third countries diverting 
trade away from the affected region; 
■ lower demand for European exports in commodity exporting countries as a result of reductions in their incomes brought about 
lower world prices of raw materials and, also, intermediate goods. 
As far as the direct trade effects of the crisis are concerned there are a number of offsetting factors that could be expected to work 
towards limiting the possible expansion of imports from Southeast Asia and to reduce the impact of Asia's initial price 
competitiveness gains: 
■ the lack of foreign exchange to buy necessary foreign inputs into production, the share of which is quite high in final output of 
Asian products, could push Asian export prices up; 
■ the lack of domestic financial resources (e.g. subsidies and export credits) may constrain possible increases of exports and 
export-orientated production capacity; 
■ rising inflation in Asia will partially eliminate Asia's initial price competitiveness gains. 
Moreover, not all of the potential trade effects that may be expected as a result of the crisis are negative. Among the potentially 
positive trade related effects that could come about as a result of the crisis are the following: 
■ European consumers may benefit from lower prices for imported consumer goods and imported for oil products, this implies 
higher real incomes of European consumers that may in turn stimulate demand for EU manufactured goods; 
■ European industries may benefit from lower input costs due to falling prices for imported raw materials and other goods, which 
may boost their competitiveness. 
Notwithstanding the above offsetting factors and positive effects, the crisis can be expected to have an overall negative impact on the 
trade balance of European industries with respect to the Southeast Asia region. The direct trade impact of the crisis in Southeast Asia 
could affect European industries either through a reduction in exports or as a result of increased imports from the region displacing 
domestic production destined for European markets. In principle, the industries that may be expect to be the most adversely affected 
by the crisis are those with high levels of exports to or imports from Southeast Asia. But the absolute levels of trade flows are not the 
only factor that will determine whether individual industries may be thought to be more or less sensitive to the crisis. To the extent 
that the sensitivity of industries can be thought of in terms of the potential impact on production and/or employment, European 
industries may be considered to be sensitive to the direct trade effects of the crisis because: 
■ A high proportion of production and/or employment is dedicated to exports to affected markets. A priori, industries for which 
the Southeast Asia region represented an important destination for production (high export ratio) or a high share of total exports, 
may be expected to be particularly sensitive to a collapse in demand in the region. 
■ A high proportion of the domestic market is exposed to imports from the affected region (high import penetration). Industries 
that sell to EU markets that already have high import penetration by Southeast Asia may be expected to be more sensitive to the 
crisis. High import penetration by products from Southeast Asia can be taken as an indicator of their ability to compete on 
European markets and gain market share. 
Other characteristics of traded products may, also, influence the sensitivity of individual industries to the crisis.
a
 
Industries may be thought to be additionally sensitive to the crisis because: 
• The products exported by the industry have a high-income elasticity of demand and accordingly are likely to be hit harder by a collapse in 
demand in the Asian region than industries producing products for which demand is relatively income inelastic. 
• The industry produces exports for which price is an important component in competitiveness (high price elasticity of demand). Given that the 
change in relative exchange rates implies an increase in the price of European exports relative to local production, such products may be 
expected to be more adversely affected than those for which other attributes are more important in determining demand. 
• The products sold by the industry on European markets have a high price elasticity of demand and are in competition with imports from the 
Asian region. Again, the change in relative exchange rates in favour of Southeast Asian producers should have a greater impact on the 
competitiveness of imports than for price inelastic products. 
• The industry is dependent on inputs into the production process coming from the affected region. This may have a positive impact if imported 
inputs become cheaper or. alternatively, if supply constraints arise there may be a negative impact on European industries. 
• The industry is in competition with producers from the affected region who are unable to adjust capacity in response to the fall in local demand 
and are therefore more likely to seek to push their export levels. European Commission 
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